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 Abstract 
 
 
Around the world, plantation economies are on the rise. Increasing con-
cerns over food, energy, and financial security combined with a geopolitical 
restructuring of the global agro-food system have led to a new wave and 
rush to secure control over resources. Corporate-controlled agro-industrial 
complexes – from seed to silo – have extended their reach geographically 
and produced new spaces for capital to penetrate, circulate, and accumulate. 
New actors and forms of capital penetration have entered the countryside, 
transforming the forms and relations of production, property and power. 
Soybeans, with industrial inputs ‘upstream’ and storage, processing and 
transportation ‘downstream’, have become a quintessential agro-industrial 
‘flex crop’, used as feed, food, fuel and industrial materials. This study ana-
lyzes how and the extent to which the development and expansion of the 
soy complex in Bolivia is transforming the countryside. New processes of 
productive exclusion have emerged, value-chain control and appropriation 
have materialized, and the very extractive character of the soy complex has 
severe implications for society, the economy and the environment. These 
dynamics of agrarian change are not unique to Bolivia nor the soy complex, 
but characteristic of the broader changes taking place in the global agro-
food system dominated by agro-industrial complexes.  
This study puts forth an analytical framework referred to as the politics of 
control which captures the new forms and mechanisms of resource control 
and value appropriation (or extraction) through an analysis of access rather 
than property or concessional rights. An analysis into the new forms of con-
trol contributes to a better understanding of class formation, differentiation, 
and class consciousness. These new forms of control are conceptualized as 
‘productive exclusion’ and ‘value-chain control’. The politics of control also 
requires an analysis into the role and nature of the capitalist state. The stra-
tegic relations among state and societal actors in gaining and maintaining 
control over the state apparatus are analyzed in the context of the need to 
balance the social contradictions of capitalism which entail facilitating the 
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conditions for accumulation and social legitimacy. Understanding these 
complex relations through the ‘state-society-capital nexus’ helps us concep-
tually to grasp the relations and interactions among elected and non-elected 
state managers and the various class fractions of labour and capital in their 
historic contexts. 
This analysis of Bolivia’s soy complex is explored within its broader 
three-pronged neo-extractivist development strategy based on minerals, hy-
drocarbons, and soybeans. Within this neo-extractivist model, the soy com-
plex is characterized as a type of ‘agrarian extractivism’, revealing the very 
extractivist social, economic and environmental dynamics associated with 
soybean production in Santa Cruz. ‘Agrarian extractivism’ not only reveals 
the extractive dynamics of capitalist industrial agriculture, it also challenges 
dominant discourses legitimating this form of production as a means to 
achieve rural development and food security. Within the context of Bolivia’s 
first indigenous president, Evo Morales, and the Movement Towards Social-
ism (MAS) as a ‘government of social movements’, fundamental contradic-
tions abound. 
This study ultimately argues that the new forms and mechanisms of con-
trol and extraction which characterize the soy complex are leading to a trun-
cated trajectory of agrarian change where the rural majority are excluded 
from accessing the means of production without prospects for labour ab-
sorption elsewhere. The soy complex has rendered the Bolivian economy 
and society vulnerable to volatile commodity prices, threatening their food 
security with an increased dependence on food imports. The forms of ex-
clusion and control require farmers to bear the risks of production while the 
corporate-controlled market oligopoly appropriates the majority of the value 
produced. While the majority of the excluded smallholders have maintained 
formal ownership over their land, this trajectory is not a pre-determined 
outcome but will depend on the balance of forces in society and the con-
tested relations within the state-society-capital nexus.  
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De Politiek van Controle:  
Een nieuwe dynamiek van agrarische verandering  
in het sojacomplex van Bolivia 
 Samenvatting 
 
 
In de hele wereld zijn plantage-economieën in opkomst. Toenemende be-
zorgdheid over voedsel, energie en financiële zekerheid heeft in combinatie 
met een geopolitieke herstructurering van de wereldwijde agro-foodsector 
geleid tot een nieuwe golf van actoren die hun controle over natuurlijke 
hulpbronnen willen veiligstellen. Agro-industriële complexen – van zaad tot 
silo – in handen van bedrijven hebben hun geografische reikwijdte vergroot 
en nieuwe plaatsen gecreëerd waarin kapitaal kan doordringen, circuleren, en 
groeien. Nieuwe actoren en vormen van penetratie van kapitaal hebben hun 
intrede gedaan op het platteland en de productiewijzen, vormen van bezit 
en machtsrelaties getransformeerd. Sojabonen zijn een typisch agro-
industrieel ‘flex crop’ (multi-inzetbaar gewas) dat wordt gebruikt als veevoer, 
voedsel, brandstof en wordt toegepast in industriële materialen, met ‘up-
stream’ industriële activiteiten en ‘downstream’ opslag, verwerking en 
vervoer. Dit is een onderzoek naar hoe en in welke mate de ontwikkeling en 
expansie van het sojacomplex in Bolivia het platteland transformeert. Er 
ontstaan nieuwe prosessen van uitsluiting van productie, er is sprake van 
controle over de waardeketen en toe-eigening, en het zeer extractieve karak-
ter van het sojacomplex heeft ernstige implicaties voor de samenleving, de 
economie en het milieu. Deze dynamiek van agrarische verandering doet 
zich niet uitsluitend in Bolivia of in het sojacomplex voor, maar weerspiegelt 
de bredere veranderingen die plaatsvinden in de wereldwijde agro-
foodsector die gedomineerd wordt door agro-industriële complexen.  
 Het analytisch kader van dit onderzoek wordt aangeduid als de politiek 
van controle en binnen dit kader worden de nieuwe vormen en mechanismen 
van controle over natuurlijke hulpbronnen en toe-eigening van waarde (of 
extractie, d.w.z. overexploitatie) zichtbaar door middel van onderzoek naar 
toegang in plaats van bezit of concessies. Onderzoek naar de nieuwe vor-
men van controle draagt bij aan een beter begrip van klassevorming, -
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differentiatie en klassebewustzijn. Voor deze nieuwe vormen van controle 
zijn de begrippen ‘uitsluiting van productie’ en ‘controle over de waarde-
keten’ bedacht. De politiek van controle vraagt ook om een onderzoek naar de 
rol en aard van de kapitalistische samenleving. De strategische relaties tus-
sen de overheid en maatschappelijke actoren bij het krijgen en handhaven 
van controle over het overheidsapparaat worden onderzocht tegen de ach-
tergrond van de noodzaak om de balans te zoeken in de sociale tegens-
trijdigheden van het kapitalisme, waarin zowel accumulatie als sociale legiti-
miteit vergemakkelijkt worden. Een beter begrip van deze complexe relaties 
door middel van het dwarsverband ‘staat-samenleving-kapitaal’ helpt bij het 
in kaart brengen van de relaties en interacties tussen gekozen en niet-
gekozen hoge ambtenaren en de verschillende groeperingen binnen de klas-
sen arbeid en kapitaal in hun historische context. 
 Het Boliviaanse sojacomplex wordt onderzocht binnen de bredere drie-
ledige neo-extractivistische ontwikkelingsstrategie van Bolivia met de com-
ponenten mineralen, koolwaterstoffen en sojabonen. Binnen dit neo-
extractivistische model wordt het sojacomplex gekenmerkt door ‘agrarisch 
extractivisme’, waarmee het zeer extractivistische karakter van de productie 
van sojabonen in Santa Cruz en de implicaties op sociaal, economisch en 
milieugebied worden belicht. De term ‘agrarisch extractivisme’ wijst niet 
alleen op de extractieve dynamiek van de kapitalistische landbouwindustrie, 
maar hiermee wordt ook het dominante discours ter discussie gesteld waarin 
deze vorm van productie wordt gelegitimeerd als middel om te zorgen voor 
plattelandsontwikkeling en voedselzekerheid. Nu Bolivia met Evo Morales 
voor het eerst een inheemse president heeft, en de Beweging naar het So-
cialisme (MAS) het land bestuurt als ‘regering van sociale bewegingen’, zijn 
er fundamentele tegenstrijdigheden te over. 
 Het onderzoek eindigt met de conclusie dat de nieuwe vormen en mech-
anismen van controle en extractie die kenmerkend zijn voor het 
sojacomplex leiden tot een beknot traject van agrarische verandering waarbij 
de rurale meerderheid geen toegang krijgt tot de productiemiddelen en geen 
zicht heeft op toetreding tot een ander deel van de arbeidsmarkt. Door het 
sojacomplex zijn de Boliviaanse economie en samenleving gevoelig ge-
worden voor sterk fluctuerende grondstoffenprijzen, en een toegenomen 
afhankelijkheid van voedselinvoer bedreigt de voedselzekerheid. Met deze 
vormen van uitsluiting en controle dragen boeren de productierisico’s terwijl 
de geproduceerde waarde grotendeels bij de door bedrijven gecontroleerde 
oligopolistische markt terechtkomt. Hoewel de meerderheid van de buiten-
gesloten kleine boeren nog steeds formeel de eigenaar van hun grond is, 
staat het resultaat van dit traject niet bij voorbaat vast, maar is het 
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afhankelijk van het maatschappelijk krachtenveld en de gespannen relaties 
binnen het dwarsverband staat-samenleving-kapitaal.  
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1 Introduction 
 
 
1.1 Introduction 
There has been a geopolitical restructuring of the global agro-food sys-
tem, as transnational capital not only flows through new geographies but 
has created new spaces for capital accumulation. The rise of emerging 
economies such as Brazil, Russia, India, China, South Africa (BRICS) 
and some Middle-Income Countries (MICs) and the recent convergence 
of crises around food prices, peak oil, finance and climate change have 
fuelled increasing demands for ‘flex crops’, commodities and invest-
ments in and around plantation agriculture. These changing global dy-
namics have important implications for the agricultural sector, rural live-
lihoods, food security, the environment, and national development. 
Industrial value-chain agriculture has become the dominant model for 
rural development, spreading around the world and promoted by the 
most influential international development institutions such as the World 
Bank. The rise of Brazil as a global agricultural power fuelled by growing 
global demands for agro-commodities led by China in particular, and 
shaped by new forms and relations of production associated with agro-
industrial complexes have significant implications for agrarian transfor-
mations around the world. 
Soybeans have been at the center of these agrarian transformations as 
one of the world’s most important crops in terms of land use, trade and 
production value, and as a quintessential ‘flex’ crop with its multiple and 
flexible uses as food, feed, fuel, and industrial materials (Oliveira and 
Schneider 2016). Soybean plantations have expanded and engulfed vast 
swaths of land across Latin America’s Southern Cone – now the world’s 
leading producer and exporter of the oilseed crop. In the Latin American 
context, the politics of land and agricultural development have become 
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intricately tied to a global agro-industrial soy complex1 with soybean ex-
pansion developing rapidly, yet unevenly, across the Southern Cone since 
the 1970s. New actors and forms of capital penetration in the country-
side associated with the soy complex, and with a rush for natural re-
sources more generally, have prompted debates as to whether such rising 
global interests in farmland and agro-commodities represent threats or 
opportunities for rural development (Deininger and Byerlee 2011; Borras 
and Franco 2010). On the one hand, several pull factors have encour-
aged many peasants and small-scale farmers to cultivate genetically-
modified (GM) soybean monocultures, including a commodities boom 
which led to favourable soybean prices as well as discourses of moderni-
zation and progress. On the other hand, push factors such as soil con-
tamination due to airplane fumigation and river run-off, unfavourable 
domestic market conditions, and economic and extra-economic forms of 
dispossession have forced many to either abandon their lands and mi-
grate to urban areas, search for employment as wage labourers in rural 
areas, transition to capital-intensive agricultural production, or various 
combinations thereof. These processes of agrarian change are not unique 
to soybean production, but common characteristics of agro-industrial 
expansion throughout the world. Dominant discourses based on the 
need to feed a growing population, to end rural poverty and provide op-
portunities for the rural poor to escape the drudgery of peasant farming, 
to modernize production by engineering seeds which can produce in 
abundance on less favourable soil and climatic conditions are widespread 
and continue to shape official policy agendas of international develop-
ment institutions and national governments. This study engages with 
these debates and challenges such dominant discourses through an inves-
tigation of the politics and processes of agrarian change in the context of 
the development and expansion of the agro-industrial soy complex in 
Bolivia.  
Perhaps better known as a producer of quinoa and coca – and for its 
progressive political regime headed by the country’s first indigenous 
president Evo Morales and the Movement Towards Socialism (Movimien-
to al Socialismo, MAS) who assumed state power in 2006 – Bolivia is one 
of the top ten soybean producers in the world. Soybeans have become 
Bolivia’s main agricultural crop, one of its top three exports and a pillar 
of its three-pronged extractivist development model along with minerals 
and hydrocarbons. The oilseed crop has transformed the country’s land-
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scape, replacing traditional crops and forested lands, and has significantly 
changed the forms and relations of production. In the context of a 
changing international political economy of food and agriculture, this 
study investigates the ways in which the development and expansion of 
the agro-industrial soy complex in Bolivia are transforming agrarian so-
cial relations in the eastern lowlands of Santa Cruz including the diverse 
socio-economic and environmental implications and the politics behind 
these processes. The particularities of agro-industry’s penetration into 
Bolivia have significant implications for rural development and can serve 
to illuminate our broader understanding of agro-industrial development 
more generally. To understand the politics behind these processes and 
the new forms of control over natural and productive resources an ana-
lytical framework is developed, referred to as the politics of control.  
1.2 Contemporary dynamics of agrarian change:  
context and problematique 
It may seem odd that the first year in human history in which the majori-
ty of the world’s population was more urban than rural, the Word Bank 
decided to focus on ‘Agriculture for Development’ in its annual World 
Development Report (WDR) of 2008. This was the first time the WDR 
explicitly focused on agriculture in over 30 years, despite the vast majori-
ty of the world’s poor residing in rural areas and depending on agricul-
ture as a main source of livelihood. Nonetheless, the WDR 2008 came at 
an important conjuncture as new pressures on land-based natural re-
sources were threatening farmers, food security, and the environment. 
But while the WDR 2008 was heavily criticized for its over-simplification 
of complex productive relations and its agro-industrial bias (see Akram-
Lodhi 2008; McMichael 2009; Carlos Oya 2009; Veltmeyer 2009), it co-
incided with a renewed interest in policy-circles and academia regarding 
agrarian reform and the agrarian question (Akram-Lodhi and Kay 2009; 
Borras 2007; FAO 2006). At a time when agriculture and the food sys-
tem more generally had become increasingly influenced and controlled 
by a few multinational companies specializing in grain trade, seed devel-
opment, and agro-chemicals, the WDR 2008 promoted the integration of 
small farmers into the private sector’s value chain agriculture which 
would effectively ‘bring the market to smallholders and commercial 
farms’ (World Bank 2007a, 8). Poverty, for the World Bank, is conceived 
of as a result of being ‘left out’ of development processes and in order to 
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reduce poverty the poor must be integrated into markets. This residual 
approach to poverty assumes that ‘the benefits of growth trickle down 
even to the poorest groups in society in the form of increased opportuni-
ties to earn (more) income’ (Bernstein 1992, 24). This has been, and con-
tinues to be, the dominant approach to development and poverty reduc-
tion by the World Bank since the first WDR in 1978, asserting that ‘rapid 
growth and alleviating poverty are inextricably linked’ (World Bank 1978, 
1). 
Yet this understanding of poverty fails to recognize that ‘develop-
ment’ via economic growth and market integration can also produce and 
reproduce poverty as well as inequality. This represents a fundamental 
epistemic problem of dominant development discourses which this study 
seeks to challenge. The WDR 2008 promotes three pathways out of rural 
poverty:  farming, labour and migration (World Bank 2007a, 73). ‘Farm-
ing’, in the report, entails integration into the dominant mode of capital-
ist agricultural production, that is, the agro-industrial complex and capi-
tal-intensive value-chain agriculture. Those farmers who are unable to 
integrate, are then encouraged to either become wage labourers in a 
seemingly growing rural economy, or migrate to urban areas. However, 
as this study reveals, these pathways are much more problematic in reali-
ty. First, while a small minority of the more well-off farmers are able to 
integrate, the vast majority become adversely incorporated into the value 
chain through a process referred to here as ‘productive exclusion’, ren-
dering the ‘farming’ pathway problematic for capital-poor farmers. Se-
cond, the mechanized form of agriculture reduces employment opportu-
nities on the farm, while non-farm rural employment remains marginal, 
temporary, and precarious, making the ‘labour’ pathway increasingly lim-
ited. Third, the uncertainties and insecurities of migrating to the city are 
even more precarious than non-farm rural employment as people lose 
their social base and social safety net provided by the moral economy in 
most rural areas and often end up in the urban slums and/or informal 
economy. The WDR’s three pathways out of rural poverty are thus be-
coming increasingly difficult to pursue as industrial capitalist agriculture 
extends its control over rural areas. As rural development becomes asso-
ciated with agro-industry, productivity gains and economic growth be-
come a measure of successful development which will eventually trickle-
down to the rural poor. This study reveals how problematic this devel-
opment agenda can be for the rural majority, and in particular small 
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farmers faced with the push and pull factors associated with the penetra-
tion of agro-industrial capital. Contrary to a residual approach to pov-
erty, this study understands poverty as a relational problem and therefore 
investigates ‘the causes of rural poverty in terms of social relations of pro-
duction and reproduction, of property and power, that characterize cer-
tain kinds of development, and especially those associated with the 
spread and growth of capitalism’ (Bernstein 1992, 24, emphasis in 
original). Rural development policies which promote a type of ‘agro-
industrialization’ for increased production and economic growth as a way 
to reduce poverty must therefore be critically analyzed as to how they 
shape and transform these social relations.  
Beyond the dominant development discourses promoted by the 
World Bank, since the turn of the century several factors have converged 
to not only bring issues of rural and agricultural development back on 
official policy agendas of international organizations, but also on the in-
vestment portfolios across a variety of sectors. First, a commodity price 
boom that was ‘unprecedented in its magnitude and duration’ doubled 
real prices of energy and metals from 2003 to 2008, while food commod-
ity prices increased 75% (Erten and Ocampo 2013, 14). Second, emerg-
ing economies such as BRICS and some MICs have exacerbated this 
boom, replacing the ‘old hubs’ of capital from the industrialized ‘north’ 
as leading producers and consumers of global commodities. In particu-
lar, the rapid pace of industrialization and urbanization of China and In-
dia has created new sources of demand for energy, metals, and agricul-
tural commodities, while Brazil and Argentina have become leading 
agricultural commodity producers. Third, the recent financialization of 
food and agriculture has been characterized by growing numbers of fi-
nancial actors speculating on agro-commodity derivatives, the introduc-
tion of farmland funds that have become increasingly sought after as a 
safe yet profitable investment in the aftermath of the 2007-08 financial 
crisis, and conventional agri-food enterprises deriving a growing share of 
their revenues from financial activities (Murphy, Burch, and Clapp 2012; 
Fairbairn 2014; Isakson 2014). Fourth, increasing energy demands in the 
context of peak oil and the need to transition to a ‘green economy’ for 
climate change mitigation has led to heightened demands for agro-
industrial flex crops such as soybeans, sugarcane, corn, and oil palm 
which have multiple and flexible uses as food, feed, fuel and industrial 
material (Borras et al., 2016).2 With biofuel blend mandates and state 
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subsidies in national fuel policies encouraging alternative fuels, a new 
kind of ‘agrofuels’ capitalism has emerged as newly formed alliances be-
tween petroleum, chemical and agro-industrial companies expand their 
control over natural resources (Oliveira et al., 2017; White & Dasgupta, 
2010). 
The convergence of these multiple and inter-related factors has led to 
a ‘resource rush’ as nation-states, corporations, and investors seek to in-
crease their control over scarce resources for energy, food, and financial 
security. This ‘rush’ led to various reports attempting to quantify large-
scale land deals ranging from 56 million hectares between 2008 and 2009 
(Deininger and Byerlee 2011) to 71 million hectares (Anseeuw et al. 
2011) and 227 million hectares between 2000 and 2010 (Oxfam 2011). 
While this range reveals the ‘messy hectares’ (Edelman 2013) based on 
different methodologies, time periods, and uncertainties as to whether 
deals are confirmed or speculative, it provoked a ‘literature rush’ on the 
topic with various non-governmental organizations (NGOs) and media 
reports as well as academic publications (Oya 2013). This resulted in a 
wave of studies on land grabbing with case studies in Latin America 
(Borras et al. 2012), Africa (Cotula 2013; Hall 2012), post-Soviet Eurasia 
(Visser and Spoor 2011; Visser, Mamonova, and Spoor 2012), Asia 
(Hofman and Ho 2012; Levien 2013); and engaging with various themes 
from labour (Li 2011), water (Mehta, Veldwisch, and Franco 2012), the 
potential to yield sustainable and equitable benefits (Deininger and 
Byerlee 2011), the environment (Fairhead, Leach, and Scoones 2012), the 
state (Wolford et al. 2013), governance (Margulis, McKeon, and Borras 
2013), resistance (Hall et al. 2015), different forms and mechanisms of 
land control (Peluso and Lund 2011), methodologies (Scoones et al. 
2013), to broader perspectives on land grabs and the global food regime 
(McMichael 2012), among many others.  
These studies have certainly brought the politics of land deals to the 
fore; creating tensions and controversies over the underlying processes, 
nature, and outcomes of land deals and how and to what extent they 
should be regulated (see Margulis, McKeon, and Borras 2013). Borras et 
al. (2013) broadly categorize the various transnational governance ap-
proaches to land grabbing under three main political tendencies: (i) regu-
late to facilitate land deals; (ii) regulate to mitigate negative impacts and 
maximize opportunities; (iii) regulate to stop and rollback land grabbing 
(Borras, Franco, and Wang 2013, 168). These three political tendencies 
Processed on: 6-4-2017
509436-L-bw-McKay
 Introduction 7 
largely represent the competing ideological debates in the literature over 
what constitutes a ‘land grab’ and what should be done about it. 
The first political tendency originates from neo-classical and new in-
stitutional economics traditions. Based on the assumption that the com-
bination of recognized, enforceable private property rights and competi-
tive free markets will result in maximizing technical, allocative, and 
distributive efficiency and thus spur economic growth and development 
undergirds this tradition (see de Soto 2000). Problems of poverty and 
‘under-development’ are approached with residual fixes, as it is assumed 
that poor people stay poor due to their inability to access, and become 
integrated into, markets. The solution, therefore, is market integration 
and establishing the fundamental principles of private property rights 
and competitive markets (including land sales and rentals) while reducing 
transaction costs, which are assumed to increase efficiencies and stimu-
late entrepreneurial activity (see North 1995; de Soto 2000).  
In the context of the recent rise in farmland deals and agricultural de-
velopment more generally, the World Bank and its lead economist in ru-
ral development, Klaus Deininger, are the main proponents of this ap-
proach. According to Deininger’s data, there are some 445 million 
‘available’ hectares which are not being used ‘efficiently’, while showing 
serious ‘yield gaps’ and therefore require investment to foster economic 
growth (Deininger and Byerlee 2011, 77). Relatedly, the WDR 2008 sug-
gests that the persistence of rural poverty and agriculture’s lack of capaci-
ty to act as an engine of growth are based on four hypotheses: (i) low 
levels of agricultural productivity growth; (ii) macroeconomic, price, and 
trade policy discrimination against agriculture; (iii) ‘urban bias’ in re-
source allocation and investment away from rural areas and agriculture; 
and (iv) a decline in official development assistance towards the sector 
(World Bank 2007a, 38). The ‘rising global interest in farmland’ 
(Deininger and Byerlee 2011), it is assumed, can provide the needed in-
vestment through capital injection and new markets to spur agricultural 
growth and alleviate rural poverty. This approach seeks to encourage and 
facilitate large-scale land deals in ‘marginal areas’ where the factors of 
production (land, labour, capital) are being under-utilized. Recognizing 
that such land investment can create problems and conflict through so-
cial, economic, and environmental exploitation, this approach relies on 
the enforcement of corporate social responsibility mechanisms to govern 
land deals. Hence, the creation of the World Bank’s ‘Principles for Re-
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sponsible Agricultural Investment that Respect Rights, Livelihoods and 
Resources’ (PRAI) promoted with agendas based on ‘good governance’, 
‘transparency’, and ‘strong legal frameworks’ for ‘win-win’ outcomes.  
Approaching the poverty problematic in a similar, residual, way, the 
second political tendency towards large-scale land deals is based on what 
Borras, Franco and Wang refer to as the ‘twin assumptions’ of ‘inevita-
bility’ and ‘impossibility’ (2013, 169). In this view, it is assumed that 
large-scale land deals are ‘inevitable’; while redistributive agrarian reform 
is ‘impossible’ – therefore, there is a need to ‘regulate to mitigate nega-
tive impacts and maximize opportunities’ through ‘win-win policies’ 
based on a code of conduct which ‘make a virtue of necessity’ (von 
Braun and Meinzen-Dick 2009). With more primacy given to the need to 
mitigate threats, this perspective adopts a rural livelihoods approach 
within a new-institutional economics framework calling for stronger pri-
vate property rights and good land governance; transparency; free, prior 
and informed consent (FPIC) and food security (Oxfam 2011). The In-
ternational Land Coalition’s (ILC) 2011 ‘Tirana Declaration’ on ‘Securing 
land access for the poor in times of intensified natural resource competi-
tion’ works within a similar framework as the International Food Policy 
Research Institute’s (IFPRI) code of conduct, the World Bank et al.’s 
Principles for Responsible Agricultural Investment (PRAI), and Oxfam’s 
recommendations. While they ‘denounce all forms of land grabbing’ 
(ILC 2011), their particular definition of what constitutes a land grab re-
mains bound within a formal institutional framework. They define land 
grabbing as land acquisitions or concessions which violate human rights, 
negate FPIC, fail to carry out impact assessments, are not based on 
transparent contracts, and do not include ‘democratic planning, inde-
pendent oversight and meaningful participation’ (ILC 2011). Though 
these issues are undoubtedly important, the definition fails to consider 
land deals or other investments which do not necessarily, or directly, vio-
late human rights but may lead to various (hidden) forms of exclusion, 
adverse incorporation, marginalization and environmental degradation. It 
also fails to account for the pre-existing formal and informal institutions 
shaping and being shaped by current societal relations, and assumes that 
land laws and policies to regulate will self-implement and self-interpret, 
negating the diverse and often conflicting interactions between and 
among state and societal actors (Franco 2008; Borras and Franco 2010, 
9). 
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The third approach to land grabbing in this broad categorization of 
political tendencies (with variations within each approach) is to ‘stop and 
rollback land grabbing’ (Borras, Franco, and Wang 2013, 170). This ap-
proach does not assume that land grabs are inevitable, nor does it as-
sume redistributive agrarian reform is impossible. Unlike the previous 
two tendencies, this perspective approaches land grabbing, and the prob-
lems of rural poverty and inequality more generally, in a relational way, 
which gives primacy to the agrarian political economy. Many scholars in 
the field of critical agrarian studies adopt this approach (see Borras et al. 
2012; Oya 2013; Edelman, Oya, and Borras 2013; Hall 2012; White et al. 
2012).  
Within the radical agrarian populist perspective, La Via Campesina is 
the largest and most influential transnational agrarian movement, with 
their position explicit in a declaration made at the ‘International Confer-
ence of Peasants and Farmers: Stop land grabbing!’ in Mali, 2011 (Via 
Campesina 2012). This document rejects the ‘mercantile policies of the 
World Bank’ and other principles based on corporate social responsibil-
ity (CSR) initiatives, concluding that these approaches are ‘fundamentally 
problematic’ and that transparent land grabbing is not better than non-
transparent land grabbing (Via Campesina 2012, 14–16).  
These three approaches represent the major theoretical underpinnings 
in the debates regarding what constitutes a land grab and whether they 
represent threats or opportunities for rural development. Central to all 
approaches is the role of the state. But while most nation-states have ex-
perienced a triple ‘squeeze’ by means of globalization, decentralization, 
and the privatization of their functions since the neoliberal era, these 
above-mentioned converging crises are ‘likely to re-emphasize, not de-
value, the role played by nation-states and state authorities in the politics 
of agrarian transformation’ (Borras 2009, 10). Understanding the role 
and nature of the state is essential in our analyses of the dynamics and 
politics of the resource rush and its implications in the agrarian political 
economy (see Wolford et al. 2013). Research commissioned by influen-
tial international institutions such as International Monetary Fund (IMF) 
and World Bank suggest that ‘countries with weak governance are not 
only more attractive to prospective investors but that they are also more 
likely to actually initiate production’ (Arezki, Deininger, and Selod 2011, 
19) and that ‘countries attracting investor interest include those that are 
land abundant and those with weak land governance’ (Deininger and 
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Byerlee 2011, xxxi). The solution, they suggest, requires some technical 
fixes and good governance instruments to get prices right and enhance 
regulatory mechanisms. But, as Tania Li points out, this approach ‘takes 
a complex political economic problem driven by unequal power, and 
parses it into components that can be addressed by technical means’ (Li 
2011, 292). Simply categorizing weak states and strong states fails to 
grasp the nature of the state and society as a unified whole in the political 
economy and the various conflicting and unequal relations among state 
and societal actors in their historical context. This study aims to contrib-
ute to this understanding by putting forth the state-society-capital nexus 
as a conceptual framework and tool of analysis for understanding socio-
economic and political processes based on the various relations among 
and between state and societal actors in pursuit of their interests. 
Of particular significance for this study and for Latin America in gen-
eral is the 17 country case study report commissioned by the Food and 
Agriculture Organization (FAO) on land grabbing in Latin America 
(Soto Baquero and Gómez 2012). In their preliminary analysis, Soto Ba-
quero and Gomez concluded that land grabbing is present in only two 
(Argentina and Brazil) of the 17 countries analyzed in Latin America. 
Analyzing the same data and case studies, another study found that land 
grabs were in fact present in at least 10 of the 17 Latin American cases 
(Borras et al. 2011). The discrepancy in the research is not only an issue 
of the ‘messy hectares’ previously mentioned, but how we define land 
grabbing in the first place. The FAO study, for example, defines land 
grabbing with the following three conditions: (i) large-scale land acquisi-
tion (1000 hectares or more); (ii) involvement of foreign governments; 
and (iii) negative impact on food security of the host country (Soto 
Baquero and Gómez 2012, 9). This narrow definition of ‘land grabbing’ 
misses many dimensions of the changing land-based social relations in 
terms of the concentration of resource control and access. First, we can-
not quantify all land grabs around the world with a specific area or capi-
tal benchmark; it must be relative, account for the scale of capital in-
volved as well as for the cultural and symbolic importance of the space 
or territory in question. Second, requiring the involvement of a foreign 
government unnecessarily narrows the lens to international relations be-
tween states, rather than focusing on broader socio-economic and envi-
ronmental implications of a land deal regardless of whether it is carried 
out by state, societal or corporate actors, whether foreign or domestic. 
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Third, land deals which lead to land-use change from traditional to ex-
port-oriented crops render populations more dependent on volatile in-
ternational agro-commodity markets, which during a crop boom may 
improve incomes and thus increase food supply in the short term. How-
ever, as evidenced during the aftermath of the food price crisis in 2008, 
countries and populations which suffered most were those that were 
food dependent with little control over their domestic food supply 
(Clapp 2009).  
Borra et al. (2012) put forth a much more nuanced characterization of 
contemporary ‘land grabs’ by delving deeper into land-based social rela-
tions of control and access, the multiple dimensions of scale, and the 
broader changing dynamics of the global political economy with the fo-
llowing three interlinked features: (i) the power to control land and its 
productive resources (ie. ‘control grabbing’); (ii) large-scale, in terms of 
either relative land size or capital involved; and (iii) a response to the 
convergence of multiple crises and the emerging needs for resources by 
‘newer hubs of global capital’, particularly BRICS and MICs (Borras et al. 
2012:850-1). Using this particular analytical framing provides a much 
more rigorous and critical approach to understanding dynamics of agrar-
ian change under contemporary capitalist relations. First, instead of ‘land 
acquisitions’ based on property rights, Ribot and Peluso’s (2003) theory 
of access is employed as a more comprehensive way of understanding 
relations of power in agrarian society based on, among other relations, 
the ability to derive benefits from things and not just holding the formal 
rights (2003:154). Second, the scale of the land grab must be relatively 
large in two senses: the scale of land or resource ‘grabbed’ and the scale 
of capital involved in production. Third, contemporary land grabs are 
understood as a response to the broader international political economy 
in the context of multiple crises and the rise of BRICS and MICs. This 
relates to the spatial restructuring of the global food system with new 
‘hubs’ of capital accumulation emerging in the ‘global south’ as key sites 
of production and consumption.  
As the wave of literature on land grabs rushed in and the debates con-
tinued, the FAO published a sequel to its initial 17 country case study 
redefining its definition of land grabbing to one more attuned to that put 
forth by Borras et al., 2012. As Sergio Gomez (2014, 2), author of the 
FAO report writes, ‘In short, a concept that originally referred to a res-
tricted reality, considering only a few actors (at least one foreign go-
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vernment) and a type of product (basic foodstuffs) has been broadened 
to include other situations involving a variety of actors and products.’ 
A narrow definition of land grabs will indeed restrict reality and there-
fore must be avoided, as the FAO study conceded. Fundamentally, the 
issue at stake is the changing and increasing processes of capitalist pene-
tration in the countryside, transforming the forms and relations of agri-
cultural production in the contemporary context.  A careful reading of 
the definition provided by Borras et al. (2012) reveals this. Control grab-
bing, for example, no longer requires land or land ownership, but refers 
to the new mechanisms of access and control which have emerged as 
industry and finance penetrate the upstream and downstream compo-
nents of agriculture. New forms of control have materialized with new 
institutional arrangements between agro-industry and farmers integrated 
within value-chain agriculture. Control over both the means of produc-
tion (including or excluding land) and labour have thus become diverse 
and concealed in structural and relational mechanisms, as well as legal 
and illegal forms (Ribot and Peluso 2003). Further, if the relative scale, in 
terms of geographic area, capital involved, or cumulative result of both, 
is small then its implications (political, socio-economic, environmental) 
are likely insignificant. If the point is to analyze processes which lead to 
new dynamics and trajectories of agrarian change they ought to be of 
significant scope and therefore large in scale in terms of the ‘two broadly 
distinct but interlinked dimensions: scale of land acquisitions and/or 
scale of capital involved’ (Borras et al. 2012, 850). Finally, Borras et al. 
(2012) frame current land grabs within the changing dynamics of the in-
ternational political economy in the contemporary context, namely re-
garding the convergence of crises and the emerging hubs of global capi-
tal such as BRICS and some MICs. This adds a temporal dimension to 
our analysis of land grabs in the contemporary period in order to differ-
entiate from historical forms of land grabbing such as the enclosure 
movement in England. 
Reframed in this way, and analyzed from a perspective grounded in 
agrarian political economy, an inquiry into how and the extent to which 
‘control grabs’ are transforming social relations of production, reproduc-
tion, property and power in the countryside ultimately requires engaging 
with contemporary agrarian questions of capital and labour. Indeed, the 
history of capitalism is one of dispossession, of ‘control grabbing’ 
through private property, divorcing (‘freeing’) people from the means of 
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production (land) and forcing them to subsist through the selling of their 
labour power (free from slavery) via the market, what Marx called ‘primi-
tive accumulation’ which is ‘nothing else than the historical process of 
divorcing the producer from the means of production’ (Marx 1976, 875). 
This is the process which creates the capital-relation and, ‘as soon as cap-
italist production stands on its own feet, it not only maintains this sepa-
ration, but reproduces it on a constantly extending scale’ (Marx 1976, 
874). If the so-called primitive accumulation ‘appears “primitive” be-
cause it forms the pre-history of capital, and of the mode of production 
corresponding to capital’ (Marx 1976, 875), then that which maintains, 
reproduces, and constantly extends this process in contemporary capital-
ism could be called ‘accumulation by dispossession’ (Harvey 2003). Da-
vid Harvey expands on Marx’s ‘primitive accumulation’ (PA) since ‘the 
predatory practices of “primitive” or “original” accumulation’ are ongo-
ing processes and therefore should be rearticulated beyond their ‘primi-
tive’ or ‘original’ nature (Harvey 2003, 144). Accumulation by disposses-
sion (ABD) functions as the ongoing process of ‘primitive accumulation’ 
which does not create the capital-relation but facilitates expanded repro-
duction and value extraction through various forms of dispossession or 
exclusion. Both PA and ABD have been used to understand contempo-
rary land grabbing, and for obvious reason. In reference to the enclosure 
movement in England and indeed, that which created the capital-
relation, Marx (2011, 470) mentions land grabbing: ‘Land grabbing on a 
great scale, such as was perpetrated in England, is the first step in creat-
ing a field for the establishment of agriculture on a great scale. Hence 
this subversion of agriculture puts on, at first, more the appearance of a 
political revolution.’ 
Marx’s use of the term land grabbing was also translated as ‘very ex-
tensive thefts of land’ (Marx 1976, 556), just as primitive accumulation 
referred to the ‘expropriation of the agricultural producer, of the peasant, 
from the soil’ (Marx 1976, 876). Interpreted in a very literal sense, this 
narrowly defines land grabbing and PA as forcible expropriation 
(through extra-economic means) of people from the land. Harvey’s ABD 
widens the definition of PA to various forms of privatization which re-
leases ‘a set of assets (including labour power) at a very low (and in some 
instances zero) cost. Overaccumulated capital can seize hold of such as-
sets and immediately turn them to profitable use’ (Harvey 2003, 149). 
Harvey also asserts that ‘the on-going cannibalistic and predatory prac-
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tices occurring even within the advanced capitalist countries under the 
guise of privatisation, market reforms, welfare withdrawals and neoliber-
alisation are better described as accumulation by dispossession’ (Harvey 
2006a, 158). Not surprisingly, this generated criticism as an ‘extraordinar-
ily wide definition’ with an exaggerated significance (Fine 2006, 143). 
Levien similarly critiques Harvey’s ABD concept as lacking in distinction 
‘from other spatial fixes and the “normal” expanded reproduction of 
capital’ as well as under-theorizing ‘the deeply political role of states in 
orchestrating dispossession and the implications that follow from this’ 
(Levien 2013, 382). The use of PA and ABD in the academic literature 
on contemporary land grabs has also been contested (see Levien 2013; 
and Hall 2013 for a review). Ultimately, and similar to the land grab de-
bate, concepts need to be properly defined and have analytic utility 
which help us understand certain processes in the contemporary context. 
Just as ‘land grabbing’ is better conceived of as ‘control grabbing’ to un-
derstand the current resource rush and to not restrict reality, it is argued 
here that ABD maintains its analytic utility if the forms of accumulation 
are, in fact, the result of people being dispossessed, or excluded, from 
their access to assets or means of production. This study uses ABD to 
understand the new forms and mechanisms which exclude people from 
accessing the means of production, but do not necessarily entail expro-
priation or a transfer of property rights, whether by means which are 
purely economic or by extra-economic coercion.  
Such new forms and mechanisms of control over land and its produc-
tive resources, therefore, require us ask: ‘is capital, and in what ways is 
capital, taking hold of agriculture, revolutionizing it, smashing the old 
forms of production and of poverty and establishing new forms which 
must succeed’ (Banaji 1980, 46). This classic agrarian question of capital 
was discussed by Marx (1976[1867]) in the context of the English enclo-
sures and ‘primitive accumulation’ and in three classic agrarian political 
economy texts by Engels (1950[1894]), Kautsky (1988[1899]) and Lenin 
(1964[1899]). The agrarian question is about understanding and ultimate-
ly overcoming agriculture’s obstacles to capitalist transformation which, 
for Marx and others, would facilitate the conditions necessary to over-
come the capitalist mode of production based on exploitation. For En-
gels, his concern with the ‘peasant question’ was a political one which 
recognized the importance of the peasantry and the need for strategic 
alliances with the urban working classes to achieve political power. 
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Kautsky and Lenin analyzed the development of capitalism in the coun-
tryside, or the ‘agrarian question of capital’ as translated by Banaji (1980) 
above, pointing to the commodification of agricultural production and 
the uneven and variegated tendencies of differentiation among the peas-
antries into class fractions of capital and labour. 
In The Development of Capitalism in Russia, Lenin (1964, 174) argued that 
the capitalist development of the Russian countryside was ‘not only “dif-
ferentiating” (the old peasantry), it (was) being completely dissolved, it 
(was) ceasing to exist, it (was) being ousted by absolutely new types of 
rural inhabitants – types that are the basis of a society in which commod-
ity economy and capitalist production prevail.’ The basis of such ‘differ-
entiation’ and ‘dissolution’ of the middle peasant, for Lenin (1964, 171), 
was the assumption that peasants are ‘completely subordinated to the 
market’ and thus subject to:  
 
all those contradictions which are inherent in every commodity economy 
and every order of capitalism: competition, the struggle for economic in-
dependence, the grabbing of land (purchasable and rentable), the con-
centration of production in the hands of a minority, the forcing of the 
majority into the ranks of the proletariat, their exploitation by a minority 
through the medium of merchant’s capital and the hiring of farm labour-
ers.  
 
What ensues as capitalism develops in the countryside, according to 
Lenin, is the differentiation of the peasantry into classes of capital (rich 
peasants) and labour (poor peasants) with the majority becoming prole-
tarians or what the Russian peasants themselves refer to as ‘depeasantis-
ing’ (Lenin 1964, 173). The differentiation of the peasantry is thought to 
be necessary for the creation of a home market for the development of 
capitalism. Subsistence (middle) peasants, for example, do not contribute 
to the supply of cheap labour nor do they purchase many commodities – 
both of which are necessary for the development of capitalism. For Len-
in, the disappearance of the peasantry was not only inevitable but also 
necessary. It was necessary for the peasantry to ‘proletarianize’ and join 
the revolutionary forces of the proletariat to ‘struggle, not only for land 
and freedom, but also against all exploitation of man by man, struggle 
against the poverty of the masses of the people, against the rule of capi-
tal’ (Lenin 1905, 42). ‘Depeasantization’, for Lenin, was not just an em-
pirical observation based on his analysis of the zemstvo3 statistics, but 
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based on his usage of Marx’s analysis, and further modified as a political 
project for a socialist transformation.  
 Russian economist Alexander Chayanov (1986[1925]) provided an 
alternative explanation to that of Lenin’s social differentiation of the 
peasantry based on demographic differentiation. For Chayanov, the het-
erogeneity among the Russian peasantry was not predominantly due to 
the development of capitalism in the countryside, but to the demograph-
ic cycle produced through consumer-worker ratios of household units. 
Chayanov approached his analysis of the Russian countryside in a com-
pletely different manner to that of Lenin. Chayanov contended that over 
90 percent of the farms in Russia were family farms4 which employed no 
hired labour and thus could not be analyzed using standard economic 
methods (Chayanov 1986, xiii). Instead, the consumer-worker ratio 
based on the number of dependents/workers is used to analyze the 
household unit. Family farms seek to strike a balance between satisfying 
their basic consumption needs and engaging in self-exploitation. Cha-
yanov did, however, acknowledge that social differentiation due to capi-
talist relations do occur, noting that ‘[F]arms may increase and decline 
with unchanged family composition due to purely economic causes…There 
is, nevertheless, no doubt at all that demographic causes play the leading 
part in these movements’ (1986, 249).  
For Chayanov, the advancement and development of Russian agricul-
ture was based on three interdependent elements: rural cooperatives, dif-
ferential optimums, and vertical cooperation (Shanin 1986, 8). While ru-
ral cooperatives are sought for economies of scale, there are differential 
optima for the organization of agriculture depending on its available 
productive forces, stage of technology, region etc. In other words, there 
is no ‘one-size-fits-all strategy’, as there is a ‘need to organize each com-
ponent separately and autonomously on the specific optimum scale 
which is appropriate to it’ (Chayanov 1991[1919], 46). ‘Optimas’ there-
fore depend on the consumer-worker ratio and the degree of self-
exploitation needed to fulfill the appropriate balance. The third interre-
lated element is vertical cooperation. Chayanov’s model for development 
is based on rural cooperatives producing at their unique differential op-
timas based on the benefit of its constituent peasant farms and integrat-
ed with other cooperatives on both the upstream and downstream side 
of the farm. ‘On the upstream side these might be cooperatives that pro-
duce and deliver inputs (e.g., fertilizers, machines, credit facilities) to 
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peasant farms. On the downstream side they would process and com-
mercialize the different produce from peasant farms’ (van der Ploeg 
2013, 19). This requires a high degree of planning and coordination at 
the local level, but would undoubtedly create stronger, more resilient, 
localized food systems. 
The key feature of the Lenin-Chayanov debate then, was the role and 
fate of the peasantry with regards to the development of capitalism. For 
Lenin, the tendency and observable trend signalled the eventual disap-
pearance of the peasantry through class differentiation. For Chayanov, 
differentiation was due to the demographic cycle based on the labour-
consumer balance which could be resolved through self-exploitation and 
enable the peasantry to persist (see Bernstein 2009). In the 1970s and 
1980s, debates regarding the fate of the peasantry re-emerged with the 
Lenin-influenced de-peasantists (descampesinistas) and the Chayanovian-
influenced peasantists (campesinistas); the former arguing that ‘the peasant 
form of production is economically unviable’ while the latter argue that 
‘the peasantry, far from being eliminated, is persisting and even being 
reinforced’ (Kay 2000, 136). 
In the contemporary period however, peasants have changed signifi-
cantly in terms of their relation with, and integration into, circuits of 
global capitalist production with processes associated with globalization. 
Those who self-identify as ‘peasants’ today often have diversified liveli-
hood strategies within the household, have become semi-proletarians, 
temporary or seasonal labourers, seasonal migrants, and engage in highly 
mechanized capital-intensive farming, among others. As a concept or 
subject, peasant or campesino is better understood as a cultural or political 
category, not as a class-in-itself analytic (Edelman 1999, 191). As Edel-
man and Borras (2016, 5–6) put it, ‘today’s peasantries are quite hetero-
geneous and frequently highly sophisticated’ and they are ‘not the peas-
antry of even one or two decades ago.’ This is certainly the case in 
Bolivia where self-identified campesinos range from subsistence, family-
based, labour-intensive farmers in the altiplano to highly mechanized, cap-
ital-intensive farmers and smallholder rentiers in the lowlands and with 
intersecting indigenous ethnicities. The narrow definition of peasantries 
as family farming with limited or no hiring or selling of labour and large-
ly subsistence-based no longer captures the diversity and multi-
functionality of peasantries of the 21st Century (van der Ploeg 2010). The 
persistence of contemporary peasants, their politics and movements have 
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provoked new concepts and discussions regarding the ‘new rurality’ 
(Giarracca 2001; Kay 2008), ‘repeasantization’ (van der Ploeg 2008), 
agroecology and food sovereignty (Martínez-Torres and Rosset 2014); as 
well as in vibrant transnational agrarian movements (Desmarais 2007; 
Edelman and Borras 2016). For van der Ploeg (2008, 7), repeasantiza-
tion, much like the new rurality and struggles for food sovereignty, is a 
reaction to the industrial capitalist development of agriculture and thus ‘a 
modern expression of the fight for autonomy and survival in a context of depri-
vation and dependency.’  
With the emergence of the Green Revolution(s), patented seeds and 
GMOs, the World Trade Organization’s Agreement on Agriculture 
(AoA) and its Trade-Related Intellectual Property Rights (TRIPs), new 
mechanisms and forms of differentiation have emerged. As van der 
Ploeg (2013, 75) notes, ‘Agrarian entrepreneurs take over land, water, 
quotas, symbols and market access from others, thus accelerating the 
process of quantitative growth at the level of the farm enterprise.’ A se-
cond mechanism, he notes, are the large capitalist farm enterprises in the 
South which are part of or closely linked to ‘food empires’:  
These new enterprises, currently created through land and water grabbing, 
no longer compete with the peasant sector on prices. Their “competitive-
ness” is typically based on their control over channels (mostly global) 
through which agricultural products are bought and sold. Decisive in such 
control is privileged access, certification, standardization of products and 
volumes of sales. It is, in short, “competitiveness” grounded on extra-
economic coercion (Ploeg 2013:75-6). 
Capitalist development in the countryside is changing significantly and 
can no longer be understood as landed predatory relations. Capital is 
penetrating the countryside in new ways and even producing new spaces 
for accumulation by means of appropriation and substitution in the up-
stream and downstream components of the agro-food system 
(Goodman, Sorj, and Wilkinson 1987).  Capitalism develops unevenly, at 
different times and places with various impacts and implications which 
must be understood historically and contextually. There are new forms 
of production and capital penetration, new actors involved, and new 
mechanisms of accumulation which continue to transform social rela-
tions of production, property and power. Understanding these new pro-
cesses of accumulation, forms and relations production, and their associ-
ated politics remain highly relevant and important in the contemporary 
Processed on: 6-4-2017
509436-L-bw-McKay
 Introduction 19 
context (Byres 1996; Bernstein 1996). These are the new dynamics of 
agrarian change with which this study engages and addresses as its cen-
tral problematique. Despite the fact that over a century has passed since 
these debates first emerged, agrarian questions remain just as, or even 
more relevant and important in the current context of globalization and 
agro-industrial complexes (see Akram-Lodhi and Kay 2009).  
As this study shows, capital is indeed penetrating and taking hold of 
agriculture and revolutionizing it, albeit in variegated and uneven ways at 
different paces and trajectories across space. Rather than a type of agro-
industrial development which may generate employment and new oppor-
tunities through forward and backward industrial linkages, forms of capi-
tal penetration and new mechanisms of control grabbing are very extrac-
tive in nature, and exclusionary in form. Agro-industrial ‘development’ is 
leading to ‘a truncated trajectory of agrarian transition in much of the 
global South, one in which there is no pathway from country to city, ag-
riculture to industry, or even a clear pathway into stable plantation work 
that pays a living wage’ (Li 2011, 296). Li places labour at the centre of 
her analysis of land grabs, stressing the need to consider ‘the predica-
ment of people who are displaced from their “inefficient” farms in a 
context where the generalized capitalist system fails to provide them with 
an alternative livelihood or a living wage’ (Li 2011, 281). This echoes the 
call of Bernstein for the need to consider new agrarian questions of la-
bour as the current phase of contemporary capitalism in the era of ne-
oliberal globalization has led to the ‘centralization and concentration, as 
well as the mobility (and “financialization”) of capital’ generating: 
 
an intensification of the fragmentation of labour. That is, the growing global 
army (or reserve army) of labour pursues its reproduction in conditions 
of increasingly insecure and oppressive wage employment combined 
with a range of likewise insecure “informal sector” (“survival”) activity, 
typically subject to its own forms of differentiation and oppression along 
intersecting lines of class, gender, generation, caste and ethnicity 
(Bernstein 2004, 204–205 italics in original).  
 
The capitalist development of agriculture (in its mechanized form) is 
supposed to release inefficient agricultural labour which is required for 
industrial development, optimizing allocative efficiency of the labour 
supply. But, as Bernstein provokes, ‘what if the forms of capitalism, in-
cluding industrialization (to the extent that it is proceeding), in poorer 
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countries today are incapable of generating sufficient, and sufficiently 
secure, employment to provide “a living wage” to the great majority?’ 
(Bernstein 2004, 205). This forms part of the central problematique for this 
study. Beyond generating sufficient employment for the great majority, it 
is important to understand the particular forms of capital penetration in 
the countryside – how new spaces of capital accumulation are created 
and controlled and how this transforms agrarian social relations in the 
countryside. Most of the world’s poor reside in rural areas, the dominant 
food system is failing humanity5 and the biophysical contradictions of 
industrial capitalist agriculture are accelerating (Weis 2010). If we are to 
overcome some of the greatest problems facing humanity, we have to 
deal and come to terms with contemporary agrarian questions. The capi-
talist development of the countryside and the new and increasing levels 
of capital penetration to ‘modernize’ agriculture into agro-industrial val-
ue-chains form part of the dominant development paradigm promoted 
and pursued around the world today. The soy complex in Bolivia is part 
of this development paradigm and represents a relatively new wave of 
capital penetration in the countryside with important implications for the 
rural majority and the country’s broader national development strategy. 
This study reveals how mechanized soybean production in Bolivia has 
developed similar to an extractive enclave, socially and sectorally disar-
ticulated from the rest of the economy with production destined for ex-
port markets. Labour has become surplus to the needs of capital accu-
mulation in the soy complex and since the oilseed ‘flex’ crop produced is 
sold to external markets there is no need for agro-industrial capitalists to 
be concerned with domestic consumer capacity or a robust internal mar-
ket. Many small farmers have little opportunity for upward mobility with 
limited access to land and capital, yet become caught in contradictory 
class positions, permitting a functional dualism in the countryside in 
which the development and expansion of the agro-industrial soy com-
plex is relatively unchallenged socially and politically despite its exclu-
sionary and extractivist characteristics. This study therefore addresses 
aspects of the contemporary agrarian questions of capital and labour by 
asking not if capital is penetrating the countryside, but how and the ex-
tent to which agro-industrial capital is developing in the countryside, the 
new forms (of control) it has taken in terms of shaping relations of pro-
duction and accumulation and the political formations associated with 
these processes (Byres 1986; 1996; Bernstein 1996). How and the extent 
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to which new forms of capital are penetrating the countryside and their 
implications for agrarian transformation remain important for national 
development and poverty alleviation and remains under-explored and 
not sufficiently explained in the literature. Studies which analyze soybean 
expansion and agrarian change in Santa Cruz provide excellent insights 
into the functioning of land markets, land concentration, ‘foreignization’, 
and technological transfer (Colque 2014; Mackey 2011; Urioste 2012; 
Zoomers 2003) (further discussed below), but do not engage with the 
new forms of control which have emerged in the context of capital-
intensive and highly-mechanized value-chain agriculture in Bolivia. 
Dominant discourses from the state, international institutions such as the 
World Bank and from the soybean sector also present alternative expla-
nations of the implications of this new capital penetration in the coun-
tryside based on economic growth, productivity, food security and sov-
ereignty, and employment generation (Vicepresidente 2012; IBCE 2014). 
This study challenges these claims, arguing that a deeper understanding 
of the social relations of production reveals very exclusionary dynamics, 
the appropriation of the surplus value by a concentrated market oligopo-
ly, and the extractive character of agricultural production. Analyzing dy-
namics of agrarian change based on a property rights-based framework, 
or by aggregate productivity levels and export-revenue generation fails to 
capture these dynamics of control, exclusion, value appropriation and 
extraction which are central to this analysis and will be further elaborated 
throughout.  
It is within these theoretical debates that this study is situated, prob-
lematizing not only the key tenets of contemporary agro-industrial de-
velopment, but also agrarian transformations and trajectories of agrarian 
change in Bolivia’s soybean expansion zone in a changing global and po-
litical context. This prompts us to ask many questions about the nature, 
pace and trajectory of agrarian change in Bolivia; the new forms of con-
trol in the context of the resource rush; the new actors and global pro-
cesses driving capital accumulation and penetration into the countryside; 
the relations within and among the various state, societal and capitalist 
actors implicated in these changes; social differentiation in the country-
side; and the politics of all these. If there is indeed, one question to rule 
them all it is the following: How and to what extent is the development and ex-
pansion of the agro-industrial soy complex transforming agrarian social relations in 
Bolivia’s eastern lowlands in the contemporary context of new forms of capital penetra-
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tion in the countryside and a changing state-society-capital nexus? Using an analyti-
cal framework rooted in agrarian political economy these questions are 
not approached or answered separately, chapter by chapter, but 
throughout the entire work. The questions are inter-related and overlap-
ping, but taken together they provide the direction for this dissertation.  
1.3 The Bolivian case 
Bolivia’s agrarian structure is extremely unequal. After undergoing two 
agrarian reform programmes since the 1952 revolution, and a so-called 
Agrarian Revolution in 2006, the country’s rural sector remains charac-
terized by an extremely unequal landholding structure. Of the roughly 
660,000 farm units in the country, 87% are small farms6 occupying just 
14% of the total available arable land (World Bank 2007b, 19). This 
translates into some 574,200 small farms occupying an average of only 
0.7 hectares each.7 The country has one of the highest rural-urban ratios 
in Latin America with 33.5% of the total population living in rural areas 
and almost one-third (29.1%) of the total workforce employed in agricul-
ture (INE 2012a). Land-based wealth and agriculture as a livelihood and 
economic activity are therefore still very relevant and extremely im-
portant for poverty alleviation and rural development (IFAD 2010). 
However, the policies and programmes pursued over the last 60 years 
have led to a rigid and entrenched agrarian structure in which classes of 
landholding and capitalist elites (classes of capital) gained and maintained 
access and control over the majority of the country’s most fertile land 
and its productive resources. These inequalities coincide with a severe 
poverty rate of over two-thirds (66.4%) of the rural population, while 
nearly half of all rural people live in extreme poverty (45.5%) (INE 
2012a). 
While Bolivia’s current agrarian structure has been shaped by previ-
ous socio-political periods which generated patterns of dispossession and 
land concentration; changes in the global political economy are resulting 
in new forms of capital penetration with new mechanisms of exclusion, 
value appropriation and extraction associated with the agro-industrial soy 
complex. This model of agro-industrial production and the development 
of new biotechnologies transformed the region into the world’s leading 
producer of soybeans, with Brazil leading the way by spreading its tech-
nologies and producers throughout Latin America’s Southern Cone 
(Oliveira and Hecht 2016).  
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To date, a limited number of studies exist on issues related to the new 
agrarian dynamics in Bolivia in the context of the recent penetration of 
new agro-capitals and the soy complex. Studies have analyzed the work-
ings of Bolivia’s land markets (Zoomers 2003) and land appropriation on 
the frontier (Colque 2014), while others have focused on the ‘foreigniza-
tion’ of land as Brazilian capitalist farmers and agro-industry increase 
their presence and control over Bolivia’s land-based natural resources 
(Urioste 2012; Mackey 2011). These studies have provided valuable in-
sights and contributed to our understanding of agrarian change in Boliv-
ia, providing the basis from which this study takes off. This study builds 
from these analyses by going beyond a land-centric and ‘foreignization’ 
lens to subtler forms and mechanisms of exclusion, control, appropria-
tion and extraction and the politics behind these processes. 
Zoomers (2003, 255), for example, examines the workings of Bolivia’s 
visible (formal) and invisible (informal) land market in Santa Cruz in the 
late 1990s, when many small farmers were not yet producing soybeans or 
using machinery. During this period, her study shows that based on a 
survey of 149 families in three communities ‘there was no systematic 
transfer of land from the smaller to the larger farmers, which means that 
there were no substantial changes in the landholding structure’ (Zoomers 
2003, 256). Zoomers points to the ability of small farmers8 to persist 
through times of drudgery and diversify their livelihood strategies, lessen 
consumption, and/or sell a portion of their land as a means to maintain 
their parcel, or part of it. This continues today, though land fragmenta-
tion is increasing as farmers continue to ‘sell their land bit by bit’ as 
Zoomers mentions, and the second generation of small farmers (coloniza-
dores) are now seeking employment, putting more pressure on the land. 
However, Zoomers does not engage with the expansion of the frontier 
during this period of land liberalization, the development of mechanized 
agriculture or the increased presence of Brazilian agro-capitalist. Recent 
studies by Urioste (2012) and Colque (2014) examine these issues in 
greater detail. 
It has been during the last 20 years that foreigners – specifically Bra-
zilians – have rapidly increased their control over Bolivian agricultural 
land and resources. In 2006-7, for example, Brazilians controlled 40.3% 
of total soy plantation area in Bolivia, up from 19.6% in 1994-5 (Urioste 
2012). Although there is no available data on the total amount of land 
controlled by Brazilians at present, the most reliable and recent study 
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conducted by Miguel Urioste of Fundación TIERRA suggests that ‘in 
oilseeds alone, Brazilians own approximately half a million hectares of 
the best agricultural lands, both category I (intensive agricultural use) and 
category II (extensive agricultural use), without counting those that are in 
fallow or rotation, nor those that are directed towards other crops or 
ranching, which usually comprise larger areas’ (2012, 449). Urioste also 
suggests that the more recent investments from Brazilians in Bolivia are 
in pasture lands for cattle ranching. It is estimated that Brazilian cattle 
ranchers occupy 700,000 hectares in the three provinces bordering Brazil 
(German Busch, Velasco and Angel Sandoval) within the Department of 
Santa Cruz (Urioste, 2012:451). Brazilian capital therefore controls an 
estimated 1.2 million hectares of Bolivia’s 2.86 million total hectares of 
cultivated land with Brazilian-based corporations Grupo Monica (Monica 
Semillas), Gama Group, and UNISOYA controlling over 200,000 hec-
tares of this land (Urioste 2012; INE, 2011). However, these data are 
very much outdated and with the state’s land titling process (saneamiento)9 
still incomplete and the unwillingness of the National Association of 
Oilseed and Wheat Producers (Asociación Nacional de Productores de Oleagi-
nosas y Trigo, ANAPO) to release specific data on its members, land con-
centration and so-called ‘foreignization’ could be much higher than these 
figures reveal. Based on discussions with key informants working in the 
municipal governments of San Julían and Cuatro Cañada (see Maps 1.1 
and 1.4) – the two main communities in the soy expansion zone – as well 
as numerous small farmers, it is clear that a culture of illegal land appro-
priation and land grabbing continues in the eastern lowlands.  
Urioste’s data, for example, is based on reports published by 
ANAPO, Bolivia’s politically and economically influential association of 
large-scale agro-industrialists which aims to reproduce the Brazilian 
model of agriculture in Bolivia. ANAPO has access to the most accurate 
information regarding land tenure (and nationality) since its members 
report these data to the association. However, ANAPO’s publications in 
recent years no longer include specific information on producer national-
ity, largely due to publications released by a Bolivian NGO on the issue 
of foreignization which created a large public backlash not only against 
ANAPO from its members but also from the public at large, and espe-
cially rural worker and peasant associations which only recently put the 
issue against the ‘foreignization’ of land on their political agenda 
(Machaca, personal communication, October 2014). It is clear, however, 
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that ANAPO values and encourages foreign investment, especially from 
Brazil. According to ANAPO’s President in 2014, Demetrio Perez, in-
vestment from Brazil, Argentina, and other countries has helped and 
continues to modernize Bolivia’s soy sector with new machinery, seed 
and agrochemical technologies, expertise, and highway development (Pe-
rez, personal communication, February 2014). Urioste also points out 
that ‘two of the leading Brazilian soybean producers serve on the board 
of the ANAPO, even though this requires changes to organizational 
statutes’ (2012, 446). ANAPO’s agenda is clearly to support the devel-
opment and expansion of agro-industry for export, representing those 
medium and large-scale farmers (22% of total farm units) who control 
90% of cultivated soybean area (ANAPO 2011). Urioste also suggests a 
general acceptance of the foreign presence – especially among the middle 
classes of Santa Cruz – so as to secure access to ‘sources of capital, tech-
nology, employment, business, market knowledge, inputs and genetically-
modified seeds’ (Urioste 2012, 450).  
This general acceptance is similar to Mackey’s (2011) research find-
ings in the region which gives primacy to Brazilian technological transfer 
in ‘manufacturing consent’ among Bolivian farmers. Like Urioste, 
Mackey points to the use of technology as a terrain of legitimation and 
the informal class alliances among Bolivian and Brazilian agro-
industrialists which have led to the ‘foreignization’ of Bolivia’s eastern 
lowlands (2011). Mackey suggests that it is important to consider the 
Brazilian presence in Bolivia in terms of the much broader political eco-
nomic relationships between the two countries and Brazil’s position as a 
regional hegemony and alternative to western imperialism (2011). Brazil’s 
role in the production and consumption of the Bolivian hydrocarbon 
sector, as well its role as a leading creditor, primarily for transportation 
infrastructure, but also credit for agricultural machinery has solidified 
bilateral relations between the countries and led to a general acceptance 
of Brazilians in Bolivia (Mackey 2011). According to Brazil’s Foreign 
Minister of Economic Affairs in South America, Joao Parkinson de Cas-
tro, the Ministry always prefers to avoid any discourse regarding ‘Brazili-
ans’ in Bolivia, but they do support their citizens across the border 
through political negotiation if necessary. The Minister said that the rela-
tionship with the current Bolivian government is delicate but positive 
and that they always ‘want to avoid any discourses of regional imperial-
ism’ (Parkinson de Castro, personal communication, May 2014). He add-
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ed that ‘the economic relationship between Santa Cruz and Mato Grosso 
and Mato Grosso do Sul is very important, but the politics in La Paz can 
sometimes threaten this relationship, so it is important that our govern-
ment supports but does not over-extend its influence in Bolivia’ (Parkin-
son de Castro, personal communication, May 2014).  
Colque (2014) reveals the workings of land appropriation on the fron-
tier in Santa Cruz, focusing on the concentration of land-based wealth 
and power held among agro-industrial elites and their ability to challenge 
and dispute the authority of the state. Colque traces these land-based 
power relations through several stages of appropriation dating back to 
the country’s first agrarian reform in 1953. Appropriation of land, he ar-
gues, predominantly occurs through informal and illegal land deals which 
exploit and further marginalize the rural poor (Colque 2014).  
Redo et al. (2011) document the dynamics of deforestation in the 
lowlands of Santa Cruz, suggesting that ‘most (of the deforestation) re-
sulted from Brazilian farmers and ranchers moving into the north-east of 
the region from Mato Grosso do Sul’ (2011, 235). These studies, and 
others, have brought to light the important and contested issue of the 
foreign (mainly Brazilian) presence in Bolivia’s eastern lowlands. It is 
clear that foreigners, especially Brazilians, have come to control a large 
share of agricultural land in Bolivia over the past three decades. Of inter-
est here, is not only if and how foreigners are controlling large parcels of 
land in Bolivia but more importantly how new forms and mechanisms of 
capital investment are changing relations of production, property, and 
power; by whom the value generated by this agro-industrial expansion is 
appropriated; and the implications and trajectories of this type of agrari-
an change. Changes in the agrarian political economy, even where for-
eign capital is present, cannot be fully captured using a ‘foreignization’ 
lens. Similarly, an overly ‘land-centric’ focus can lose sight of relations of 
debt, dependency and exclusion whereby land and resource control shift 
without physical displacement or property rights-based changes.  
The focus on nationality presents a veiled threat to understanding the 
nature, pace and trajectories of agrarian change in the broader context of 
new forms and mechanisms of control. The lines distinguishing national 
from trans-Latina capital have become increasingly blurred as joint-
ventures, subsidiaries, informal partnerships, land leasing, financing, and 
cross-border marriages render it increasingly difficult to distinguish be-
tween Bolivian and Brazilian capital in many instances. Nationality 
Processed on: 6-4-2017
509436-L-bw-McKay
 Introduction 27 
should become central if it leads to capital flight, but not necessarily if it 
operates similarly to domestic capital.  As the national origin of capital 
and financial investment become intertwined, it becomes more im-
portant to reveal the changing relations of access and control over land 
and resources and the politics behind these processes. This study there-
fore does not analyze the new processes of agrarian restructuring in Bo-
livia as ‘foreignization’, but rather in terms of the logic of capital and its 
incessant drive for accumulation through expanded reproduction, dis-
possession and exclusion. Breaking down the imaginary national borders 
and giving primacy to the classes of capital ‘distinguished by the interest 
and strategies of capital in particular activities and sectors and on scales 
from local to regional, national to transnational’ (Bernstein 2010, 112) 
requires going beyond the ‘foreignization of property’ to the ‘character and 
direction of change in social relations of property’ (Borras et al. 2012, 864, 
emphasis in original). 
1.4 Methodology, methods and study sites 
The methodological approach that guides this study is based in agrarian 
political economy which requires an investigation into ‘the social rela-
tions and dynamics of production and reproduction, property and power 
in agrarian formations and their processes of change, both historical and 
contemporary’ (Bernstein 2010, 1). This approach understands socio-
economic and political change as a product of specific social relations 
and structures in their historical contexts. It requires identifying the na-
ture, forms, and relations of capital accumulation which entails an analy-
sis of class and class structure and the role and nature of the state. It 
therefore rejects notions of economic growth or productivity as 
measures of development or social progress as such economic variables 
must be contextualized as a product of social relations. The accumula-
tion of capital can indeed lead to the wealth of nations, growth and 
abundance, poverty alleviation and social progress. It can also, however, 
lead to impoverishment, exclusion, inequality, environmental destruction 
and conflict. Residual, or technical, approaches to development and pov-
erty alleviation often ascribe to the notion that economic and productivi-
ty growth will eventually lead to social progress for all; failing to account 
for the broader array unequal structures and relations of power implicat-
ed in capitalist societies. Agrarian political economy takes a relational ap-
proach which concerns the social relations of access, of divisions and 
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conditions of labour, of income and value distribution, and of consump-
tion, reproduction and accumulation (Bernstein 2010, 22–23). These re-
lations must be analyzed in their historical and social contexts, under-
standing that societal structures shape and have been shaped by social 
interaction and class struggle which in turn produce new structural elab-
orations and conditions. While tendencies of capital accumulation and 
profitability inherent to the capitalist mode of production are acknowl-
edged, they are not necessarily determinants of social change. Such 
tendencies interact with existing structures and are contingent on histori-
cal processes and class struggle. As Ben Fine asserts, it is important that 
our theoretical foundations ‘remain sensitive both to diversity and histor-
ical contingency’ (Fine 1994, 522). Remaining sensitive to such diversity, 
empirical data was collected during fieldwork conducted in Bolivia from 
2013 through to 2015 in order to engage first hand with the people im-
plicated in these new dynamics of agrarian change. More methodological 
and conceptual considerations associated with the analytical framework 
guiding this study are discussed in Chapter 2. 
1.4.1 Mixed methods approach 
This study employs a mixed methods research approach using between-
methods triangulation in an attempt to limit the degree of bias and in-
consistencies in the study. Primary and secondary qualitative and quanti-
tative data were used based on official government reports, national, re-
gional and municipal cadastral data, NGO, academic and newspaper 
publications as well as ethnographic research carried out through partici-
pant observation, formal (semi-structured) and informal (everyday) in-
terviews and conversations with key informants and community mem-
bers from Cuatro Cañadas and San Julián. A household survey was also 
conducted in collaboration with Bolivian NGO Fundación TIERRA 
with a partial financial contribution from the University of Michigan ad-
ministered by Dr. Lesli Hoey, consisting of a total of 303 households 
from Cuatro Cañadas and San Julián (Map 1.1 and 1.4). The mixed 
methods approach is used not simply to combine different types of data, 
but to compare and contrast them in order to ‘counteract the threats to 
validity identified in each’ (Berg 2001, 5). This mixed methods approach 
has enabled this study to limit errors in data collection and analysis, not 
only in the shortcomings of the household survey which are elaborated 
on below, but also as a foreigner doing research in Bolivia. While many 
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measures were undertaken in order to limit the degree of bias in semi-
structured interviews with key informants, being an ‘outsider’ and partic-
ularly a foreigner from Canada can potentially lead to skewed responses, 
unwillingness to participate, and misinterpretations. On the other hand, 
‘outsider’ status can also be less threatening, unassuming, and therefore 
work in one’s favour. Based on my experience, people from all classes, 
state and societal actors alike, were very open and willing to participate 
and engage in conversation. Nonetheless, biases across approaches have 
been limited by using between-method triangulation which combines 
‘two or more different research strategies in the study of the same empir-
ical units’ (Denzin 1978, 302). Since the nature of the research problem 
for this study requires an investigation into the particular relations of 
production, property and power and forms of control and access which 
cannot always be captured by means of the survey method, this study 
remains qualitatively dominant. What the survey method adds is a larger 
sample size across a wider geographical area which is used to compare 
and contrast with the in-depth interview data. As Webb et al. (1966, 174) 
explain: “When a hypothesis can survive confrontation of a series of 
complementary methods of testing it contains a degree of validity unat-
tainable by one tested within the more constricted framework of a single 
method.” 
Greene et al. (1989) identify five key purposes for using a mixed 
methods approach: (1) triangulation, which combines multiple methods 
in order to capture different features of the same empirical reality; (2) 
complementarity, whereby one method enhances, clarifies, and validates 
the results of the other; (3) development, whereby one methods informs 
the other; (4) initiation, which refers to paradoxes and contradictions in 
the results of the multiple methods used; and (5) expansion, which refers 
to adding either breadth or depth which is often lacking when using one 
single method (Greene, Caracelli, and Graham 1989, 259). However, 
since this study is qualitative dominant it does not fully benefit from the 
utility of these five key rationales for using a mixed methods approach. 
The survey data collected could not capture, or provide an alternative 
angle of inquiry into certain aspects of the social relations of production 
and mechanisms of control which became apparent from the qualitative 
data collection based on semi-structure interviews, participant observa-
tion and focus groups. Nonetheless, even if only used in a descriptive 
way, the survey data complements the more in-depth qualitative data 
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through an understanding of household characteristics, landholdings, 
access to credit and machinery, etc., across a much larger sample group 
than was possible through in-depth interviews. No apparent contradic-
tions or paradoxes were found in the results of the various methods 
used, validating the data gathered from the more in-depth, yet smaller 
sample size, of the qualitative interviews for which the majority of this 
study relies. 
1.4.2 Household survey10 
The survey targeted rural producers in Cuatro Cañadas and San Julián, 
interviewing the self-identified decision-makers or ‘heads of households’ 
as identified by the people living in the household. In order to reach a 
substantial number of households across both municipalities, it was 
deemed necessary to recruit university students from the Universidad 
Autónoma Gabriel René Moreno, San Julián campus, studying agronomy, 
veterinary studies and agricultural engineering. Fourteen students (7 
male, 7 female) were selected after several training sessions and practice 
surveys were carried out over a two-week period. The survey was carried 
out from November 2014 to January 2015 due to the availability of sur-
veyors and before the soybean summer harvest. Combined, the two mu-
nicipalities have a total 13,712 people who identify agriculture as their 
main economic activity (INE 2012b). Given the long distances between 
rural homesteads and across various communities and road access limita-
tions during periods of heavy rainfall, students were designated to visit 
households within their respective regions. A random selection of 
households was first attempted based on a selection scheme of every se-
cond household, but resulted in many absences as students would travel 
long distances only to find that many people were not available. Limited 
financial resources and student availability forced us to allow students to 
visit cooperative and accessible households, rendering a selection bias in 
the survey sample. Household visits, however, were carried out during 
random periods throughout the week and were therefore not structured 
to only weekdays or weekends, nor only during mornings, afternoons or 
evenings. This reduces the selection bias to an extent, though we must 
take into account that a perfect random sample was not achieved. More-
over, although several training workshops were carried out with the stu-
dents, we must assume variation in interviewer interpretations and ex-
planations of certain questions. In terms of the total sample, 86% of self-
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identified ‘heads of households’ are also male. However, this gender bias 
was inevitable given that we were targeting agricultural producers and the 
current system of agro-industrial production is a system of patriarchy. 
The latest government data suggests that 83.7% of the population which 
identify agriculture as their main economic activity in these two munici-
palities are male, deeming our sample consistent with government data 
(INE 2012b). The exclusion of women in production and decision-
making has become characteristic of the agro-industrial model as tradi-
tional farmer knowledge has been replaced by ‘technological packages’ 
and labour-intensive tasks replaced by mechanization. Women play a 
lead role in those activities that are under-recognized in society and un-
recognized in the economy, namely household reproduction. This in-
volves childcare, caring for the elderly and sick, food preparation, clean-
ing, tending household garden plots, among many other tasks. However, 
when it comes to agricultural contracts, purchasing ‘technological pack-
ages’, or working with heavy machinery, women for the most part do not 
participate. Given the survey’s target population, the gender inequality of 
the sample is therefore representative since most questions are related to 
the political economy of soybean production. Although gender and gen-
erational differences within the household are not revealed in the survey, 
it is important to recognize that households are not homogeneous enti-
ties (White 1986; Razavi 2009). These intra-household and class dynam-
ics are further discussed in Chapter 5 and based on qualitative data col-
lection from interviews and participant observation. Table 1.1 presents 
the socio-economic characteristics of the survey sample: 
Accounting for the survey’s shortcomings and potential biases, survey 
data is used in a complementary way in an attempt to limit the degree of 
bias and inconsistencies in the study through triangulation. Survey data is 
used in a descriptive way to illustrate household and productive charac-
teristics.  Qualitative data is much more central, but the survey data al-
lows for between-method triangulation whereby ‘the flaws for one 
method are often the strengths of another; and by combining methods, 
observers can achieve the best of each while overcoming their unique 
deficiencies’ (Denzin 1978, 302). Survey data which was inconsistent or 
contradicted with that of semi-structured interviews, participant observa-
tion or secondary data collection could therefore be probed for further 
investigation. Despite the survey’s shortcomings, the breadth of data I 
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was able to collect validated the more in-depth and qualitatively richer 
data from my interviews and participant observation.  
Table 1.1 
Household survey socio-economic characteristics 
Total number of households     303 
Mean age of head of household Mean household size (persons) 
Mean 47.9 
Mean 4.62 
Standard deviation 11.4 
Gender Landholding size (hectares) 
Male 86% Mean 53.3 
Female 14% Standard Deviation 30.7 
Education Level  Year of arrival to settlement 
None 7% After 2009 9% 
Primary (partial) 58% 2000-2009 17% 
Primary (complete) 19% 1990-1999 30% 
Secondary (partial) 6% 1980-1989 27% 
Secondary (complete) 8% 1970-1979 15% 
Post-secondary trade 1% Before 1970 3% 
University 1% 
  
Ethnicity Principal economic activity 
None 7% None 0% 
Quechua 68% Agriculture 83% 
Guarani 0% Rural labour 9% 
Chiquitano 2% Shopkeeper 1% 
Mestizo 1% Household labour 1% 
Other 18% Public employee 3% 
 
Student 1% 
Corporate/industrial worker 0% 
Other 1% 
 
Source: Household survey conducted by author, 2014-15. 
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The semi-structured interviews, participant observation, and every day 
informal conversations with the local population are, in general, much 
more revealing than the survey data. Many farmers become apprehen-
sive, nervous, and sceptical with the formalities of a survey. Even doing a 
cross-examination of survey data and qualitative interviews revealed in-
consistencies in peoples’ responses, particularly concerning the number 
of parcels or amount of land people own or work. Since under the Land 
Law one cannot legally rent out their land, people are hesitant to tell the 
truth about certain contract arrangements which prevail throughout the 
community, particularly in a long-form survey. Unfortunately, much of 
the data which informs policy and dominant discourses is based on a 
very superficial understanding of the rural reality from survey data. In 
fact, ANAPO provides the government with its ‘official’ data on land use 
changes, yields, overall soybean production (tonnes and hectares), and 
employment. This has led to many misconceptions and false claims by 
both state and capitalist actors as they continue to justify and legitimize 
the development and expansion of the soybean complex with data which 
lacks depth and relational characteristics. As Jerven asserts, ‘Failures to 
understand that data are social products, and that the relations of power 
condition the production of them, may lead researchers and donors to 
place undue confidence in data sets’ (2014, 14). It is important to recog-
nize the ‘social nature of data production’ (2001, 141) as Ronald J. Her-
ring puts it. Census data from the state and survey data from ANAPO, 
for example, fail to capture many important aspects regarding land ten-
ure relations. Land size may be accounted for (though only partially), but 
aggregate and absolute physical size of land parcels tells us nothing about 
soil quality, yields, flood zone risks, or access to infrastructure and mar-
kets. Relations between landowners, wage labourers and machine opera-
tors, and agro-industry are further hidden in survey statistics, making it 
nearly impossible to reveal and analyze the changing social relations and 
forms of production embedded within land tenure relations. Sacrificing 
the breadth of the survey data, this study relies primarily on the in-depth 
qualitative data collected through conversations and observation while 
using the survey data in a secondary, complementary and minor way. 
Processed on: 6-4-2017
509436-L-bw-McKay
34 CHAPTER 1 
 
1.4.3 Qualitative data collection 
From 2014 to 2015, I lived in Cuatro Cañadas, in the heart of the soy-
bean expansion zone, conducting semi-structured interviews with key 
informants through snowballing and focus groups with members of rural 
worker associations, while also engaging in countless conversations with 
people in the nearby communities on a daily basis. I first travelled 
around the region with Enrique Callisaya, a Bolivian agronomist with 
over 15 years of work experience in Cuatro Cañadas. Mr. Callisaya not 
only has an abundance of knowledge regarding land-use changes, chang-
ing forms of production, and the general socio-economic and environ-
mental transformations he has witnessed over the years, he is also a high-
ly regarded agricultural expert and well-known throughout the 
community. Mr. Callisaya introduced me to many of the key informants 
interviewed for this study, enabling me to break through the otherwise 
difficult social and cultural barriers which would have arisen as a Canadi-
an researcher in rural Bolivia. Bolivian NGO Fundación TIERRA with 
which I continue to collaborate, connected me with Mr. Callisaya and 
provided other institutional and personal support throughout this re-
search. Living in the community was also very important to build rela-
tionships with community members – whether at the market, community 
events, restaurants, gas stations, bus rides, or even at the rural worker 
association’s meetings – everyday interactions and shared experiences 
strengthened my relationship with the community. 
Interviews with academics, researchers, social movements leaders, and 
government officials were conducted in La Paz, Cochabamba and Santa 
Cruz. I travelled to Brazil’s capital city, Brasilia, where I conducted inter-
views with government officials, EMBRAPA researchers, soybean farm-
ers, as well as leaders from La Via Campesina and the Landless Worker’s 
Movement (MST). A total of 84 semi-structured interviews were con-
ducted with key informants across these sites, along with many informal 
conversations particularly with people not working in the agricultural 
sector.11 Taxi, bus, and truck drivers, shopkeepers, school teachers, stu-
dents, hospital workers, mechanics, restaurant owners, gas station work-
ers, among others across genders, generations, and ethnicities living in 
Cuatro Cañadas and San Julián provided key insights into broader socio-
economic and environmental changes taking place throughout the re-
gion. The semi-structured interview allows the interviewer ‘to probe far 
beyond the answers to their prepared and standardized questions’ (Berg 
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2001, 70) making for a more natural and fluid interaction with the re-
search subjects. This requires adapting the language to the local slang 
and ‘dichos’ (expressions), while also being conscious of local politics, cur-
rent events in the community, and generally sensitive to specific context, 
including the interviewee’s time availability. 
I also attended community meetings with rural worker associations 
and the town councils, mostly participating through observation, while at 
times presenting my research and engaging in small focus group discus-
sions. Focus groups were conducted with members from the small pro-
ducer association, Federación Sindical de Comunidades Interculturales de Produc-
tores Agropecuarios Cuatro Cañadas (FSCIPACC) and other community 
members from the village of Nuevo Palmar. Focus groups included only 
male participants given the patriarchal structure of the soy complex and 
the cultural norm of males as the decision makers in terms of agricultural 
production. Since the focus group as a research method ‘is intended to 
encourage subjects to speak freely and completely about behaviors, atti-
tudes, and opinions they possess’ (Berg 2001, 111), the inclusion of 
women or youth may have only repressed and excluded their participa-
tion. Despite the gender and generational bias of the focus group, these 
discussions enabled me to understand the broader issues facing produc-
ers from the association’s standpoint and in the community, which 
helped guide my study and other issues which could be raised during the 
semi-structured interviews which followed. Interviews and conversations 
were held separately with both women and youth groups, including fe-
male community leaders and women’s worker associations. Key insights 
from the interviews, focus groups, participant observation, and house-
hold survey are weaved through the entire dissertation, informing the 
analysis and conclusions throughout. 
I attended local events such as the annual ExpoSoya where agribusi-
ness companies such as Syngenta, Monsanto, John Deere, New Holland, 
Nidera, among others, collaborate with ANAPO, the Agricultural 
Chamber of Commerce for the Orient (Cámara Agropecuaria del Oriente, 
CAO) and government officials from the local, regional, and national 
levels to promote new seed varieties, harvesters, tractors, fumigators, 
seeders, agro-chemicals, and even credit and financial services. When I 
attended the event in 2014, President Evo Morales arrived by helicopter 
and, alongside ANAPO’s then President Demetrio Perez and CAO Pres-
ident Julio Roda, expressed his support for the industry, the importance 
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of soybeans for food security and food sovereignty and authorized a su-
preme decree lifting the export limit on soybean grain to 300,000 tons 
for the winter harvest. It was a typical state discourse which emerged 
since the post-2009 era of Evo Morales and the MAS, filled with anti-US 
imperial rhetoric, support for indigenous originary peasants (indígena orig-
inario campesinos)12, and the importance of regaining Bolivia’s sovereignty 
from its neoliberal past. The soybean, dubbed as the ‘golden grain’, was 
praised by the President for bringing development, economic growth, 
employment, as well as food security and sovereignty. Yet, as will be-
come apparent throughout this study, this discourse not only contradicts 
itself, but is filled with misconceptions about the socio-economic impli-
cations of soybean production in Bolivia. Nonetheless, Bolivia’s first in-
digenous president, with his charisma and ability to connect with the 
country’s historically marginalized people, was able to simultaneously 
gain support and approval from capital-poor small-scale farmers to large-
scale landowners and agro-industry. Indeed, this discourse is representa-
tive of much deeper relations among rural classes of capital and labour 
and the politics of control which will become much more apparent 
throughout this study. Next, a description of the case study sites is pre-
sented including their demographics, socio-economic and agro-ecological 
characteristics, as well as detailed maps which reveal their location in the 
very centre of the soybean expansion zone. 
1.4.4 Cuatro Cañadas 
The municipality of Cuatro Cañadas was founded in 2002, though high-
land peasants and Mennonites started to settle in the area from the late 
1950s onward. It is located in the heart of the soybean expansion zone, 
about 104 kilometres east of Santa Cruz de la Sierra, Bolivia’s most pop-
ulated and fastest growing city, both economically and demographically. 
The municipality exists as a direct result of planned migratory policies 
and the arrival of Mennonites who established their colonies in the area 
and were pioneers of the frontier expansion. While Mennonites pur-
chased vast swaths of land known as ‘colonies’ which today are an aver-
age size of 11,000 hectares divided into family parcels of 50 hectares, 
highland peasants were also given plots up to 50 hectares each. Today, 
Cuatro Cañadas is a quintessential soybean town. Economic and demo-
graphic flows correlate with the soybean sector. During periods of har-
vest, the town is bustling as massive transport trucks, tractors and har-
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vesters move from parcel to parcel, village to village, collecting soybean 
grains for storage and processing. The rapid movement generates vast 
dust clouds which swallow up the town as the municipality’s three hotels 
become booked solid, earning the majority of their annual revenue over 
the course of a few weeks. With high levels of rainfall spanning from 
November through to March and an average temperature of 24 degrees 
Celsius, the region’s fertile lands produce two harvests per year, though 
the summer season is the most favourable for soybean cultivation and 
farmers usually cultivate maize, sunflower, sorghum, or wheat in the win-
ter harvest (Álvarez Álvarez 2005; Gobierno Municipal de Cuatro 
Cañadas 2008). Annual rainfall for 2013-14 was only 773 millimetres, a 
significant decrease from past years (ANAPO 2014; Álvarez Álvarez 
2005). The total summer harvest for Cuatro Cañadas in 2013-14 was 
245,000 hectares for a total of 659,050 metric tonnes (MT) representing 
28% of the country’s total soybean harvest (ANAPO 2014). The munic-
ipality had one of the highest average yields at 2.69 MT/ha, though the 
range varies drastically depending on geographic location and technolog-
ical inputs (ANAPO 2014). The landholding structure for the municipali-
ty is shown in Figure 1.1: 
Figure 1.1  
Landholding structure, Cuatro Cañadas 
  Source: (ANAPO 2014) 
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Cuatro Cañadas has a population of 22,845, with 52% male and 48% 
female while 81% are below the age of 40 (INE 2012b). Of the econom-
ically active population (9,604), 45% denote agriculture as their main 
economic activity; followed by commerce, transport, and shopkeepers 
(17%); and unspecified services (14%). Regardless of the economic activ-
ity, 38% classify as labourers and 39% as ‘self-employed’ (INE 2012b). 
Spanish is the first language of 55% of the population, followed by ‘for-
eign languages’ (26%) and Quechua (16%) (INE 2012b). The ‘foreign 
language’ mainly refers to Plattdeutsch or Mennonite Low German (ale-
mán bajo) and to a smaller extent, Brazilian Portuguese. Poverty, broadly 
defined by the National Statistics Institute (INE) as the inability to satis-
fy one’s basic needs, remains widespread, affecting just over 50% of the 
population while another 34.3% are on the threshold (INE 2012b). The 
majority of the townships are located in the west of the municipality. 
This is where the first migrants settled as they expanded outward from 
the large river which borders the municipality (Río Grande). Consequent-
ly, as the frontier expanded east with the arrival of Brazilian agro-
capitalists and agro-industry, everything east of highway 9 is controlled 
by Mennonites or large-scale farmers. Unfortunately for the majority of 
smallholders located west of highway 9 and close to Río Grande, they 
have not only experienced lower yields (1 MT/ha less than the west, on 
average), they also have experienced flooding as the river borders are 
increasingly eroding and climate fluctuations becoming more severe 
(ANAPO 2014; Álvarez Álvarez 2005; Gobierno Municipal de Cuatro 
Cañadas 2008; field notes 2014-15).  
Generated from Google Earth Engine Timelapse, Map 1.2 shows the 
rapid expansion of the agricultural frontier. This entire area is now used 
for soybean cultivation and has resulted in massive rates of deforestation 
which is discussed in more detail in the chapters that follow. Maps 1.2 
and 1.3 are snapshots of the same area which allows us to see the river 
(Río Grande) bordering Cuatro Cañadas to the west; the centre of the 
municipality marked by the red star in Map 1.3; and highway 9 which 
runs more or less north-south from the red star, marked by a red line. 
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Map 1.1 
Cuatro Cañadas, Nuflo de Chavez, Santa Cruz 
 
Source: Prepared for author by Efrain Tinta Guachalla, Fundacion TIERRA. The map is based 
on a satellite image using Landsat 7 spectral bands 4,3,2 (RGB). Green indicates vegetation 
with bright green indicating areas of cultivation and dark green indicating forested areas. The 
light pink areas indicate areas which have been under heavily cultivation; magenta represent 
soil with high humidity and possibly with irrigation; and dark purple represents areas covered 
in water, rivers and lakes. 
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Map 1.2 
Cuatro Cañadas, land change 1984-2012 
 
 
Source: Google Earth Engine Timelapse  
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Map 1.3 
Cuatro Cañadas 
 
 
Source: Fundacruz, n.d. 
 
1.4.2 San Julián 
San Julián was established as a municipality in 1989, though similar to 
Cuatro Cañadas, settlements were established decades earlier. It is locat-
ed to the northwest of Cuatro Cañadas and was one of the first coloniza-
tion zones to be established. Unlike Cuatro Cañadas in which settle-
ments established naturally and sporadically, settlements in San Julián 
were planned around nucleos coordinated by the National Colonization 
Institute (INC) and supported with funding from the United States 
Agency for International Development (USAID). The nucleo settlement 
pattern comprises of 40 settler households, each given 50 hectare parcels 
which radiate outwardly from the central township area for a total of 
2,000 hectares per nucleo. This design is meant to facilitate greater linkag-
es within the communities for cost-effective distribution of goods and 
services and organization among community members (Painter and 
Partridge 1986, 3). This settlement project started in 1972, but the major-
ity of migrants settled during the 1980s and 1990s. The current popula-
tion is 47,416 with similar demographics as Cuatro Cañadas with slightly 
more males than females (52-48%) and 80% of the population below the 
age of 40 (INE 2012b). Of the economically active population (19,843), 
47% denote agriculture as their main economic activity; followed by 
commerce, transport and shopkeepers (17%); and unspecified services 
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(14%). Agriculture in this area has become extremely male-dominated, as 
83% of ‘agriculturalists’ are male (INE 2012b). While the structure of 
economic activity mirrors that of Cuatro Cañadas, San Julián is a much 
more concentrated municipality with less cultivable land extension. In 
the summer of 2013-14, San Julián harvested 128,000 hectares of soy-
beans, roughly 50% that of Cuatro Cañadas (ANAPO 2014). The land-
holding structure for San Julián is shown in Figure 1.2: 
Figure 1.2 
Landholding structure, San Julián 
Source: ANAPO 2014 
 
 
Unlike Cuatro Cañadas, small-scale farmers in San Julián still have ac-
cess to the largest share of land relative to the farm size groupings. Two 
interrelated factors can explain this key difference: higher population 
density and the establishment of the nucleo planned settlement scheme. 
San Julián was the target region for highland peasant settlements and the 
nucleo scheme strengthened farmer cohesion and resiliency, making it 
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much more difficult for land appropriations to take place.  However, the 
penetration of industrial agriculture has resulted in new forms of socio-
economic differentiation within the nucleos which will be discussed in the 
subsequent chapters. 
Map 1.4 
San Julián, Nuflo de Chavez, Santa Cruz 
 
Source: Prepared for author by Efrain Tinta Guachalla, Fundacion TIERRA. The map is based 
on a satellite image using Landsat 7 spectral bands 4,3,2 (RGB). Green indicates vegetation 
with bright green indicating areas of cultivation and dark green indicating forested areas. The 
light pink areas indicate areas which have been under heavily cultivation; magenta represent 
soil with high humidity and possibly with irrigation; and dark purple represents areas covered 
in water, rivers and lakes. 
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Map 1.4 shows the geographic location of San Julián in relation to the 
rest of the country as well as a municipal map of its settlements. In Map 
1.5, we can see the development of the nucleos from 1984 to 2012 and the 
agricultural expansion in the surrounding areas. Map 1.6 shows the areas 
in San Julián which are at risk of flooding from Río Grande which borders 
the municipality and continues south towards Cuatro Cañadas. The areas 
in pink, orange and yellow have permanently high, seasonally high, and 
moderate risks of flooding, respectively, and have forced many commu-
nities to abandon their landholdings. This floodplain continues south 
towards Cuatro Cañadas where the majority of small-scale landowners 
are located, as previously discussed. 
Map 1.5 
San Julián, land change 1984-2012 
 
 
Source: Google Earth Engine Timelapse < https://earthengine.google.com/timelapse/>  
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Map 1.6 
San Julián 
 
 
Source: Prefectura de San Julián, n.d. 
 
 
These municipalities have experienced the most rapid rates of land 
use change over the past two decades and continue to be key sites of 
agro-industrial expansion. Indeed, these municipalities are the product of 
the agro-industrial soy complex. This region is the boundary of Bolivia’s 
agricultural frontier which continues to expand, coinciding with indige-
nous territories and classes of rural labour vying for land access. These 
communities do not exist in a vacuum and must analyzed in the context 
of their geographic proximity to Brazil and broader socio-economic and 
political changes nationally, regionally and internationally. While offering 
intrinsic value and relational specificity at the micro level; at the macro 
level the case study is used in an instrumental way to ‘provide insights 
into, or refine a theoretical explanation, making it more generalizable’ 
(Berg 2009, 326).  The study therefore seeks to extend from the micro 
level to the macro level, allowing us to draw insights from these case 
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studies on a much broader scale. Further, the empirical data illuminates 
more generalizable trends and tendencies of agro-industrial capital’s pen-
etration into the countryside in the contemporary era. Using data trian-
gulation through the mixed methods approach, Cuatro Cañadas and San 
Julián, as case studies, have enabled this study to draw empirical generali-
zations for the larger group of producers and smallholders integrated in 
the soy complex. Analytical generalizations are also drawn from the ex-
clusionary and extractive tendencies of the soy complex and agro-capital 
penetration more broadly. Such insights and analyses hope to contribute 
to new understandings of agrarian questions and the politics of agrarian 
change in the contemporary period.    
This study analyzes the development and expansion of the agro-
industrial soy complex in Bolivia and the implications for agrarian 
change using an approach based in agrarian political economy. Empirical 
data from the field provide fresh insights into changing social relations 
of access and control, the new forms of capital penetration and institu-
tional arrangements, class struggle, and general observations and percep-
tions from rural populations. Before delving into these empirics, an ana-
lytical framework is presented which guides the overarching framing of 
this study. The politics of control is presented in the next chapter. 
1.5 Organization of the study and its main arguments 
This dissertation consists of eight chapters, including this introduction 
and a conclusion. In Chapter 2 an analytical framework is developed 
which is used throughout the study to analyze new relations of access 
and control which have emerged with the development of the agro-
industrial soy complex. The framework, referred to as the politics of 
control, helps us understand the role and nature of the state and the rela-
tions among state, societal, and capitalist actors conceptualized as the 
state-society-capital nexus. While the politics of control is used to under-
stand such new forms of control and the politics behind these processes 
in the Bolivian context, the framework aims to contribute to our under-
standing of ‘control grabbing’ more generally with more conceptual clari-
ty in understanding the nature and role of the capitalist state. 
Chapter 3 discusses the development of the soy complex in Latin 
America, from the commercialization of GM soybean seeds, to agro-
chemicals, processing and distribution. It proceeds with an overview of 
the emergence of a market oligopoly controlling the upstream and 
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downstream components of soybean production and the importance of 
Brazil in adopting, developing and transferring these technologies and its 
agro-industrial model throughout the region. The combination of a 
changing global political economy of food and agriculture and biotech-
nology innovations fuelled the expansion of soybean plantations on a 
great scale, triggering a trajectory of agrarian change throughout the re-
gion which has had important and lasting implications for agricultural 
development and geo-political relations. 
In Chapter 4, the development of Bolivia’s agrarian structure is ana-
lyzed historically through several phases of transition – from revolution, 
migration, crises and agrarian reforms. The expansion of the agricultural 
frontier and the arrival of Brazilian agro-capitalists is discussed with first-
hand experiences from some of the first Brazilian farmers who went to 
Santa Cruz in the 1990s. Relations among state, societal, and capitalist 
actors and the forms of legitimacy and accumulation which characterize 
these periods are analyzed within the politics of control framework. The 
emergence of new social movements and the rejection of neoliberalism 
set the conditions for the rise of Evo Morales and the MAS as a ‘gov-
ernment of social movements’.   
Chapter 5 analyzes the politics of agrarian change during the Morales 
administration, from its Agrarian Revolution in 2006 to the Productive 
Revolution in 2011. The state-society-capital nexus is analyzed within 
this changing context, arguing that a state-capital alliance was formed 
enabling the MAS to maintain control over the state apparatus and clas-
ses of capital in Santa Cruz to maintain control over the soy complex. 
New forms of exclusion and mechanisms of control which place small-
holders in contradictory class positions have led to a functional dualism 
in the countryside, hindering the ability of smallholders to mobilize and 
organize as a ‘class for itself’ and voice their demands to the state. 
Chapter 6 takes a step back to focus on the forms of value appropria-
tion via value-chain control and relations of debt and dependency. This 
chapter reveals the limited value-added generated by the sector as agro-
industrial inputs are imported from abroad and the soybean, only semi-
processed, is exported for further processing elsewhere. The concentra-
tion of control over the entire complex points to limited competition as 
corporations distort prices and heavily influence quality standards and 
input requirements. Institutional arrangements of debt and dependency 
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are revealed, eroding farmer knowledge and their control over produc-
tion.  
The concept of agrarian extractivism is further developed in Chapter 
7. This chapter reveals the very extractive character of the agro-industrial 
soy complex. Four interlinked features of agrarian extractivism in Bolivia 
are put forth: (1) large volumes of materials extracted destined for export 
with little or no processing; (2) value-chain concentration and sectoral 
disarticulation (3) high intensity of environmental degradation; and (4) 
deterioration of labour opportunities and/or labour conditions. It is ar-
gued here that this type of agro-industrial development parallels that of 
an extractive enclave, disconnected from sufficient value-added and em-
ployment generation activity due to a lack of forward and backward link-
ages with the rest of the economy with a high intensity of environmental 
degradation. Agrarian extractivism challenges the legitimating discourse 
of ‘industrial agriculture’, arguing for the need to delve deeper analytical-
ly into the extractive dynamics of some forms of agricultural production. 
The conclusion provides a synthesis of the main findings of the study, 
including the analytical utility of the politics of control, the rise and in-
fluence of Brazilians in Bolivia’s soy complex, and the importance of us-
ing an analysis of access, control and exclusion rather than rights-based 
approaches. Finally, based on this investigation some trajectories of 
agrarian change are discussed with some possible broader implications 
for researchers, policy makers and social movements. 
Notes 
 
1 Including both upstream (seeds, land, agro-inputs, machinery) and down-
stream (storage, processing, packaging, distribution) components of soybean 
production, consumption, and distribution. 
2 See the Journal of Peasant Studies special forum on flex crops and commodities 
with papers on soybean (Oliveira and Schneider 2016), sugarcane (McKay et 
al. 2016), corn (Gillon 2016) and oil palm (Alonso-Fradejas et al. 2016).  
3 Provincial and district farming statistics, see (Thorner 1966:xi) 
4 ‘A farm normally run by a family without hired outside wage labour, some-
times in part engaging in nonagricultural crafts and trades. Since there is no 
wage category, analysis in terms of normal capitalist categories is inapplicable. 
Moreover, the motivation of such a farm is not profit but labor-consumer bal-
ance’ (Chayanov 1966 [1925]:273). 
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5 According to the Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO) and the World 
Health Organization (WHO) we produce enough food to feed nealy 9.5 bil-
lion people yet one billion suffer from chronic hunger and another two billion 
are overweight and obsese (FAO 2015; WHO 2016; FAOSTAT 2016). 
6 According to Law 3545 2006 (Reconducción de la reforma agraria), in Santa Cruz 
small farms defined as those with less than 50 hectares; medium-scale farms 
range from 51-500ha; and large-scale have over 500 hectares. 
7 Author’s calculation based on data from INE, 2011 and World Bank 2007: 
(2,861,330 ha total arable land ´ 0.14)/ (660,000 total farm units ´ 0.87 small-
holders) =0.698 ha per unit. 
8 A small farmer in Santa Cruz is defined as having 50 hectares or less. 
9 Saneamiento is a process of land regularization formalizing tenure relations. 
10 A special thanks to Fundación TIERRA and in particular Jose Luis 
Eyzaguirre, who helped with the design of the survey and training the stu-
dents. 
11 See Appendix for key informant profiles. 
12 This new political subject was created in the 2009 Constitution as an inclu-
sive, multicultural and plurinational term which strategically includes the iden-
tities of the country’s most influential social movements, namely 
CONAMAQ (originarios), CIDOB (indígenas), and CSUTCB (campesinos). Dur-
ing the Katarista movement in the 1970s the common identity of Eastern ‘in-
digenous’ and Andean peasants ‘resulted in the recognition of both groups as 
a part of originario peoples or ‘nations’ of the country, thereby adopting a con-
cept similar to that of ‘first nations’ used by North American indigenous 
groups or that of adivasi used by indigenous peoples in India’ (Albó 2002, 77). 
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2 The Politics of Control 
 
2.1 Introduction 
New forms and mechanisms of capital penetration in the countryside 
require us to go beyond a framework based on property rights or formal 
land ownership to one of ‘control grabbing’ as put forth by Borras et al. 
(2012). For Borras et al. (2012, 850) ‘control grabbing is inherently rela-
tional and political; it involves political power relations’ and can manifest 
in a variety of ways which ‘does not always result in dispossession’. The 
analytical framework which guides this study, referred to as the politics 
of control, builds upon this concept and synthesizes three other theoreti-
cal interventions:  (1) Ribot and Peluso’s (2003) ‘theory of access’ and 
the new forms and mechanisms of control which have emerged in 
(agro)extractive development; (2) the works of O’Connor (1973), Pou-
lantzas (1978), and Jessop (2008) on the nature and role of the capitalist 
state; and (3) the works of Fox (1993) and Borras (2007) on state-society 
relations. The analytic utility of the politics of control are twofold: first, it 
captures the new forms and mechanisms of resource control and value 
appropriation (or extraction) in (agro)extractive sectors through an anal-
ysis of access rather than property or concessional rights. These include 
various forms of dispossession and displacement, but also mechanisms 
of exclusion and appropriation which do not necessarily require the 
physical removal of people from the land. Second, it provides an analyti-
cal framework for evaluating the state’s dual and often contradictory 
functions of facilitating capital accumulation and maintaining political 
legitimacy and the strategic relations among state and societal actors in 
gaining and maintaining control over the state apparatus. ‘Control’ there-
fore has a dual meaning: control over the state apparatus and control 
over the factors of production (land, labour, capital) and thus resource 
access. Several concepts are developed throughout this work which help 
us understand the politics of control such as ‘productive exclusion’, ‘val-
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ue-chain control’, ‘agrarian extractivism’, and ‘state-society-capital nexus’. 
These concepts are developed in the subsequent chapters and only the 
latter will be discussed at length in this chapter. This chapter elaborates 
on the role and nature of the state, its dual and often contradictory func-
tions of accumulation and legitimacy and develops the state-society-
capital nexus as a conceptual framework for understanding state-society 
relations. 
2.2 Power, property and access relations 
Central to this research is the concept of power and understanding the 
differentiated powers within society, what constitutes such powers, and 
how we can analyze a relatively abstract concept that is so central to this 
analysis. Instead of simplifying the concept, it was deemed necessary to 
problematize ‘power’ so as to be able to understand the multiple dimen-
sions and levels of power relations between and within the state-society 
relation. Since power relations are so closely intertwined with access and 
control relations, these latter concepts are also discussed in the context 
of Ribot and Peluso’s (2003) ‘Theory of Access’. The following discus-
sion on power is by no means exhaustive, but situates how the concept is 
used and understood for the purposes of this study. 
2.2.1 Relations of power 
Central to an analysis of access is the concept of power. Power is under-
stood here as a relational concept, existing through social relationships 
between different actors. Drawing from the works of Lukes (1974) and 
later Gaventa (1980), this study understands the concept of power as 
multidimensional – apparent through diverse formations, across various 
levels, and within different spaces.   In its most basic form, power reveals 
itself in visible, decision-making arenas where one can easily observe 
‘who participates, who gains and loses, and who prevails in decision-
making’ (Polsby 1963, 5). The mechanisms of power here involve politi-
cal resources which, in capitalist societies, are often, but not necessarily, 
associated with one’s access to capital. However, this notion of power 
adhered to by pluralist’s such as Dahl (1961) and Polsby (1963) gives 
primacy to that which appears on the surface – one’s behaviour, partici-
pation, and action. But those not participating within these particular 
spaces are not properly taken into account in the analysis of power rela-
tions and their ‘political silence’ (i.e. marginalization, exclusion) can be 
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taken to reflect consensus, apathy, quiescence, etc. (Gaventa 1980, 7–8).  
This one-dimensional approach to understanding power is therefore not 
fully adequate in explaining the various forms of power and when, why, 
and how some actors participate, or act in such a way and others not. 
The exclusion of certain actors from decision-making spaces through 
various barriers generated by vested interests presents another mecha-
nism of power. Critiquing the pluralist’s view that different actors are 
able to participate in decision-making spaces through interest/pressure 
group systems, Eric Elmer Schattsneider (1960) introduced the concept 
‘mobilization of bias’ whereby ‘power is exercised not just upon partici-
pants within the decision-making process but also towards the exclusion 
of certain participants and issues altogether’ (Gaventa 1980, 9). Thus, we 
must take into account the ‘political origins of inaction’ (Crenson 1971), 
that is, why, how and the extent to which some actors are excluded. 
Bachrach and Baratz (1970, 43) elaborate on the ‘mobilization of bias’ as: 
A set of predominant values, beliefs, rituals, and institutional procedures 
(‘rules of the game’) that operate systematically and consistently to the 
benefit of certain persons and groups at the expense of others. Those who 
benefit are placed in a preferred position to defend and promote their 
vested interests.  
This is manifested through formal and informal institutional barriers 
such as language and location, discriminatory policies favouring one 
group over another, and the decision of what qualifies as an issue and a 
non-issue. In capitalist societies, these vested interests and actors shaping 
the ‘rules of the game’ are often representative of the interests of the 
capitalist class – those who control the means of production and are 
seeking to maintain the status quo and facilitate processes of capital ac-
cumulation. The ‘powers of exclusion’ can be in some ways hidden, inso-
far as they become embedded within institutions, the ‘workings’ of the 
market, norms, and regulations (Hall, Hirsch, and Li 2011). Most often, 
exclusion in the rural context regards property rights, and is conceptual-
ized as either the enclosure of common lands and dispossession of the 
peasantry (Marx 1976) or as a pre-requisite for economic growth and 
development (de Soto 2000). Evidently, exclusion depends which side of 
the fence you are on, so to speak, and can equally protect and facilitate 
greater access to credit and other resources as it can exclude, displace 
and marginalize the poor. Exclusion, and the power to exclude, in this 
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sense, assumes the excluded and marginalized are aware of their exclu-
sion and oppression and can therefore consciously mobilize as, for ex-
ample, a ‘class for itself’, against such forms of institutionalized exclu-
sion. In other words, this approach assumes observable conflict, 
resistance, whether overt or covert. However, as Steven Lukes points out 
‘to assume that the absence of grievance equals genuine consensus is 
simply to rule out the possibility of false or manipulated consensus by 
definitional fiat’ (Lukes 2005, 28).  This form of power does delve into 
another level of power relations, however it fails to explain one’s ability 
to actually influence, shape, and determine the very wants, practices and 
ideas of others which brings us to the third dimension of power as put 
forward by Lukes (2005). 
The third dimension of power goes beyond the act of exercising pow-
er over others and the power to exclude, to a deeper level of power ma-
nipulation. It involves dominant discourses and ideologies which em-
body, portray, and reinforce certain social relations. Forms of 
domination and thus power become embedded in ‘normal processes’ of, 
say, ‘modernization’ and ‘development’ which may be perceived as ‘un-
changeable’ and therefore go unchallenged. This dimension can be root-
ed in public education systems, through information control, mass me-
dia, and processes of socialization (Gaventa 1980, 16). Power, in this 
dimension, is akin to Gramsci’s (1971) concept of ‘cultural hegemony’ 
and ‘war of position’; Lippmann’s (1922) ‘manufacture of consent’; and 
Bernays’ (1947) ‘engineering of consent’. For Gramsci (1971, 80), ‘the 
supremacy of a social group manifests itself in two ways, as ‘domination’ 
and as ‘intellectual and moral leadership’, while hegemony ‘is character-
ized by the combination of force and consent, which balance each other 
reciprocally, without force predominating excessively over consent.’ 
Gramsci’s coercion and consent reflects both power in its observable 
and unobservable, or ideological, form. While Walter Lippmann (1922, 
248), writing in the early 1920s, argued that ‘persuasion has become a 
self-conscious art and a regular organ of popular government’ and that 
‘under the impact of propaganda…the old constants of our thinking 
have become variables.’ Along similar lines, Edward Bernays (1947, 119–
120), proclaimed that ‘communication is the key to engineering consent 
for social action’ but ‘will accomplish little unless they are the tools of a 
soundly thought-out plan and carefully organized methods.’ These forms 
of manipulation through information control become embedded within 
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cultural and ideological institutions as a form of ‘invisible’ power exercis-
ing great influence over both political and civil society.  
As dominant discourses become normalized and internalized, forms 
of oppression, discrimination, and exclusion reinforce a sense of false 
consciousness of social relations across all classes in society. This rein-
forces certain (false) expectations and can lead to a sense of powerless-
ness which is conducive to inaction or a lowering of demands (Gaventa 
1980, 17). If we assume that, as Pizzorno (1970, 45) asserts ‘class con-
sciousness promotes political participation, and in its turn political par-
ticipation increases class consciousness’ then this third power dimension 
can be extremely difficult to overcome as it works to alter perceptions, 
norms, expectations, and therefore one’s identity and level of conscious-
ness. Class consciousness and organizing as a ‘class for itself’ through 
high degrees of organization, mobilization, and alliance building is crucial 
for marginalized groups to overcome forms of oppression and exclusion. 
Understanding and deconstructing the power structures that exist in so-
ciety enables people and groups to better formulate forms of resistance 
through strategic alliances.  
These three dimensions demonstrate how power, as a social relation, 
is self-reinforcing and becomes embedded in cultural and ideological in-
stitutions. In the first dimension, one actor (or group) is able to prevail 
over another in a decision-making arena, enabling the former greater in-
fluence over the allocation of resources in a given situation. In the se-
cond dimension, the former may be able to accumulate surplus resources 
which can be used to exclude others from entering the decision-making 
arena altogether, creating barriers of a ‘mobilization of bias’. Finally, the 
third dimension of power is the result of increased concentration of re-
sources and influence by means of the first two dimensions which allow 
the now relatively ‘powerful’ to legitimate its position in relation to oth-
ers via communications control, media, institutions, and developing 
dominant ideologies and discourses (Gaventa 1980, 22). Hale’s (2002) 
notion of ‘neoliberal multiculturalism’ could be an example of this di-
mension of power ‘whereby proponents of the neoliberal doctrine pro-
actively endorse a substantive, if limited, version of indigenous cultural 
rights, as a means to resolve their own problems and advance their own 
political agendas’ (Hale 2002, 487). The Bolivian government’s attempt 
to construct a highway through the autonomous territory for indigenous 
peoples of TIPNIS (Territorio Indígena del Parque Nacional Isiboro-Sécure) ex-
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emplifies the notion of neoliberal multiculturalism as the government, in 
one sense, granted a record number of ‘autonomous’ Native Community 
Lands (Tierra Comunitaria de Origen, TCO), yet continues to pursue an ex-
tractivist development strategy rooted in a neoliberal ideology to im-
prove market access and ignore the rights of the very people the highway 
was supposedly to serve – what Jeffery Webber calls ‘reconstituted ne-
oliberalism’ (see Webber 2011; 2012). However, the power of social mo-
bilization and organization as demonstrated by the counter-movement of 
several highland and lowland indigenous groups, as well as the urban la-
bour movement who marched over 600 kilometres in 65 days from Beni 
to La Paz, forcing the MAS to, at least initially, cancel the highway pro-
ject, demonstrates the dialectic of the power relation (Webber 2012). 
Without a mobilizing societal sphere resisting forms of oppression and 
exploitation, the multiple dimensions of power can lead to deep and last-
ing social implications. Power relations exist as a matter of degree and 
are multi-directional. Through the mobilization against certain issues, 
acting as a ‘class for itself’, and forming strategic alliances, power rela-
tions can be altered and transformed. Just as power relations are self-
reinforcing, so too are processes of deconstruction. Challenging and 
weakening the unequal relation can reinforce forms of rebellion, con-
sciousness, participation, and eventually lead to social transformation. 
This domino effect or breaking one link in the ‘power chain’, highlights 
the importance of resistance and protest, even when the third dimension 
of power has been reinforced in the most dominant national and interna-
tional institutions. Power relations must be understood not only through 
such diverse formations, but also across different levels and within vari-
ous spaces as well as their interrelationships. From macro to micro levels 
of analysis – between, across and within class, gender, race, ethnicity, 
religion, generation – relations of power exist. Power is also manifested 
in various spaces – closed (bureaucrats, experts, elected representatives), 
invited (state actors invite social actors to participate in processes), 
claimed/created (spaces claimed/created by certain actors) (Gaventa 
2006).  
This analysis understands power as emergent from individuals and 
groups and eventually embedded in institutions. As explained in the third 
dimension of power, the generation of ‘new knowledges’ or ‘truths’ are 
constituted through the control of social communication, media, educa-
tion, research and development (R&D) and institutions. As emergent 
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from individuals and institutionalized within societal structures, power 
exists in the dialectical relationship between structure and agency as a 
continually evolving and transforming relation. Power, then, can be in-
terpreted through its various formations, across different levels, and 
within various spaces. This study is interested in the changing relations 
of access and control over productive resources in the context of agro-
industrial expansion and the politics of these processes. Since access to 
and control over land and its productive resources is the most important 
source of livelihood for rural peoples, land-based social relations are in-
dicative of the different power relations in rural areas. As Ronald J. Her-
ring (1999, 1) states, ‘land confers power in agrarian systems; reform pol-
icy must work through a system of power to restructure its base.’ This 
system of power is indeed multidimensional across different levels and 
spaces, and has become even more complex as the agro-industrial com-
plex becomes more vertically and horizontally integrated across sectors 
and along the value chain.  
Hall et al. (2011) discuss four ‘powers of exclusion’ which prevent 
people from benefitting from things, inverting Ribot and Peluso’s defini-
tion of access which is the ability to benefit from things. These include 
regulation, market, force and legitimation. Regulation and the market are 
represented within the second dimension of power as these are formal 
and informal institutional barriers which result in exclusion. Force is the 
outright, apparent form whereby ‘A has power over B to the extent that 
he can get B to do something that B would not otherwise do’ (Lukes 
2005, 16) which is represented within Lukes’ first dimension of power. 
Legitimation is about power manipulation, consent, or Gramsci’s war of 
position detailed in the third dimension of power. Linking power, exclu-
sion and access, as done by Hall et al. (2011), provide powerful tools of 
analysis which go beyond rights-based approaches. Building upon these 
works, this study analyzes the changing relations of access and control 
(and therefore power and exclusion) associated with the soy complex in 
Santa Cruz.  
2.2.2 Relations of access 
As new institutional arrangements emerge with the development of in-
dustrial agriculture, so too do new forms and mechanisms of control. 
Agro-industry’s control over seeds, agro-chemical inputs, machinery, 
processing, distribution and markets has rendered agriculture more in-
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dustrial by controlling the upstream and downstream components of 
production. This does not mean that land has lost its importance or sig-
nificance, but it has rendered relations of production and property more 
complex as value-chain agriculture becomes an instrument of control. In 
order to understand the complexities of these changing relations of ac-
cess and control, this study goes beyond the formal ‘bundle of rights’ 
associated with property rights theory to a broader analysis of access 
(Ribot and Peluso 2003). Ribot and Peluso’s (2003, 154) definition of 
access as ‘the ability to derive benefits from things’ offers a much broad-
er and comprehensive lens to understand the complex relationships 
which enable some people to benefit from resources, while restricting 
others. Framing the analysis in this way locates property rights as just 
one set of access relations among many others which allow people to 
gain, maintain, and control productive resources.  
Before delving into Ribot and Peluso’s ‘Theory of Access’ and how it 
will be used in this study, it is important to problematize the ‘bundle of 
rights’ concept and the shortcomings of property rights theory in dealing 
with land-based social relations. Property rights theory developed from, 
and has been a key pillar in, the works of classical and neoclassi-
cal/institutional economists from Adam Smith (1776), to Friedrich Hay-
ek (1945), Milton Friedman (1962), and now de Soto (2000) and World 
Bank economist’s Deininger and Binswanger (1999) among many others. 
According to this school, in order for a capitalist economy to function 
most effectively and efficiently a secure, well-defined property rights re-
gime must be implemented with four underlying criteria: universality, 
exclusivity, transferability, and enforceability (Swaney 1990, 452). In es-
sence, these four components constitute the so-called ‘bundle of rights’ 
inherent in property rights which overlap with the collection of rights 
guaranteed to individuals within certain societies.  According to Klein 
and Robinson (2011, 195), the concept ‘bundle of rights’ emerged in the 
late 19th Century and evolved ‘in the age of expanding democracy and 
collectivism.’ Whereas ‘property ownership’ previously entailed specific 
rules bearing on, or excluding others, including government; the ‘bundle 
of rights’ concept for property ownership would facilitate government 
intervention as ‘not the violating of property, but rather the rearranging 
or redefining of the bundle’ (Klein and Robinson 2011, 195). The con-
cept therefore renders property ownership much more subjective to in-
terpretation and easier for state actors to manipulate through the for-
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mation or amendment of new laws which create overlaps, contradictions, 
or discrepancies within the ‘bundle of rights’.  
Whether or not such an abstract concept is useful or not is still up for 
debate (see Klein and Robinson 2011). However, the underlying princi-
ple of ‘rights’ as opposed to ‘ability’ renders this concept incapable of 
dealing with the layers, or dimensions, of embedded power which facili-
tate access and control over resources by means which are legal, illegal, 
informal, relational, and historical.   These layers of embedded power 
represent the various types of social relations interacting around a given 
resource which form what Ribot and Peluso (2003) call ‘bundles of pow-
er’. While the ‘bundles of power’ refer to that which individuals and in-
stitutions hold and can draw on to ‘gain, control, or maintain access 
within particular political and cultural circumstances’, they are located 
and constituted within a larger network of ‘webs of power’ (Ribot and 
Peluso 2003).  Locating and analyzing these spheres of influence allows 
for a much deeper and comprehensive analysis of the social reality of 
control and access relations. 
In order to locate and analyze certain ‘bundles of powers’ we must 
define the very ‘things’ which individuals and institutions hold and can 
draw on to gain, control, or maintain access to land-based resources. 
These sources of power are intrinsic within the three dimensions of 
power previously mentioned, which, on the surface determines who par-
ticipates, who gains and loses, and who prevails in decision-making’ 
(Polsby 1963, 5). This draws from Blaikie’s (1985, 110) discussion of ‘ac-
cess qualifications’ as the range of income opportunities which one can 
draw from to secure access and control over assets. Ribot and Peluso 
(2003, 154) develop these ‘qualifications’ as ‘structural and relational 
mechanisms of access’ which encompass ‘the multiplicity of ways people 
derive benefits from resources, including, but not limited to, property 
relations.’ These include the following access mechanisms, most of 
which have overlapping characteristics: technology, capital, markets, la-
bour opportunities, knowledge, authority, social identity, and social rela-
tions. However, most of these mechanisms depend on one’s access to 
capital since one’s access to capital can enable their access to technology, 
markets, labour opportunities, authority, positionality of social identity, 
positionality of social relations vis-à-vis other people, and to a lesser ex-
tent, access to knowledge. Access to knowledge can be in the form of 
access to higher education, expertise, training, privileged information or 
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opportunities etc.; but also one’s ability to shape or produce certain 
knowledge. This last mechanism is very much embedded in the third di-
mension of power – that which ‘manufactures consent’ (Lippman 1922), 
achieving ‘cultural hegemony’ (Gramsci, 1971) and thereby defining the 
development agenda. 
These mechanisms of access thus constitute the ‘bundles of power’ 
from which one is able to derive benefits from resources. As actors with 
similar interests form alliances, their respective ‘bundles of powers’ ‘be-
come nodes in larger webs and, at the same time, can be disaggregated 
into their constituent strands’ (Ribot and Peluso 2003, 158).  
I therefore go beyond a rights-based approach where legal institutions 
within the state apparatus function as the legal mediator and adjudicator 
of the ‘right to benefit’ to an access-approach based on the ability to 
benefit. This requires the analysis to delve into the power relations un-
derlying these abilities among different state and societal actors. In this 
regard, though a class-based analysis will be primarily used to understand 
the dynamics of agrarian change, power relations that exist within certain 
classes as well as between and within the state apparatus will reveal other 
elements of power based on mechanisms of access which a ‘purely’ class-
based approach may not be able to fully comprehend.  Indeed, Marx 
recognized such variations of power within classes in Capital Volume 3:  
The specific economic form in which unpaid surplus labour is pumped 
out of the direct producers determines the relationship of domination and 
servitude, as this grows directly out of production itself and reacts back on 
it in turn as a determinant. On this is based the entire configuration of the 
economic community arising from the actual relations of production, and 
hence also its specific political form.…This does not prevent the same 
economic basis - the same in its major conditions - from displaying endless 
variations and gradations in its appearance, as the result of innumerable 
different empirical circumstances, natural conditions, racial relations, his-
torical influences acting from outside, etc., and these can only be under-
stood by analysing these empirically given conditions (Marx 1981, 927–
928). 
From a Marxist political economy approach, inter/intra-class strug-
gles of race, gender, ethnicity, generations, etc. are bounded, reinforced, 
and reproduced through class relations. The social relations of produc-
tion, then, are not just reproduced in economic terms but also in the so-
cial, political, cultural, and ideological spheres. This reproduction thus 
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reinforces the historically-bounded discriminatory social relations inher-
ent in capitalist societies through a system of cultural and ideological he-
gemony (Gramsci 1971). Variations of discriminatory practices are rein-
forced and rearticulated within the produced and reproduced social 
relations of production and the institutions facilitating such reproduc-
tion. This can be seen through the lack of support for ‘traditional’ or in-
digenous forms of production, the establishment of TCOs which rein-
force a racial divide and generate ethnic/racial antagonism within and 
across classes, or the construction of new highways and natural gas pipe-
lines through autonomous indigenous regions which threaten livelihoods 
on the basis of ‘efficiency’ for economic development. It can also mani-
fest in the unequal inheritance rights/property rights ownership among 
women and the rapidly declining opportunities for and exclusion of 
younger generations regarding their access to land-based resources. 
Moreover, the dominant discourse based on the need for large-scale 
agro-industrial monocrop plantations to increase productivity, spur eco-
nomic growth, and ‘feed the world’ reproduces a system which excludes 
and threatens the livelihoods of the marginalized, while reinforcing the 
power and domination of the privileged classes.  
Access analysis therefore embodies relations of power historically 
shaped by actors and institutions in society. As will be further discussed 
in the chapters which follow, agro-industry’s power over research and 
biotechnology innovations and ability to influence the political agenda in 
establishing intellectual property rights over inputs such as seeds has fa-
cilitated its ability to derive benefits from an otherwise natural input. In 
effect, it has excluded many and generated new mechanisms of resource 
control. Understanding the politics influencing these processes requires a 
further engagement with the role and nature of the state and state-society 
relations. 
2.3 The state-society-capitalist nexus 
The various state and societal actors, their interests and capacities; exist-
ing institutions and socio-economic structures; and the relations of all 
these in specific historical conjunctures is a messy, continuously evolving 
web of interaction and change. In the state-society relations literature, 
variants of state-centred and society-centred approaches provide explan-
atory frameworks for state action, policy outcomes and socio-economic 
change. For state-centred approaches, policy elites are the ‘decision-
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makers’ and main unit of analysis in explaining state action and policy 
outcomes (Krasner 1978; Nordlinger 1981; Evans, Rueschemeyer, and 
Skocpol 1985),  whereas for society-centred approaches, social classes 
and the particular class relations are the main unit of analysis which ulti-
mately shape state action and policy outcomes (Paige 1978; de Janvry 
1981; Domhoff 1996; 1987).  These frameworks are rooted in, on the 
one hand, distinct state theories from the Weberian tradition of the state 
as ‘a human community that (successfully) claims the monopoly of the legiti-
mate use of physical force within a given territory’ (Weber 1946, 78, italics in 
original)  and on the other hand, the Marxist tradition which understands 
the state as an instrument of class rule – with many variants along this 
theoretical spectrum. Some of these approaches tend to understand the 
state and society as mutually exclusive and self-determining entities 
which can be analyzed in isolation with ‘clear and unambiguous bounda-
ries between state apparatus and society, state managers and social forc-
es, and state power and societal power’ (Jessop 2001, 155). As two sepa-
rate entities, this implies that we can understand the workings of the 
state without necessarily understanding society or the societal structure 
and vice versa, ruling out ‘hybrid logics such as corporatism or policy 
networks; divisions among state managers due to ties between state or-
gans and other social spheres; and many other forms of overlaps be-
tween state and society’ (Jessop 2001, 155).  This study rejects this divi-
sion and argues that although they may appear to be two separate 
entities, the state and society are inextricably linked as a relation and thus 
we cannot understand the workings of the state apparatus, its institu-
tions, and state managers without understanding the social structure that 
makes up society. 
Under the logics of a state-society dualism, it may be difficult to un-
derstand why the Bolivian state (as an autonomous, self-determining en-
tity) has conceded economic power and control over land and other re-
sources to agro-industrial and landed elites rather than pursue its 
Agrarian Revolution through redistributive land reform and serve the 
interests of its constituents, namely indigenous and peasant farmers. At 
the very least, one would assume the new political elite would exercise 
their agency and autonomy to collect more taxes, royalties, or assume 
control over certain parts of the agricultural sector to fund social welfare 
programmes as it does in other sectors (mining, hydrocarbons) in its 
‘neo’ extractivist development model. Conversely, if the state has no au-
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tonomy whatsoever, it becomes difficult to fully understand why and 
how state action and policy outcomes, at times, go against the interests 
of the dominant, capitalist classes. In the context of the MAS as a self-
proclaimed ‘government of the social movements’, even understanding 
who the dominant classes are – whether the new political or old eco-
nomic elites – can also be increasingly blurred. While the oligarchic elites 
of old have not disappeared, their economic power is increasingly chal-
lenged by the new political elite. The state’s share of the domestic econ-
omy, for example, has increased from 15 to 38% of GDP since 2006 as 
it now controls some 43 companies in strategic sectors and has increased 
royalties and tax revenues from mining and hydrocarbons (Lazcano 
2013; Varela Mendoza 2014). When we consider the relations among 
state and societal actors concerning ‘revolving door politics’, when banks 
are too big to fail, or when lobby groups or key constituents (e.g. el Pacto 
de Unidad) are highly influential in electoral politics the apparent lines be-
tween the state and society become increasingly blurred. Yet even within 
the state apparatus, state managers (elected and appointed) are increas-
ingly at odds with one another as politics become ever-more polarizing. 
In Bolivia, relations between opposition leader and governor of Santa 
Cruz, Ruben Costas and President Evo Morales have gone from the 
former calling the latter an ‘assassin’, a ‘dictator’ and threatening a coup 
in 2008; to an apparent alliance in 2013-2014 (Ortiz 2013; 
EconomiaBolivia 2013). Evo Morales is now invited to meetings with 
the associations representing agro-industry such as CAO, CAINCO1, 
ANAPO and inaugurates corporate events of the Santa Cruz elite such 
as Fexpocuz and Expo Soya as mentioned in Chapter 1. How do we un-
derstand this apparently newly formed alliance between state actors and 
capitalist elites? 
The changing relations among elected political officials within the 
state apparatus and with classes of capital and labour cannot be fully un-
derstood in isolation to one another. At times, it may appear as though 
the state is simply an instrument of the ruling, capitalist class (represent-
ed by CAO, CAINCO, ANAPO, etc.); while at other times, the state 
appears as an autonomous entity with the capacity to pursue its own in-
terests. But these dualist perspectives tend to fall short of capturing the 
complexity of the state system which is neither autonomous nor an in-
strument, but a terrain of contested strategic relations among political 
forces attempting to appear neutral and outside of the society. As Mitch-
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ell (1991, 78) puts it, ‘the distinction (between the state and society) must 
be taken not as the boundary between two discrete entities, but as a line 
drawn internally within the network of institutional mechanisms through 
which a social and political order is maintained.’  
This study understands social and political change by engaging not 
with the state and society as independent variables, but as a historically-
situated strategic social relation that is always in motion, shaped and re-
shaped by their respective actors and institutions in specific conjunc-
tures. We therefore cannot understand the state without understanding 
society. As an ensemble of unequal power centres activated through the 
agency of state managers (elected and non-elected officials) and their in-
teraction with specific social forces, state power is maintained by balanc-
ing the state’s dual and contradictory function of facilitating capital ac-
cumulation and promoting political legitimacy (Jessop 2008; O’Connor 
1973).  
Capital accumulation and political legitimacy, as O’Connor puts it, are 
‘two basic and often mutually contradictory functions’ of the capitalist 
state (O’Connor 1973, 6). Agencies of the state can exercise their power 
in order to encourage and facilitate capital accumulation through fiscal 
and monetary policy, trade agreements, subsidies, infrastructure invest-
ment etc., to increase the fiscal capacity of the state and carry out its ob-
jective function which ‘depends upon revenues that originate in the 
sphere of production’ (de Janvry 1981, 196). Conversely, in order to 
maintain legitimacy state institutions and agents must create the condi-
tions for social harmony and reconcile conflicting class interests in socie-
ty. This manifests in a variety of forms such as social welfare pro-
grammes, progressive income tax systems, increased social and 
environmental regulations, redistributive reforms, public education and 
health care, social security and unemployment insurance, forms of stra-
tegic popular discourse and so on. If state expenditures surpass its fiscal 
revenues in order to carry out its subjective function (legitimacy), it risks 
entering into a fiscal crisis (O’Connor 1973). However, if the state’s ob-
jective function (capital accumulation) is pursued beyond its legitimacy 
threshold – to the point where it facilitates capital accumulation at the 
expense of the welfare of the masses, it risks a crisis of legitimacy. Crises 
can lead to political reforms, social revolution or political coup, or re-
pressive forms of control by the state. The extent to which the state pur-
sues legitimating and accumulation strategies are politically contingent on 
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external demands, the autonomy and capacity of state actors, and ‘the 
nature of their interaction with contending forces making those de-
mands’ (Fox 1993, 31). This dual function is contradictory in capitalist 
societies since the dominant classes have their interests in the objective 
function of the state and can use their economic and political influence 
to interact with and pressure state managers. However, if the objective 
function is over-pursued and a state-capital alliance is exposed it can 
provoke class consciousness among classes of labour and lead to a legit-
imacy crisis of the state (de Janvry 1981). 
The contending social forces with which state managers interact con-
sist of various societal actors with interests spanning the objective func-
tions (capital-oriented for accumulation) and subjective functions (social-
ly-oriented for legitimation, social harmony) of the state. For purposes of 
conceptual clarity we can categorize the interests of the various social 
classes and class fractions as those societal actors who represent classes 
of labour2 (representing ‘society’ in the state-society-capital nexus) with 
their political and economic interests in the subjective functions of the 
state and those which represent classes of capital3 (representing ‘capital’ 
in the state-society-capital nexus) with political and economic interests in 
the objective function of the state. While there are certainly other class 
fractions and transitional classes such as semi-proletarians and petty-
bourgeoisie which at times are in contradictory class positions, their so-
cio-economic and political interests are influenced by this principal con-
tradiction.4 This conceptualization draws from, and extends upon, 
Gramsci’s ‘integral state’ composed of political and civil society (Gramsci 
1971). While political society, consisting of the military, police, legal sys-
tem, political institutions, etc., constitute the realm of force or coercion; 
civil society, consisting of competing social classes struggling for mobili-
ty in relation to the means of production, constitute the realm of con-
sent. In other words, Gramsci (1971, 263) refers to the state as ‘hegemo-
ny (civil society) protected by the armour of coercion (political society).’  
By no means are these two realms mutually exclusive, rather they interact 
in a dialectical relation which constitutes the state apparatus. The state-
society-capital nexus explicitly separates social classes in Gramsci’s ‘civil 
society’ into classes of labour and capital. This helps us conceptually to 
grasp the relations and interactions among elected and non-elected state 
managers and the various class fractions of labour and capital. However, 
this approach does not separate the economic from the political and thus 
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reduce state action and socio-political change to either economic or po-
litical determinism. Rather, it treats the relation of the economic and po-
litical as inherently embedded within social relations under capitalism 
and the capitalist state as ‘a particularized surface form of the capital rela-
tion of class domination’ (Holloway and Picciotto 1977). The state-
society-capital nexus thus provides a framework of analysis to under-
stand the nature of the state through the capital relation; that is, a rela-
tion of class struggle among classes of labour and capital. The capital re-
lation assumes two forms, the economic and the political; state managers 
must therefore maintain the organization of the capitalist mode of pro-
duction, appear as a neutral entity outside of society, and reconcile class 
differences of labour and capital through balancing its often-
contradictory functions of capital accumulation and legitimacy.  
2.4 Conclusion: towards a politics of control 
This section started with an analysis of the three dimensions of power as 
developed by Lukes (1974, 2005) and later Gaventa (1980). This multi-
dimensional approach reveals that power not only exists on the surface 
such as when ‘A has power over B to the extent that he can get B do 
something that B would not otherwise do’ (Lukes 2005, 16), nor is it on-
ly about who sets the agenda, thereby deciding what issues are actually to 
be discussed in the first place. Lukes third dimension of power is ‘the 
power to prevent people, to whatever degree, from having grievances by 
shaping their perceptions, cognitions and preferences in such a way that 
they accept their role in the existing order of things’ (Lukes 2005, 11). 
Ribot and Peluso’s ‘Theory of Access’ was then discussed which goes 
beyond the ‘bundles of rights’ embedded in property rights theory to the 
‘bundles of power’ which enable people to gain, control or maintain ac-
cess to resources through structural and relational mechanisms. Evident-
ly, power permeates such mechanisms of access whether in decision 
making processes, setting the ‘rules of the game’, or by shaping percep-
tions based on ideological constructs of modernity, growth and devel-
opment which ‘should’ be desirable for human progress. It is argued here 
that the development of industrial value-chain agriculture binds farmers 
into new institutional arrangements which, in effect, represent a new 
form of control. Discourses ranging from economic growth, develop-
ment, employment creation and productivity to food security and food 
sovereignty from state and capitalist actors alike have facilitated and 
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promoted this expansion. Yet, as the majority of small-scale farmers en-
ter into value-chain relations they forfeit control over decision-making, 
production, and their land as they become indebted and dependent on 
agro-industry and capitalist farmers. Indeed, this is a new mechanism of 
control which has emerged through Lukes’ third dimension of power. 
Small-scale, capital-poor farmers with minimal access to credit and fac-
tors of production enter into contradictory class positions as they remain 
landowners yet become divorced from working their land. Their interests 
therefore coincide with those of agro-industry and large-scale landown-
ers, that is, for the expansion of the agricultural frontier, for increased 
productivity through new technologies, and for better soybean prices. 
Soybeans have become the only option – it is, after all, the ‘golden 
grain’-- and farmers understandably want to develop and modernize their 
production systems. But the changing forms and relations of production 
have led to their exclusion, while natural resources and the surplus value 
produced is being extracted. This is the new form of agro-industrial con-
trol which has emerged in Bolivia and represents one feature of the poli-
tics of control.  
The second feature of the politics of control considers control over 
the state apparatus and the relations which make up the state-society-
capital nexus. How do we make sense of the rise of Evo Morales and the 
Movement Towards Socialism in gaining and maintaining control over 
the state? Their political support has been unprecedented in Bolivia’s 
democratic history with strong (initial) support from indigenous groups, 
peasants, classes of labour, youth, and the intellectual left. The Agrarian 
Revolution launched in 2006 threatened to expropriate the landowning 
elites of Santa Cruz and triggered class warfare which led to an attempt-
ed coup in 2008. By 2010, the so-called Agrarian Revolution was super-
seded by a Productive Revolution. State discourses changed and Evo 
Morales was soon inaugurating events such as ExpoSoya and meeting 
with governors of the opposition who threatened the Morales govern-
ment just years earlier with support from the Santa Cruz elite. It is ar-
gued here that the Morales government ceded control to the elites of 
Santa Cruz over agricultural development in the lowlands in order to 
maintain and strengthen its control over the state apparatus. Rather than 
entering into conflict and polarizing the country to political power con-
centrated in La Paz and economic power in Santa Cruz, the Morales 
government strategically formed an alliance with agro-capital in order to 
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increase its political power and maintain its control over the state appa-
ratus. The new forms of control in the countryside have hindered forms 
of social protest and grievances as farmers enter into contradictory class 
positions and become less likely to form a class-for-itself. Demands have 
become similar to those of the large-scale landowners and capitalist 
elites, allowing elected state managers to fulfill demands for increased 
‘agro-capital’ accumulation without threatening its legitimacy and sup-
port among its main indigenous originary peasant constituents. This 
strategy to maintain control over the state apparatus is tightly interlinked 
with the new forms of agro-industrial control. Together, they constitute 
what is referred to here as the politics of control. 
The politics of control is an overarching framework which aims to 
contribute to a better understanding of the politics of agrarian change in 
Bolivia in the context of the expanding soy complex. Before delving into 
how these new mechanisms of control and state-society relations have 
developed over time in the Bolivian context, the next chapter examines 
industrial capital’s penetration into agriculture, the international political 
economy of food (and food aid), and the rise of the soy complex in Latin 
America and particularly in Brazil. 
Notes 
 
1 Cámara de Industria, Comercio, Servicios y Turismo de Santa Cruz 
2 Wage labourers, semi-proletarians and, more generally, those who ‘depend – 
directly and indirectly – on the sale of their labour power for their own daily re-
production’ (Bernstein, 2009:73). 
3 Capitalist farmers, agro-industrialists, medium-large-scale landowners, and more 
generally those who own and control the means of production. 
4 That is, between labour and capital, or the interests of the proletariat and the 
bourgeoisie.  
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3 
The Rise of the Soy Complex and  
the ‘United Soybean Republic’  
in Latin America 
 
3.1 Introduction 
The promotion of agro-industrial development thrives from a logic 
which assumes that increasing food supply is necessary to not only feed 
the estimated 795 million people who are currently undernourished 
globally, but also to feed a growing population expected to reach 9.7 bil-
lion in 2050 (FAO, IFAD, and WFP 2015; UN 2015). This logic has its 
roots in the influential work of the Reverend Thomas Malthus who, writ-
ing in the late 18th and early 19th Centuries, argued that population 
growth was a main cause of poverty, as populations, if unchecked, grow 
in geometrical progression while food, given a fixed amount of land and 
technologies at the time, could only grow arithmetically. Populations 
would therefore have a tendency to grow beyond the means of subsist-
ence, leading to resource scarcity, poverty and hunger. Writing much lat-
er, Ester Boserup (1965) turned Malthus’ argument on its head. Boserup 
argued that population growth was actually a catalyst for innovation, 
productivity increases, and wealth creation. Demographic pressures thus 
led to agricultural growth and innovation since people, as productive as-
sets, could increase productivity (see Gould 2009). But if Boserup turned 
Malthus’ argument on its head, then Marx turned it inside-out. While 
both Malthus and Boserup give primacy to population growth as a key 
determinant of poverty and development, Marx gives primacy to the re-
lations inherent in the mode of production. Population will thus vary 
according to the various stages of capitalist development, but is not a 
determining factor of poverty or development. In capitalism, it is the un-
equal distribution of the surplus value which leads to inequality and the 
exploitation and exclusion of people which leads to poverty and relative 
surplus populations. Marx therefore emphasised the relations of produc-
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tion and distribution of resources in capitalism which in itself creates the 
conditions of poverty due to such unequal relations.  
While technological innovations, particularly associated with the 
Green Revolution, proved inaccurate Malthus’ assumption that popula-
tion growth would outstrip food supply, neo-Malthusians continue to 
equate population growth with increased environmental degradation, 
resource depletion, and food scarcity (Ehrlich and Ehrlich 1990; Brown 
2012). Ehrlich and Ehrlich (2009, 68) suggest that the world’s ‘optimum’ 
population size is between 1.5 to 2 billion people since ‘the capacity of 
the Earth to produce food and support people is finite’ and ‘as our 
population, consumption, and technological skills expand, the probability 
of a vast catastrophe looms steadily larger.’ But rather than focusing on 
the need to transform the relations inherent in the dominant mode of 
capitalist production, neo-Malthusians tend to assume its inevitability 
and therefore prioritize population growth rather than address the crux 
of the poverty problematic. We already produce enough food to feed 
some 9.5 billion people (FAOSTAT 2016), yet one in 8 people continue 
to go hungry while another 2 billion are overweight and obese (FAO 
2015; WHO 2016). Poverty and hunger are structural problems of access 
relations. Simply by producing more food does not guarantee that those 
in need will have greater access. An estimated one third of global food 
production is never even consumed, meaning that the focus should be 
on increasing access and democratizing distribution channels to ensure 
no one goes hungry (WFP 2016). According to the FAO, ‘in developing 
countries 40% of losses occur at post-harvest and processing levels while 
in industrialized countries more than 40% of losses happen at retail and 
consumer levels’ (FAO 2016). Food production, just like types of wealth 
creation, does not simply ‘trickle down’ to the poor, it depends on who 
controls production, how labour is organized and its ‘fruits’ distributed, 
and what is done with the surplus created (Bernstein 2010). Relatedly, 
neo-Malthusian assumptions regarding deforestation and population 
growth have also been refuted, as they fail to account for the underlying 
political, economic, and social dynamics of forest transitions and how 
population change is just one variable which interacts with ‘diverse insti-
tutional and policy arrangements, ways of valuing vegetation at certain 
times, and dynamic ecologies’ (Leach and Fairhead 2000, 39; and see 
Hecht 2014).  
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Despite such critiques and empirical evidence demonstrating other-
wise, neo-Malthusian logics have continued to influence policy at the 
national and international level. This is based on the logic which assumes 
that increasing the food supply will increase availability and/or decrease 
prices making food more accessible to all. Biotechnologies are also as-
sumed to decrease agro-chemical use and enable us to grow crops on less 
fertile or otherwise inadequate soils, such as the highly acidic Brazilian 
Cerrado (savannah). For state actors, it is much more difficult to trans-
form existing socio-economic structures in capitalist societies given the 
political and economic influence of those who control the means of pro-
duction and circuits of distribution. Rather than tackling the root of the 
problem, as identified by Marx, state actors are much more inclined to 
facilitate economic growth, increase productivity, and encourage techno-
logical innovations combined with population checks such as family 
planning, birth control, and education.  
Agricultural production, trade and the workings of the global food 
system have never been just about world food supply. In the post-World 
War II period, agro-food relations became governed by a set of implicit 
and explicit rules which structured ‘production and consumption of food 
on a world scale’ (Friedmann 1993, 30–31). The agro-food sector be-
came a key feature of the post-war relations in the international political 
economy with the United States as the new global superpower. The US 
was determined to pursue mercantile agricultural trade policies through 
import controls and export subsidies, leading to the rejection of multilat-
eral trade initiatives such as the World Food Board Proposal and the In-
ternational Trade Organization which otherwise had widespread support 
among post-war governments (Friedmann 1993, 33). The dominant po-
sition held by the US in the international political economy enabled it to 
essentially dictate the rules for international trade policies concerning 
agriculture. New Deal price supports for farmers were maintained in the 
post-war period despite generating chronic surpluses. With the US mar-
ket protected, other countries focused on developing their domestic 
markets as well. However, the US was able to use its leverage to unload 
its agricultural surpluses via the Marshal Plan and later in the form of 
food aid to the global ‘South’ through Public Law 480 (Friedmann 1993). 
Subsidized US wheat came to flood the markets of the global ‘South’, 
out-competing domestic producers and rendering formerly food self-
sufficient countries dependent on US imports.  For neo-Malthusians, in 
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the post-war period ‘it was becoming increasingly clear that maintaining 
food production per capita was a challenging task’ provoking the need 
for technological innovation in agriculture (Evenson 2005, 469).  This 
prompted the development of International Agricultural Research Cen-
ters (IARCs) which were later organized under the Consultative Group 
for International Agricultural Research (CGIAR). IARC programmes1 
began specializing in specific crops, developing gene banks and hybrid 
varieties which sparked the Green Revolution (Evenson 2005). Yet, the 
development of Green Revolution technologies implied the industrializa-
tion of the agricultural sector as natural inputs became increasingly ap-
propriated by industrial inputs (seeds, agro-chemicals, machinery) while 
crops shifted from final use to an industrial substitute for manufactured 
goods (Friedmann and McMichael 1989; Goodman, Sorj, and Wilkinson 
1987). As agriculture became industrialized, it also became increasingly 
specialized, ‘linked in inputs chains that crossed national boundaries to 
create food products marketed transnationally’ (Friedmann and 
McMichael 1989, 94–95). Countries of the global ‘South’ became inte-
grated into global circuits of capital accumulation, providers of tropical 
raw materials for export controlled by a market oligopoly of mainly US-
based agro-food corporations. The agro-industrial complex integrated 
specialized crops such as soybeans and hybrid maize with livestock pro-
duction, establishing a grain-meat complex controlled by agro-industrial 
corporations. Until the 1970s, the US dominated global soybean produc-
tion. But, as is further discussed in the next section, a series of crises and 
an unprecedented grain deal between the US and the Soviet Union in 
1972-73 which tore down the Cold War trade wall inadvertently sowed 
the seeds for Latin America’s ‘Soybean Republic’. 
3.2 The rise of soybeans in Brazil and Latin America 
Soybeans were first cultivated in Brazil as early as the 1880s for research 
purposes at the Agricultural School of Bahia and the Agronomic Insti-
tute of Campinas and later (in 1900) at the Agronomy School of Rio 
Grande do Sul where significant soybean cultivation for export would 
eventually take root (William and Aoyagi 2009). The 1907 Brazilian-
Japanese Treaty brought waves of Japanese immigrants, mostly farmers 
and rural wage labourers, who brought soybean seeds from Japan and 
began their own cultivation for household consumption. By 1939, Bra-
zil’s most southern state, Rio Grande do Sul, produced 40,000 kilograms 
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of soybeans for export, though the nitrogen-fixing legume was mostly 
used as a green fertilizer in rotation with wheat and maize cultivation in 
order to recover soil fertility (Oliveira 2016; Shurtleff and Aoyagi 2009). 
As the land market in Rio Grande do Sul increased rapidly with the capi-
talization of crops such as wheat, soybeans and rice during the 1950s, 
farmers moved north to Santa Catarina and Parana where land prices 
‘were as much as four times lower than in Rio Grande as late as 1964’ 
(Foweraker 1981, 68–69). By 1969, Brazil’s soybean production reached 
over 1 million tonnes and in 1971 the National Commission for Soy Re-
search was established in the Ministry of Agriculture which began 
launching new Brazilian soybean varieties (William and Aoyagi 2009, 8; 
FAOSTAT 2016). Two years later, in 1973, the Brazilian Agricultural 
Research Agency (Empresa Brasileira de Pesquisa Agropecuaria, EMBRAPA) 
was established, which would later be responsible for ‘the miracle of the 
Cerrado’ by transforming Brazil’s highly acidic and nutrient deficient Cer-
rado region into an area which now accounts for some 70% of country’s 
total farm output (The Economist 2010).  Brazil used its soybean pro-
duction to feed its intensive livestock sector, while also encouraging na-
tional processing through export taxes on unprocessed soybeans, already 
developing its agro-industrial sector before the 1970s (Friedmann 1993, 
46). As Brazil was beginning its rise as a ‘new agricultural country’ 
(NAC), favourable changes in the international political economy would 
solidify its trajectory.  
During the Cold War period of constructive relations (détente) between 
the United States and the Soviet Union, the United States shipped some 
30 million metric tons of grain to the Soviet Union in 1972-73 ‘which 
amounted to three quarters of all commercially traded grain in the world’ 
(Friedmann 1993, 40). This unprecedented trade deal, combined with 
increased international demand for feed grains and global shortages in 
proteins due to a decline in Peruvian fishmeal as well as Indian and Sen-
egalese meal exports, resulted in grain shortages on international markets 
(Oki 2008, 6). As a result, food prices began to rise, particularly high-
protein feed grains such as soybeans, reaching record levels in 1973. In 
order to protect its domestic livestock industry and ensure sufficient 
grain supply, the US imposed an embargo on soybean exports, abruptly 
cutting off grain supplies to its major trading partners in East Asia reliant 
on the crop for domestic food supply. Japan, for example, was highly 
dependent on US soybeans with over 88% of its imports coming from 
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Brazil, not only for animal feed, but for its traditional staple foods such 
as tofu, soy sauce, miso (soybean paste), natto (fermented soybeans), 
kinako (roasted soybean flour), aburaage (deep fried sliced tofu), among 
other soy-based foods (Conlon 2009; Oki 2008). In order to reduce its 
dependence on US soybeans, Japan looked to upcoming NACs like Bra-
zil to diversify its soybean supply, effectively opening a new and growing 
market for Brazilian soybeans. With Brazilian soybean production in-
creasing nearly ten-fold from 1969-1975, new research centres were es-
tablished within EMBRAPA to expand into the Cerrado frontier (Em-
brapa-Cerrados, est. 1971) and to develop soybean production in the 
region’s acidic soils (Empraba-Soja, est. 1975) (Oliveira 2016, 355). Sev-
eral settlements projects were underway in the Cerrado, and by 1976 the 
Japanese-Brazilian Cooperative Program for Cerrado Development 
(PROCEDER) was established, financing infrastructure, research and 
commercial farm improvements in collaboration with other national-
based Cerrado development projects (Jepson, Brannstrom, and Filippi 
2010, 93). In effect, the collaboration between Brazil and Japan provided 
increased market access for Brazil’s rising soybean production as well as 
a stable source of supply for Japanese demand. Brazil was well on its way 
to becoming not only a ‘new agricultural country’ but a global agricultur-
al powerhouse fuelled by biotech innovations and new trade relations 
with growing East Asian markets which would soon have rippling effects 
throughout the Latin American region.   
As agricultural settlements expanded deeper into the Cerrado in the 
1990s, state subsidies and public programs were replaced by private fi-
nancial institutions and credit schemes with agribusiness firms which 
stimulated agro-industrial soybean production for export (Jepson, 
Brannstrom, and Filippi 2010). Waves of neoliberal economic policies 
were implemented throughout the late 1980s through to the early 2000s, 
as international capital flows were liberalized, a floating exchange rate 
was imposed, labour laws were loosened, import restrictions were re-
duced, public services were privatized and alliances between foreign and 
domestic capital were promoted by the state (Saad Filho 2010; 2014). 
Tariffs on food imports were cut across the Latin American region, but 
none compared to the drastic cuts made by the Brazilian government 
which cut tariffs on food imports from over 50% during 1984-87 to just 
over 10% in 1991-93 (Spoor 2002, 384). The period of stimulating do-
mestic production for industrialization, rather than for export, through 
Processed on: 6-4-2017
509436-L-bw-McKay
74 CHAPTER 3 
 
import substitution industrialization (ISI) had come to an end. As Spoor 
puts it, ‘Central to the policy shift was the reduction of the size of the 
state, seen as the main cause of market distortions and the source of bu-
reaucratic failures’ (Spoor 2002, 385).  These neoliberal policies, com-
bined with the commercialization of GM seeds and agro-industry’s 
‘technological packages’ integrated farmers into a new agro-industrial 
value-chain often characterized by various mechanisms of control lead-
ing to debt and dependency (McMichael 2013; McKay 2017). The col-
lapse of several public support programs such as COOPERCANA 
‘meant that cooperative members lost streamlined access to credit, a ma-
jor discount supplier of agricultural inputs, and storage facilities, all of 
which translated into higher transaction costs of production’ (Jepson, 
Brannstrom, and Filippi 2010). As capital began its rapid penetration into 
the countryside and agricultural inputs became increasingly commodified 
and expensive, rural wage labour was displaced by mechanization and 
access to land became increasingly more difficult, leading to a ‘simple 
reproduction squeeze’ of not only the peasantry but also small-scale capi-
talist farmers (Bernstein 1979). As Bernstein (1979, 427).  puts it:  
the ‘squeeze’ on simple reproduction include those arising from the ex-
haustion of both land and labour given the techniques of cultivation em-
ployed, from rural ‘development’ schemes which encourage or impose 
more expensive means of production (improved seeds, tools, more exten-
sive use of fertilisers, insecticides, pesticides, etc.) with no assurance that 
there will be increased returns to labour commensurate with the costs in-
curred, and from deteriorating terms of exchange for peasant produced 
commodities.  
Similarly, Cristóbal Kay asserts that ‘peasants get squeezed by neolib-
eral policies as, on the one hand, they cannot compete with the cheap 
food imports (especially if free trade agreements are implemented) and, 
on the other hand, do not benefit from the new export opportunities due 
to lack of capital, technical know-how, marketing skills, lack of econo-
mies of scale, and so on’ (Kay 2006, 464).  Despite claims that structural 
adjustment programmes (SAPs), through the liberalization of trade, mar-
ket and financial deregulation and privatization schemes, would improve 
the performance of the agricultural sector, evidence suggests otherwise 
(Spoor 2002, 395). Max Spoor argues that neoliberal reforms led to ‘a 
more unstable, near volatile path’ of agriculture as the ‘dynamics of eco-
nomic growth is largely to be found in the sectors of commercial farmers 
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who have been able to link up with foreign, mostly transnational capital, 
integrating themselves in domestic and international agro-business com-
plexes’ while marginalizing and excluding small producers and peasant 
farmers (2002, 397). The resultant ‘squeeze’ on smallholders and the 
peasantry not only led to processes of social differentiation in country-
side, but also widespread migration throughout the region.  
In particular, Brazilian farmers from the southern states of Rio 
Grande do Sul and Parana who began to experience rising land and pro-
duction costs in the 1970s started migrating to Paraguay and Bolivia 
where fertile lands could be purchased for a fraction of the price com-
pared to those in Brazil (Nickson 1981; Urioste 2001; Marques Gimenez 
2010; Urioste 2012). By the mid-1980s, such ‘peripheral’ countries such 
as Bolivia were also undergoing neoliberal policies, opening up their ag-
ricultural frontiers led by Mennonites, Brazilians and nationals as they 
marched to the lowlands of Santa Cruz. Soybean expansion became par-
ticularly acute starting in the mid-1990s as new biotechnologies and agro-
industrial capital began its penetration, increasing over 21 million hec-
tares in the region, or 114%, from 1995 to 2005 (FAOSTAT 2016). By 
the mid-2000s, farmers of Brazilian origin came to control between 40-
50% of soybean landholdings in both Bolivia and Paraguay (Urioste 
2012; Galeano 2012). Soybean prices were booming, agricultural fron-
tiers expanding, and new agrarian relations were taking shape. Formal 
land ownership through private property rights became just one mecha-
nism of control, as agro-industrial value-chains began to develop 
throughout the region. Property rights remained important, but new 
mechanisms of control enabled capitalists to derive most of the benefits 
from land, labour and capital.  
The so-called ‘foreignization’ of Brazilian agro-capitalists expanding 
their control over the region is about the changing forms and relations of 
production rather than the fact that they are foreign or Brazilian. It is the 
expansion of capital into ‘under-capitalized’ frontiers, or new greenfield 
sites where more surplus value can be extracted and appropriated. The 
simple fact that they are foreign does not reveal anything about changes 
in the forms or relations of production, property and power. Going be-
yond a property rights and nationality lens, this study analyzes the ‘con-
stellations of means, relations, and processes that enable various actors 
to derive benefits from resources’ (Ribot and Peluso 2003, 153). The 
agro-industrial soy complex has introduced a variety of institutional ar-
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rangements which enable some actors to derive benefits from both natu-
ral2 and productive3 resources while excluding others, regardless of land 
ownership. These include arrangements such as contract farming (Wesz 
Jr 2016), small-scale land leasing or the ‘partida’ arrangement (McKay 
and Colque 2016),  pools de siembra  (sowing pools) (Craviotti 2016) and 
combinations of these between and among farmers and agro-industry. 
The next section discusses what is meant by the agro-industrial soy com-
plex, its formation, and how it has transformed agriculture.  
3.3 The agro-industrial soy complex 
3.3.1 Commodification and concentration upstream 
In 2003, Syngenta Corporation launched an advertising campaign with a 
map of a ‘United Soybean Republic’ cutting across Argentina, Bolivia, 
Brazil, Paraguay and Uruguay with the slogan, ‘The soybean knows no 
boundaries’ (la soya no conoce fronteras).  The image could not have been 
any clearer: transnational agribusiness was expanding its territorial con-
trol over Latin America. Indeed, from 2003 to 2005, Bolivia, Brazil, Par-
aguay and Uruguay legalized genetically modified (GM) seed varieties, 
though the seeds were already being smuggled in from Argentina which 
legalized GM varieties in 1996 (Oliveira and Hecht 2016, 254). This offi-
cially marked the beginning of an economic and technological treadmill 
in which farmers became increasingly dependent on the technological 
packages associated with new high yielding patented seeds which, in 
turn, increased production costs. Following the legalization of GM varie-
ties in Argentina, soybean plantations began to rapidly expand from 17.5 
million hectares in 1996 to 55.7 million in 2014 in the so-called ‘Repub-
lic’, making the crop the most important in terms of both surface area 
and export value in the region (FAOSTAT 2016).4 Agricultural frontiers 
expanded into ‘new’ and ‘un(der)-utilized’ agro-ecological systems such 
as the Brazilian Cerrado, the Argentinian Pampas, and Bolivia’s eastern 
lowlands and led to widespread deforestation in important ecosystems 
such as the Amazon, the Atlantic Forest, the Gran Chaco and the 
Chiquitano Forest which cross territorial boundaries in the region (Hecht 
2005; WWF 2014).  
 
Processed on: 6-4-2017
509436-L-bw-McKay
 The Soy Complex and the ‘United Soybean Republic’ in Latin America 77 
Figure 3.1 
Hectares of soybean harvest in the ‘United Soybean Republic’ 
  Source: FAOSTAT 2016 
 
The ‘tropicalization’ and commercialization of GM soybean seeds was 
a success for the biotech industry as  soybeans were modified as a kind 
of ‘neo-nature’ – ‘amenable to mechanized planting and harvesting, 
adapted to longer photoperiods and higher temperatures, and able to 
grow in more acidic, low-phosphorus soil conditions than the temperate 
areas of China, the USA and Ukraine’ (Oliveira and Hecht 2016, 253). 
GM soybeans now account for between 88-99% of total soybeans plant-
ed in the region and 83% globally (James 2015; WWF 2014). The GM 
seed, which is resistant to the herbicide glyphosate, enables farmers to 
use the herbicide in a no-tillage system in order to kill unwanted weeds 
which might affect the plant’s growth. In theory, using glyphosate with 
glyphosate resistant seeds is supposed to replace herbicides that are more 
toxic and thereby reduce herbicide volumes used in production (Cerdeira 
et al. 2011). However, studies by EMBRAPA and Argentina’s National 
Agricultural Technology Institute (Instituto Nacional de Tecnología Agropecuar-
ia, INTA) have found that the persistent application of the glyphosate 
herbicide in no-tillage monoculture production using GM seeds has led 
to the growing presence of various weed species resistant to the herbi-
cide (Papa and Tuesca 2014; Cerdeira et al. 2011). This has led to not 
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only a ‘direct link between the area of GM soybean and increases in the 
use of herbicides’ but a drastic increase in the volume and types of herbi-
cides relative to the increase in the soybean planted area (Catacora-
Vargas et al. 2012). The combination of monocultures, the over-reliance 
on glyphosate due to the GM seed, and the neglect of other weed con-
trol measures has resulted in what the Union of Concerned Scientists call 
‘the rise of superweeds’ (USC 2013). Resistant to herbicides, these ‘su-
perweeds’ have infested some 60 million acres of U.S cropland and have 
led to the use of increased volumes and more toxic herbicides and pesti-
cides, contradicting the very logic of using GM seeds in the first place 
(USC 2013). This ‘pesticide treadmill’ (Nicholls and Altieri 1997) has not 
only increased production costs for producers, but has led to the greater 
application of agro-chemicals such as 2,4D, atrazine, and paraquat – the 
latter of which has been banned by the European Union due to high lev-
els of toxicity and its implication in neurological and reproductive disor-
ders (Catacora-Vargas et al. 2012, 33). Yet, for companies such as Syn-
genta, which developed one of the most widely used paraquat-based 
herbicides, known as Gramoxome, the evolution of ‘superweeds’ and the 
associated ‘pesticide treadmill’ continues to increase their bottom line. 
The industrial transformation of agriculture – first via mechanization 
which reduced the need for labour, then through the dissemination of 
hybrid and genetically-modified seeds, and finally the dependence on 
agro-chemicals – has led to ‘a series of partial, discontinuous appropria-
tions of the rural labour and biological production processes’ (Goodman, 
Sorj, and Wilkinson 1987, 2). This is what Goodman, Sorj and Wilkinson 
refer to as ‘appropriationism’ which is ‘constituted by the action of in-
dustrial capitals to reduce the importance of nature in rural production, 
and specifically as a force beyond their direction and control’ (Goodman, 
Sorj, and Wilkinson 1987, 3). With farmers increasingly dependent on 
GM seeds, agro-chemicals, and machinery, industrial capital has pene-
trated agriculture by partially eliminating its material base and part of the 
natural production process incompatible with capital accumulation 
(Goodman, Sorj, and Wilkinson 1987, 156).  
Not only has industry transformed agricultural production in its tech-
nical form, it has also changed the particular configurations of produc-
tive relations and forms of appropriation of the productive process. This 
has emerged through new forms of land and value-chain control which 
exclude the rural majority and extract value from nature and the produc-
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tion process. One of the principal forms of control has been through 
market concentration and consolidation of seed and chemical companies 
which has led to a market oligopoly largely controlled globally by the ‘Big 
Six’: Monsanto, Syngenta, Bayer, Dow Chemical, BASF and Dupont. 
Together, these companies control 75% of the global agro-chemical 
market, 63% of the commercial seed market, and over 75% of private 
sector research in seeds and pesticides (ETC Group 2015, 4). Moreover, 
just three companies (Syngenta, Bayer, BASF) control 49% of the global 
agro-chemicals market; while Monsanto, DuPont and Syngenta control 
45% of the global seed market (ETC Group 2015). As recently as the 
1970s, these markets were controlled by thousands of small-scale, mostly 
family owned businesses (Howard 2015). The increased intellectual 
property protections for living organisms passed in the 1970s and 1980s, 
including the full patent protections on transgenic seeds, attracted large 
firms which rapidly acquired ‘hundreds of formerly independent bio-
technology and seed companies’ and eventually merged with each other 
to create the ‘Big Six’ (Howard 2015). The commodification of the seed 
– what Kloppenburg calls the ‘biological nexus of farm-level production’ 
– was the most important component for private industry’s accumula-
tion interests (Kloppenburg 2004, 37). Without both scientific innova-
tion (R&D) and the introduction of new legislation, this would have 
never been possible. Since the seed reproduces itself as grain and can be 
replanted infinitely, legislation was required in order to separate the 
farmer from the reproduction of the seed – that is, from the agricultural 
means of production. Yet, as Newell and Glover argue, not only does 
the biotech industry and the state share mutual interests for innovation 
and growth, ‘there is also evidence of a ‘revolving door’ between the bio-
technology industry and government agencies’ (Newell and Glover 2003, 
12). Mutual interests, ‘revolving door’ politics, and powerful lobbyists 
from multinationals such as Monsanto are major reasons why such legis-
lation gets passed. 
As the seed became commodified and commercialized, so too did ag-
ricultural research. In the 1990s, private industry began to both recruit 
the leading scientific faculty and form strategic partnerships with public 
universities. In 1998, for example, Novartis (now Syngenta) signed a 
partnership with the University of California Berkeley’s Department of 
Plant and Microbial Biology which ‘gave Berkeley $25 million and access 
to Novartis’ genomic database in return for a seat on departmental 
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committees and first right to negotiate a license to patents from selected 
discoveries’ (Kloppenburg 2004, 329). As transgenic crops became 
commercialized and more and more countries legalized GM varieties, the 
seed market became even more consolidated as the top ten seed firms 
acquired almost 200 seed companies from 1996 to 2013 (Howard 2015). 
With the agro-chemical-seed market oligopoly, the ‘Big Six’ now engage 
in cross-licensing agreements for transgenic seed traits – an effect ‘simi-
lar to the formation of a shared monopoly or cartel to exclude other po-
tential competitors’ (Howard 2015). More than the material commodifi-
cation and control of agro-inputs, the ‘Big Six’ also control access to 
information and innovations. Combined, their budgets for agriculture 
research and development (R&D) is some 20 times larger than that of 
CGIAR and 15 times that of the United States Department of Agricul-
ture’s Agricultural Research Service (USDA-ARS) budget for crop sci-
ence research,  giving them significant control over the agricultural R&D 
industry (ETC Group 2015). As Kloppenburg argues, agricultural re-
search has been ‘an important means of eliminating the barriers to the 
penetration of agriculture by capital’ by commodifying agro-inputs and 
displacing productive activities off the farm and into an industrial setting 
(Kloppenburg 2004, 10). But while agricultural innovations are certainly 
important, it becomes problematic when a small, self-interested group 
dictates the research agenda and the interlinked technologies and prod-
ucts which are available in the market (see Miller and Conko 2001). With 
significant influence and control over the agricultural research agenda, 
the ‘Big Six’ can therefore invest in shaping agriculture’s technical form 
through continued ‘innovations’ which require their ‘technological pack-
ages’ complete with patented seeds, agro-chemical inputs and access to 
advanced mechanization. This control over information and knowledge 
production represents the power agro-industry has over ideas, techno-
logical innovation, and ultimately authority over the terms of modern 
agricultural production. 
Furthermore, just three farm equipment companies – Deere & Co. 
(John Deere), CNH (New Holland) and AGCO – combined for 49% of 
global farm equipment sales in 2013, some US$ 116 billion (ETC Group 
2015). These equipment companies are collaborating with the Big Six in 
developing digital platforms such as Precision Planting and Climate 
FieldView which give the industry complete control over every agricul-
tural input decision from crop to seed variety to agro-chemicals (ETC 
Processed on: 6-4-2017
509436-L-bw-McKay
 The Soy Complex and the ‘United Soybean Republic’ in Latin America 81 
Group 2015).  This type of integration has enabled multinationals greater 
control over farmers, the production process, and even natural biological 
cycles of plant growth. It has also suppressed the value of farmer 
knowledge, as technological packages now dictate the terms and lengths 
of production. It is suggested by institutional economists that ‘when four 
firms control 40 to 50% of a market, it is no longer competitive, as dom-
inant firms can simply signal their intention to raise prices and the other 
will find it in their interest to follow suit’ (Howard 2015, 3). This not on-
ly squeezes out the less capitalized competitors, but creates a market oli-
gopoly with a concentration of control and power. Industry has increas-
ingly commodified and appropriated the ‘upstream’ components of 
agricultural production – from machinery to fertilizers, seeds, agro-
chemicals and biotechnologies to knowledge generation (R&D) – reduc-
ing the importance of nature in the rural production process via appro-
priationism (Goodman, Sorj, and Wilkinson 1987). By doing so, the rela-
tive importance of the material base of agriculture has diminished, as 
industry can appropriate more surplus value from agro-industrial inputs 
and processing than from the actual agricultural production process it-
self. Even control over land becomes secondary if industry can control 
the ‘upstream’ and ‘downstream’ components of the market – forcing 
farmers to both purchase their value-added inputs and sell their final 
primary product to a market oligopoly. With such concentrated market 
power, the costs of these inputs - particularly seeds - for soybean farmers 
have increased substantially, as shown in Figure 3.2.  
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Figure 3.2 
Production costs of seed, fertilizer and chemicals  
per planted acre of soybean, United States 
 
Source: (USDA-ERS 2016) 
 
3.3.2 Control, substitutionism and ‘flexing’ downstream 
Agro-industry’s control does not stop at the ‘upstream’ components of 
the market. Control over the downstream components – that is, every-
thing after the crop is harvested from storage, processing, packaging, and 
distribution – is even more concentrated. The well-known ABCD 
(ADM, Bunge, Cargill, Louis Dreyfus) agribusiness firms control an es-
timated 75 to 90% of the global grain trade (Wesz Jr 2016, 294). This 
type of oligopolistic market power obstructs competition and can lead to 
price fixing – as was the case in the 1990s when ADM was fined over 
US$ 100 million for colluding with other companies to raise prices for 
lysine and citric acid (Murphy, Burch, and Clapp 2012). 
In Latin America’s Southern Cone5, the presence of the ABCD firms 
began to gain prominence in the soy complex in the mid-1990s with the 
opening up to the global economy, the onset of neoliberal policies, the 
commercialization of GM varieties and the expansion of the region’s ag-
ricultural frontiers. Primarily through mergers and acquisitions, the 
ABCD firms expanded their control over the region’s soybeans from 
controlling 10% of the crushing capacity in 1995 to over 50% in 2011 
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(Wesz Jr 2016, 294–295). Through vertical integration and, at times, col-
laborating with the ‘Big Six’, the ABCD firms have become integrated 
along various components of the production process such as the sale of 
inputs, financing and insurance schemes with farmers, technical assis-
tance, as well as purchase, storage, processing, transportation and trade 
(Wesz Jr 2016). More than just vertical integration, the ABCD firms are 
increasingly expanding horizontally into complementary markets such as 
energy, industrial material and finance.  
The multiple and flexible uses of agro-industrial crops for feed, food, 
fuel, and industrial materials have also facilitated the integration of these 
firms into different sectors (Borras et al. 2016). With just 6% of the 
world’s soybean crop used directly as human food without industrial 
processing, soybeans have become the quintessential agro-industrial flex 
crop (Oliveira and Schneider 2016). Approximately 85% of world pro-
duction is processed into meal and oil, with 98% of the meal used for 
animal feed and 95% of the oil component used as edible oil (Soyatech 
2016). The remainder of the meal is further processed as soy flour and 
protein while the rest of the oil is used as an industrial input for products 
such as soaps, biodiesel, fatty acids, among many others (Soyatech 2016; 
Oliveira and Schneider 2016).  With its multiple and flexible uses, indus-
try specializes in breaking apart the crop to use its various components 
as industrial inputs rendering industrial processing virtually a necessity 
for the crop’s final consumption. This is similar to what Goodman et al. 
(1987) call substitutionism whereby ‘the food industry was to interpose 
mechanized industrial processing and manufacture between the source 
of field production and final consumption. Once this step had been tak-
en, the rural form of the commodity and its constituents could then be 
modified and obscured, facilitating its treatment and presentation as an 
industrial product’ (Goodman, Sorj, and Wilkinson 1987, 60). For 
Goodman et al., however, they conceived of a tendency for substitution-
ism ‘to reduce the rural product to a simple industrial input, opening the 
way to the elimination of the rural production process, either by utilizing 
non-agricultural raw materials or by creating industrial substitutes for 
food and fibres’ (Goodman, Sorj, and Wilkinson 1987, 58). But rather 
than utilizing non-agricultural raw materials or creating industrial substi-
tutes for foods, crops like soybeans have been increasingly used to sub-
stitute industrial inputs such as plastics, adhesives, anti-corrosive agents, 
hydraulic oil, grease, ink, paints, cosmetics, asphalt emulsions, polyesters, 
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particle board among many other products (Pederson 2007). Substitu-
tionism and flexing represent the ways in which capital has penetrated 
the downstream components of agriculture by reducing the crop to just 
another industrial input. 
The industrialization of agriculture has been further intensified 
through the financialization of land and agriculture as both new and old 
actors increasingly engage in speculation and hedging. Following the fi-
nancial crisis of 2007-08 and subsequent food price hike in 2008, inves-
tors started to target farmland as a secure investment alternative since it 
is strongly correlated with inflation and is thus ‘touted as an inflation 
hedge and an excellent way to reduce portfolio risk through diversifica-
tion’ (Fairbairn 2014, 778). As farmland increasingly is turned into a fi-
nancial asset for hedgers and speculators, as well as within agribusiness, 
it also retains its productive capacity as a use value. This ‘dual nature’ of 
farmland, as Fairbairn points out, makes it possible ‘to use the land pro-
ductively while simultaneously speculating on financial returns from its 
appreciation’ (Fairbairn 2014). The financialization of agriculture, includ-
ing the financial service divisions of the ABCDs, has intricately linked 
finance, food and agriculture due to financial deregulation and the new 
types of derivatives which often bundle a variety of non-food and agri-
cultural commodities, enabling investors to significantly influence both 
food and land prices (Murphy, Burch, and Clapp 2012). This has not on-
ly reinforced existing unequal relations of power among farmers, agri-
business and new financial actors far removed from production but has 
led to increasing food price volatility on international markets (Isakson 
2014). 
As the upstream and downstream components of agriculture become 
increasingly controlled by a few multinational corporations and capital 
continues its penetration of agriculture through appropriationism, substi-
tutionism, flexing, and financialization, important implications arise for 
rural populations – especially small-scale, capital poor farmers – and the 
environment. Agro-industry integrates farmers into their value-chains, 
requiring the use (and purchase) of certain seeds and chemical inputs 
(upstream) in order to comply with standardized market requirements 
(downstream) controlled by the same agro-industrial market oligopoly. 
These new institutional arrangements bind farmers into cycles of debt 
and dependency, altering their relationship and access to land and other 
factors of production in subtler ways than physical dispossession or dis-
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placement. Rather than becoming fully proletarianized, there is a tenden-
cy for farmers to progressively enter into contradictory class positions – 
between labour and capital – effectively impeding their abilities to organ-
ize as a class for itself and apply pressure from below to improve their 
socio-economic position in society. 
3.3.3 (Trans-)Latin American capital, pools de siembra and 
contract farming 
Although the ABCD firms did expand their control over the soybean 
complex in the Southern Cone, we cannot discount the influence of re-
gional actors in the soy complex. Many Brazilian and Argentinian large-
scale landowners and entrepreneurs have developed pools de siembra 
whereby farm management companies pool resources to achieve econ-
omies of scale through input purchases, access to storage and processing 
facilities and to increase bargaining power. This enabled Brazilian and 
Argentinian agribusiness firms such as Cresud-Brasilago, Amaggi-Bom 
Futuro, Adecoagro, SLC Agricola, El Tejar, TIAA-CREF Global Agri-
culture, V-Agro, MSU and Los Grobos to successfully expand through 
the Southern Cone and establish themselves as major players among the 
ABCD firms (Oliveira and Hecht 2016). Of particular significance are 
two of region’s largest landowners, Blairo Maggi, owner of Amaggi-Bom 
Futuro of Brazil and Gustavo Grobocopatel, owner of Los Grobos of 
Argentina. These agricultural entrepreneurs have been pioneers of the 
soybean complex in the region, developing and expanding their enter-
prises both upstream and downstream alongside the ABCD firms, while 
Amaggi-Bom Futuro also engages in strategic joint ventures with Bunge 
and Louis Dreyfus (Oliveira and Hecht 2016, 261–64). Pools de siembra 
represent new contractual arrangements which combine land, capital and 
human resources across scales, levels and actors. The model originated in 
Argentina in the late 1980s by the Alvarado family (El Tejar) and the 
Grobocopatel family (Los Grobo) who own and lease some 1.4 million 
hectares and 420,000 hectares, respectively, across the Southern Cone 
(Oliveira and Hecht 2016, 262–64). While pools de siembra can refer to a 
variety of ‘innovative arrangements’, these include ‘leasing or providing 
property in trust, contracting machines and services, using technology 
packages based on modern machinery, heavily utilising biotechnology or 
agochemicals and incorporating digital systems and individuals who spe-
cialise in field selection, production, management and marketing’ 
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(Murmis and Murmis 2012, 491). The increased financialization of land 
and agriculture and the convergence of sectors becoming more integrat-
ed in agro-industrial value-chains have rendered pools de siembra much 
more complex involving a variety of investors far removed from the 
production process. In Argentina, Murmis and Murmis (2012, 501) find 
that the expansion of pools de siembra tends to lead to land concentration 
as large farms gradually displace smaller farms. Given that economies of 
scale have increased in importance with the development of agro-
industry’s capital-intensive forms of production, market mechanisms fa-
vour larger scale production, pressuring smaller scale producers to sell or 
lease their land. A similar dynamic is found in Argentina’s Pampa region 
whereby the expansion of pools de siembra ‘is connected with the demise 
of family farmers who rent out the land they formerly worked them-
selves’ (Gras 2009, 353). 
While pools de siembra have also taken root in Paraguay and Uruguay, 
individual leases and purchases are much more common. Land concen-
tration occurs through the amalgamation of successive purchases in a 
given area, indebtedness of capital-poor farmers due to intensive capital 
requirements of soybean production who are forced to sell their land, 
and the forcible displacement through violence or soil contamination  
(Galeano 2012; Ezquerro-Cañete 2016; Elgert 2015). In Paraguay, Brazil-
ian capital has come to dominate soybean production, originating with 
cross-border migrations in the 1970s, and more recently for agribusiness 
expansion (Galeano 2012). According to Galeano (2012, 463), ‘Brazilians 
rank first both in terms of the amount of land they own and in terms of 
the number of regions where they have invested in recent years (2006 – 
2010)’, while Wesz (2016, 289) finds that ‘90 percent of Paraguayan soy 
is produced by Brazilians or their descendants.’ In Uruguay, land leasing 
and purchases have also increased substantially in recent years. From 
2000 to 2010, 39% of the country’s agricultural area (roughly 6.4 million 
hectares) was purchased, while another 45% (roughly 7.3 million hec-
tares) was leased, mostly by multinational companies, investment funds, 
as well as Argentinian, Brazilian and domestic companies (Piñeiro 2012, 
483–485). Piñeiro explains how a combination of purchasing and leasing 
is becoming more common, particularly among Argentinian companies 
by ‘buying a tract of land; establishing a base of operations and machin-
ery on that land; and leasing surrounding lands on which to expand pro-
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duction. This strategy reduces the capital investment in land, but insures 
control of a large area’ (Piñeiro 2012, 484).  
Most common among those who actually put land into production is 
contract farming. This is common among the more well-off medium and 
large-scale landholders who own agricultural machinery such as tractors 
and harvesters. These capital-rich farmers tend to lease the land of others 
or rent out their services (sowing, fumigating, harvesting) to capital-poor 
farmers. Many of these farmers are part of associations, whereby the as-
sociation pools their resources together in order to achieve economies of 
scale and negotiate with input suppliers, processors and traders – a kind 
of small-scale, cooperative based pool de siembra. Indeed, even the large-
scale pools de siembra are a form of contract farming among investors, var-
ious farmers, and agribusiness firms. However, here we specify contract 
farming as contracts between producers and agribusiness, unlike pools de 
siembra which entail a variety of rural and urban actors removed from the 
production process. Little and Watts (1994, 9) provide a comprehensive 
definition that perhaps rings more true today than at the time of writing, 
defining contract farming as ‘forms of vertical coordination between 
growers and buyers-processors that directly shape production decisions 
through contractually specifying market obligations (by volume, value, 
quality, and, at times, advanced price determination); provide specific 
inputs; and exercise some control at the point of production (i.e., a divi-
sion of management functions between contractor and contractee)’. As 
agro-industry expands its control over the upstream and downstream 
components of production, their power to control, regulate and dictate 
the terms of production also increases. As Wesz (2016, 298) puts it, ‘the 
more firm dependent producers become, the less farmer friendly con-
tracts established with the companies will be, involving differences in 
interests rates, inputs’ prices, deadlines for delivery of goods, and the 
general conditions of the contracts’.  
Proponents of contract farming, such as the World Bank suggest that 
contract farmers ‘have significantly higher incomes than other farmers’ 
and that  ‘producer organizations and contract farming are essential for 
these smallholders to take part in value chains and cater to supermarket 
demands’ (World Bank 2007a, 127, 241). This argument is based on the 
need to integrate farmers with markets and is once again based on a re-
sidual logic and technical approach, neglecting important relational as-
pects of power and access. It rests on a neo-institutional framework fo-
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cusing on transaction costs, economies of scale, efficiency, coordination 
failures, access to technology, among others. But what fails to be taken 
into account are the power relations among participants, the socio-
political environments in which implementation takes place, the types of 
farmers who are likely to benefit or not, or those who will be excluded 
and how it will affect farmer differentiation (White 1997; Oya 2012). 
While there is great diversity of contract farming schemes, farmers ulti-
mately become incorporated into broader circuits of capital accumula-
tion, shift their cultivation from diversified domestic crop production to 
export-oriented monocultures, and become much more dependent on 
the dictates of international (agro) commodity prices, external industrial 
inputs, while entering into cycles of debt and dependency (White 1997; 
McMichael 2013). In effect, agro-industrial capital is able to extend its 
territorial reach without owning the land and assuming risks such as 
price fluctuations, natural disasters and crop failures, or threats of expro-
priation from above or below. Contract farming thus represents a form 
of control without dispossession which nonetheless produces farmer 
differentiation, exclusion and marginalization. 
3.4 Conclusion 
Technological innovation has enabled the persistent penetration of in-
dustrial and financial capital into agriculture. Fuelled by neo-Malthusian 
logics and theories of modernization, achieving maximum yields and ex-
panding agricultural frontiers into otherwise unsuitable soils has become 
the model for agricultural development.  The agro-food sector has be-
come increasingly corporatized and concentrated, largely controlled by a 
few multinational firms who collaborate among themselves to control 
the upstream and downstream components of the agro-industrial com-
plex. The post-war restructuring of the global agro-food system enabled 
the US to shape global agro-food relations of production and circulation 
until around the early 1970s when a series of crises led to dramatic 
changes in the international political economy of food and agriculture. 
Brazil became a dominant soybean producer, replacing the US as East 
Asia’s main supplier of soybeans. Green Revolution technologies devel-
oped into the Cerrado region, as new hybrid and GM seeds, agro-
chemical inputs, and capital-intensive mechanized production expanded 
outwards from the south of Brazil. Appropriationism, subsistutionism, 
flexing and financialization characterize this process, as new agrarian re-
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lations and forms of control emerged in the countryside. Pools de siembra 
and various types of contract farming have enabled industrial and finan-
cial capital to control and appropriate value from agricultural production 
without necessarily owning the land. This has and continues to incorpo-
rate classes of rural labour into industrial value-chains, mostly in adverse 
ways. This chapter has examined how, where and to what extent agro-
industry developed in Latin America, the forms it has taken and some of 
the implications for agrarian change.  
The following chapters delve deeper into these dynamics in Bolivia, 
situating Bolivia’s agrarian structure in historical context, the develop-
ment of the soy complex, and the new mechanisms of control which 
have emerged, ultimately leading to processes of productive exclusion 
which bind farmers in contradictory class positions of debt and depend-
ency.  
Notes 
 
1 IARC programmes include the International Rice Research Institute (IRRI); 
the International Center for Tropical Agriculture (CIAT); the International 
Center for Wheat and Maize Improvement (CIMMYT); the International Po-
tato Center (CIP), among others (see Evenson 2005). 
2 Land-based natural resources. 
3 Capital, technology, labour. 
4 The region refers to the so-called ‘United Soybean Republic’ – Argentina, 
Bolivia, Brazil, Paraguay and Uruguay. 
5 Argentina, Bolivia, Brazil, Paraguay, Uruguay 
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4 Land Control: Bolivia’s Agrarian Structure and Frontier Expansion1 
 
4.1 Introduction  
This chapter traces the development of Bolivia’s agrarian structure in its 
historical context, from independence in 1825, the revolution in 1952, 
through to the neoliberal transition from 1985 to 2005. It reveals the in-
fluence of Cold War politics and geopolitical interests of the US through 
the use of PL480 and the Bohan Plan’s ‘march to the east’ in shaping 
Bolivia’s present-day agrarian structure. In the mid-1980s public policies 
started encouraging foreign investment, the economy (and the agricul-
tural sector) became deregulated and frontier expansion was prioritized 
with an agro-industrial bias. Soybean production started to develop, 
though its rapid expansion only took off in the 1990s – much later than 
its neighbouring Southern Cone countries, particularly Brazil and Argen-
tina. First-hand experiences from Brazilian farmers who went to Santa 
Cruz in the 1990s in search of land is presented, as frontier expansion 
encouraged investments and led to widespread deforestation. This chap-
ter presents an overview of the development and expansion of the agri-
cultural frontier, the politics behind these processes, and the shifting re-
lations among state, societal and capitalist before the rise of Evo Morales 
and the MAS to state power.  
4.2 Historical context 
Bolivia gained its independence from the Spanish in 1825, but the vast 
majority of Bolivians remained marginalized, excluded from political par-
ticipation, and subordinated to a landed elite and conservative oligarchy 
until the mid-20th Century. From independence to the 1950s, approxi-
mately 2% of the total population voted in elections, as indigenous peo-
ples were excluded from voting (Malloy 1970). State authorities and insti-
tutions remained concentrated in the country’s main cities of La Paz, 
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Santa Cruz, Sucre, Cochabamba, Potosi and Oruro for much of the 19th 
Century, ignoring vast areas of the country’s geography and people as the 
state remained an alien power and colonial reality for the majority of Bo-
livia’s indigenous population (Malloy 1970; Grindle 2000). Silver and tin 
barons continued to extract the country’s mineral wealth destined for 
Europe, this time under capitalist relations rather than the feudal-
colonial relations under Spanish rule. Agriculture remained marginal in 
terms of productivity and geographic extension. Until 1950, only 2-3% 
of the country’s total available agricultural land was under cultivation, 
nearly all of which was located in the mountainous altiplano region near 
La Paz and its nearby valleys (Malloy 1970, 348–349). This was largely 
due to the location of indigenous communities (labourers) who settled 
and remained concentrated in the altiplano since the pre-Inca period. 
Since labour was the main input for agricultural production, agricultural 
expansion remained limited to where exploitable labour was available 
and thus concentrated in the altiplano, leaving the vast majority of the 
country’s most fertile land underutilized, particularly those in the low-
lands of Santa Cruz. The hacienda (large-scale landed estates) regime ex-
propriated the lands of indigenous communities, often allowing indige-
nous families usufruct rights to a small parcel on the hacienda so long as 
they worked as labourers for the hacendado (estate owner) (Kay and 
Urioste 2007).  
With state authorities and economic interests largely confined to the 
mountainous Andean region around La Paz, Bolivia’s border regions to 
the north, east, south and west were unprotected. The Bolivian state was 
unable to defend these regions from its aggressive bordering neighbours, 
ceding land to Brazil (1867, 1903), Chile (1904), and Paraguay (1938), 
which resulted in the loss of nearly half of its territory since 1825 (Klein 
2011, 101). Of particular significance was the Chaco War (1932-1935) 
with Paraguay during the Great Depression. The decline of the tin indus-
try combined with a stagnating and exploitative agricultural sector, left 
many miners unemployed and indigenous peasants landless. This culmi-
nated during the Chaco War where Paraguay defeated Bolivia in a bloody  
and one-sided battle, leading to over 65,000 deaths, the majority of 
which were indigenous peasants who served on the front line in a Bolivi-
an army organized by race and ethnicity (Klein 2011, 182). The defeat 
marked a turning point in Bolivian society. Radical ideas were emerging 
and the traditional belief system of class, ethnic and race discrimination 
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were being challenged. New political parties were formed and Bolivia 
changed ‘from being one of the least mobilized societies in Latin Ameri-
ca, in terms of radical ideology and union organization, to one of the 
most advanced’ (Klein 2011, 177).  
Civil wars and internal tensions came to a peak in 1952 when the mili-
tary and oligarchs were confronted by the Nationalist Revolutionary 
Movement (Movimiento Nacional Revolucionario, MNR) who had garnered 
support among miners, peasants, national police, and the powerful Boliv-
ian Workers’ Confederation (Central Obrera Boliviana, COB) (Grindle 
2000, 101). As conflict quickly spread throughout the country, the mili-
tary disintegrated, as armed peasant, miners, indigenous, and other wage 
labourers aligned to drive landed elites and mine owners off their land. 
Many indigenous (referred to as ‘Indians’ at the time) began to self-
identify as peasants (campesinos), as a national trade union was formed 
uniting Quechas, Aymaras, and other peasants in the National Confeder-
ation of Peasant Workers of Bolivia (Confederación Nacional de Trabajadores 
Campesinos de Bolivia, CNTCB)2 which was closely linked to the MNR 
government (Albó 2002). The MNR took state power in 1952, and began 
implementing important reforms including universal adult suffrage 
which allowed indigenous people to vote, the nationalization of the ma-
jority of the mining industry, and an agrarian reform which redistributed 
some 30% of the country’s agricultural land to over 200,000 rural fami-
lies (Grindle 2000, 101; Klein 2011). Prior to the agrarian reform, Bolivia 
had one of the most unequal agrarian structures in Latin America where-
by just 6% of landowners controlled 92% of the land, with the average 
estate over 1000 hectares using just 1.5% of the land (Klein 2011, 210). 
With the country’s best lands underutilized, Bolivia was dependent on 
food imports to feed its population. Since many of the landed elites were 
absentee landowners with little capital invested, peasant mobilization and 
redistribution by expropriation was not heavily contested. While miners, 
indigenous-peasants, and labour unions continued to make their de-
mands, the state’s fiscal capacity was entering into crisis. The state in-
creased the currency supply in an attempt to finance social programmes 
and economic reforms demanded by an increasingly strong movement of 
aligned workers and peasants.  By the mid-1950s however, annual infla-
tion rates surged to over 900%, drastically devaluing the currency and 
triggering a financial crisis (Klein 2011, 216). The fiscal crisis threatened 
the MNR’s state power as social and economic upheaval was imminent. 
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With the Cold War in full swing, President Eisenhower was wary of the 
emergence of revolutionary regimes hostile to US interests springing up 
throughout the region. The US quickly offered financial and food aid 
under Public Law 480, and by the late 1950s Bolivia was ‘the largest sin-
gle recipient of United States foreign aid in Latin America and the high-
est per capita in the world’ (Klein 2011, 218). While initially food aid was 
necessary to alleviate hunger, the persistent dumping of US subsidized 
milled wheat flooded the Bolivian market undermining the development 
of Bolivia’s own wheat sector, both for peasants and millers. Bolivia also 
accepted a loan from the IMF in 1957 along with a ‘Stabilization Plan’ 
which ‘required that Bolivia balance its budget, end the food subsidiza-
tion of the miners, hold down wage increases, create a single exchange 
rate, and adopt a host of other measures restricting government initia-
tives and expenditures’ (Klein 2011, 220–21). The US invested in infra-
structure development, connecting Bolivia’s major cities and facilitating 
expansion into new frontiers of the east.  
A two-track agricultural development strategy was designed by US 
government officials and funded through a $25 million agreement with 
the U.S. Export-Import Bank to promote economic development 
(Thorn 1971, 165). Led by US State Department official Merwin L. Bo-
han, the ‘Bohan Plan’ ‘recommended that the population be shifted from 
the poor lands of the altiplano to the fertile lands of the east’ (Ibid. 1971, 
165).  The ensuing migration referred to as ‘march to the east’ (la marcha 
al oriente) offered highland peasants between 20 to 50 hectares of land in 
San Julián, Cuatro Cañadas and the surrounding region in order to pro-
duce traditional crops for domestic consumption while providing large-
scale farms with an abundant supply of labour. By 1980, 41% of the 
population of Santa Cruz were highlanders (Valdivia 2010, 69). Large-
scale parcels were also distributed to capitalist entrepreneurs and the po-
litical elites who received landholdings between 500 to 50,000 hectares 
referred to as ‘enterprises’ not latifundium3 (Ibid. 2010, 69).  
4.2.1 Bolivia’s Mennonite colonies 
The march to the east coincided with the arrival of Mennonites who ini-
tially immigrated from Paraguay and Canada as early as 1954 (Kopp 
2015, 55). Mennonites trace their roots to the Anabaptist (meaning ‘re-
baptizers’) movement in 16th Century Europe and take their name from 
one of their early leaders, Menno Simons, a Catholic priest from the 
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northwest region of Friesland in the Netherlands who became aligned 
with the Anabaptist in 1536 (Mennonite Church USA 2014). According 
to the directory of the World Mennonite Conference the Anabaptist 
movement consists of 2.1 million people in 87 countries around the 
world (Conference 2015). They are pacifists and have been persecuted 
historically for their religious beliefs and parting ways with dominant 
Christian beliefs. Persecution has led to widespread migration, yet re-
gardless of where they settle they ‘have existed largely within the con-
fines of tightly-knit, symbiotic communities characterized by distinctive 
religious and social beliefs and practices’ (Winland 1993, 110). Mennon-
ites were among the first peoples to settle in what is now the soybean 
expansion zone in the lowlands of Santa Cruz, purchasing vast amounts 
of land through formal and informal channels in order to establish their 
‘colonies’. They were granted several rights which allow them to defend 
and protect their way of life ‘in isolation from the outside world’ includ-
ing freedom of religion, education, and exemption from military service 
(Kopp 2015, 97). As conditions for land access improved in Bolivia’s 
lowlands, Mennonite families from Mexico and Belize also began to im-
migrate to Bolivia. They imported used agricultural machinery from their 
home countries, particularly from Canada and Mexico, and became the 
pioneers of mechanized agriculture and even soybean cultivation before 
the soybean boom and the arrival of Brazilians in the 1990s. There are 
now 52 Mennonite colonies in Bolivia, controlling 645,735 hectares of 
land and consisting of 56,175 registered inhabitants or 9,790 families 
(Kopp 2015, 69). On average, each family controls 66 hectares of land, 
90% of which are in Santa Cruz where they are considered slightly larger 
than small-scale farmers (50 hectares or less). Mennonite colonies in Bo-
livia vary in terms of their ethno-religious identities. Some colonies are 
modernized, using electricity and motorized vehicles with rubber tires, 
while others remain ‘off the grid’ using natural gas or diesel-powered 
generators. While even the most traditional colonies use heavy machin-
ery for agricultural production, some refuse to use rubber tractor tires 
opting for steel tires. This has to do with the Mennonite tradition of 
lessening their dependence on the outside world and remaining faithful 
to their family, cultural and religious values (field notes, 2014-15). Men-
nonites self-identify as farmers, or people of the land, dedicated to farm 
work and living in relative isolation from the rest of society.  
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4.2.2  The ‘eastern landlord bias’ 
Driven by the interests of the Inter-American Agricultural Service, an 
‘eastern landlord bias’ emerged in the late 1950s, favouring large-scale 
export-oriented agriculture (Kay 2006; Kay 2009). Rather than an ‘urban 
bias’ which involves the inefficient and inequitable transfer of resources 
to urban areas and ‘price twists’ which are disadvantageous for rural are-
as (Lipton 1977), the ‘landlord bias’ is much more useful to understand 
what emerged in Bolivia’s eastern lowlands of Santa Cruz. As Cristóbal 
Kay (1981, 498) argues in his critique of Lipton’s ‘urban bias’ and in ref-
erence to class alliances and agrarian change in Chile: 
Different social classes exist within each economically or geographically 
defined sector, and the main contradiction in society is not between sec-
tors but between social classes. It is this essential contradiction which the 
state constantly tries to mediate through measures ranging from coercion 
to consent and which aim to ensure the domination of those classes in 
control of the state apparatus. The introduction of a class analysis reveals 
that whilst the State may have discriminated against the agricultural sector, 
it also acted to protect landlords’ interests. Peasants were the main social 
group to be adversely affected by the government. 
For Kay (2009, 112–113), a more useful analysis would therefore con-
sider the ‘landlord bias’ who exercise power ‘from the blocking of land 
reform, the absence or non-enforcement of minimum wage and social 
security legislation, the outlawing of rural trade unions, the failure to 
curb exploitative practices of traders (including sometimes landlords) 
who pay low prices for the peasants’ marketed surplus and sell at a high 
price the inputs purchased by peasants, and lenders (including sometimes 
landlords) who charge usury interest rates for credit’. Technology, low-
interest credit, and infrastructure investment policies were directed to-
wards modernizing large-scale agriculture in the late 1950s (Valdivia 
2010; Ormachea 2007; Kay and Urioste 2007). Despite distributing 
83.4% of the total available arable land to 74.3% of the total number of 
‘farming families’ from 1953 to 1977 , the lack of supportive policies and 
extension services such as technological assistance, training, access to 
credit, marketing and distribution services resulted in internal contradic-
tions in the reform process, forcing those with little resources to aban-
don their land as they struggled to maintain viable and productive farms 
(Thiesenhusen 1989, 10). Many small farmers were forced to work as 
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wage labourers to supplement their household farm income (Ormachea 
2007, 26). While the agrarian structure in the western Andes became 
plagued with ‘economically and technically unsustainable’ minifundios; the 
eastern lowlands were characterized by an increasingly dominant agricul-
tural ‘enterprise’ regime (Kay and Urioste 2007, 58).  
The construction of new highways connected the western Andes to 
the eastern plains as public and private investment was directed to infra-
structure development for agricultural and livestock production, forestry, 
sugar and oil refineries (Kay and Urioste 2007, 4). The military dictator-
ships of 1971-78 and 1980-82, solidified the reversal of the progress 
made during the earlier reform period as hundreds of thousands of hec-
tares of land were freely distributed to political allies. This period marks 
the process of the contemporary differentiation of the peasantry in Bo-
livia as the ‘middle peasantry’ was squeezed of its resource-access and a 
stark divide between landlord class and landless or near landless 
emerged. This ‘conquest of the east’ (Kay and Urioste 2007, 44) has 
characterized Bolivia’s agrarian structure to the present-day. Class divi-
sions were solidified by means of the ‘Bohan Plan’ and subsequent pro-
cesses in not only the eastern lowlands but also the entire country. The 
altiplano was largely ignored in the plan – only being viewed as a region of 
surplus labour available to serve the labour needs of the ‘modern’ ex-
port-oriented agriculture in the eastern lowlands.  
After years of political instability and military dictatorships, Bolivia’s 
first democratically elected government in 18 years led by President 
Hernan Siles4 of the Unidad Democrática y Popular (UDP) was experi-
encing fiscal and administrative crises in the early to mid-1980s. Interest 
rates on existing international loans increased substantially, tax revenues 
were falling, access to foreign loans declined, and the tin industry went 
into crisis as international tin prices plummeted, severely affecting the 
Bolivian economy and employment (Morales and Sachs 1989). Hyperin-
flation and a debt crisis ensued as annual GDP growth from 1980-1985 
was –4.5%, the annual inflation rate averaged an unprecedented 569.1% 
and foreign debt more than doubled from USD $2.7 billion to $5.6 bil-
lion during the same period (Morales and Sachs 1989; Van Dijck 1998). 
The fiscal crisis of the state led to the premature resignation of President 
Siles as Victor Paz Estenssoro, representing the right-wing faction of the 
MNR was sworn into office in 1985, ushering in a period of neoliberal 
reforms with Decree 20160. With support from the Bolivian Private 
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Business Federation (Confederación de Empresarios Privados de Bolivia, CEPB) 
and a political alliance with Hugo Banzer of the National Democratic 
Action party (Acción Democrática Nacional, AND) (and former head of the 
military government from 1971-1978), the Paz administration introduced 
the Jeffrey Sachs-inspired5 ‘New Economic Plan’ (NEP) in 1985 
(Conaghan, Malloy, and Abugattas 1990). The NEP led to swift cuts in 
government spending, including subsidies on food and public services; 
froze wages and reduced public sector employment; reformed the tax 
system; liberalized trade; devalued the currency and established interna-
tional agreements ‘to allow foreign guarantees for foreign investors’ (Van 
Dijck 1998, 32). Labour unions, particularly the COB and the tin miners’ 
federation (Federación Sindical de Trabajadores Mineros de Bolivia, FSTMB), 
were increasingly suppressed and disbanded as the state-owned tin mines 
of the Bolivian Mining Corporation (Corporación Minera de Bolivia, 
COMIBOL) were shut down. Close to 30,000 miners lost their jobs and 
were forced to migrate elsewhere – some of whom received land in the 
lowlands of Santa Cruz and would later become smallholders in the soy-
bean expansion zone (Gill 2000). By 1987, another 6,000 people lost 
their jobs in the private mining sector, 10,000 in public administration, 
2,000 in banking and over 110 factories closed down (Kruse 2001, 159). 
In order to counter forms of resistance, cash bonuses and promises of 
job ‘relocation’ via migration were offered by state managers (Sanabria 
1999). Resistance, or threats thereof, was met with firm repression as the 
state strategically targeted the country’s most militant faction of the min-
er’s union and ‘security forces quickly and effortlessly encircled work-
places where miners had gone on strike and/or occupied mines, and de-
liberately blocked the supply of foodstuffs and other life necessities, such 
as electricity and natural gas – essentially severing their lifelines’ (Sanabria 
1999, 544). The tin price crisis further weakened the mining union’s ca-
pacity to negotiate as it eroded their economic and political influence. 
The assault on labour which ensued, further weakened the country’s 
strongest labour union, the COB, as miners were dispersed, relocated, 
and could be easily targeted if they resisted. During this period, state ac-
tors exercised their power through coercion, lacking legitimacy among 
the marginalized majority while strategically repressing forms of labour 
organization. 
Private capital started to fill the void left by COMIBOL and from 
1988 to 1992 private sector investment in mining nearly doubled 
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(Sanabria 1999).  While the NEP quickly brought the inflation rate under 
control, stabilized the economy and re-established relations with official 
foreign creditors6, unemployment increased and poverty remained wide-
spread (Van Dijck 1998). Even the Plan’s principal architect, Jeffrey 
Sachs pointed to the increased inequality, the over-reliance on a laissez-
faire economic approach, and the lack of sectorial and regional diversifi-
cation of the economy, four years after the NEP was implemented 
(Morales and Sachs 1989, 78–79). Most significantly, classes of labour, 
small-scale farmers and peasants were left in much more vulnerable con-
ditions as new legislation made it easier to dismiss workers and dismantle 
unions, while public sector cuts resulted in immediate unemployment 
and the lack of subsidies and social assistance led to increased impover-
ishment. 
The combined lack of state subsidies and support services, trade lib-
eralization, and the designation of peasant production to an ‘economical-
ly marginal’ role (Sanabria 1999, 539) resulted in a rural poverty rate of 
nearly 90% in the lowlands of Santa Cruz in 1994 (Vos, Haeduck, and 
Mejia 1998, 123). The urban-rural income gap widened and the terms of 
trade in agriculture declined as peasant farming remained stagnant and 
industrial crops for export were prioritized (Vos, Haeduck, and Mejia 
1998). Traditional crops7 from the Andean region suffered a negative 
growth rate (-7%) from 1991-1997, while industrial crops8 in Santa Cruz 
destined mainly for export grew 124% during the same period (Kay and 
Urioste 2007, 54). As such a ‘landlord bias’ (Kay 2009) became evident, 
whereby ‘public policy discriminates against rural workers and poor 
peasants in favour of landlords and rural capitalists’ (Ibid. 2009, 112). 
Investment and frontier expansion during this period represents an im-
portant transition in the forms and relations that characterized agricul-
tural production at the time.  
4.3 Neoliberal multiculturalism: accumulation with 
legitimacy? 
During this first phase of neoliberal policies, Bolivia’s main trade union 
organizations, COMIBOL and the COB, were weakened as state support 
was rolled back and many unions dismantled. However, other organized 
social movements were strengthening in rural areas. These movements 
were united, in large part, due to the Katarista movement (Movimiento In-
dio Tupaj Katari, MITK) of the 1970s inspired by indigenous independ-
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ence leader and hero Tupaj Katari who died fighting the Spanish in 1781. 
The Kataristas united trade unions (miners) and peasants, but ‘put ethnic 
demands at the top of the agenda’ (Albó 2002, 76). The Kataristas came 
to head the main peasant movement, CNTCB (which later became 
CSUTCB) and joined the COB, generating a heightened collective con-
sciousness which combined class exploitation and ethnic discrimination. 
Organized peasant (Confederación Sindical Única de Trabajadores Campesinos de 
Bolivia, CSUTCB), indigenous (Confederación Indígena del Oriente Boliviano, 
CIDOB and Coordinadora de Pueblos Étnicas de Santa Cruz, CPESC), wom-
en (Confederación Nacional de Mujeres Campesinas Indígenas Originarias de Boliv-
ia ‘Bartolina Sisa’; CNMCIOB-BS) and coca grower (Comité Coordinadora de 
los Cocaleros) movements which were formed from 1979 to the early 
1990s grew stronger and gained influence and, while the Bolivian state 
may had solved its fiscal crisis in the short term, the high incidence of 
rural poverty, widening urban-rural gap, and lack of recognition of indig-
enous rights threatened the legitimacy of the state among these key con-
stituents. As renowned Bolivian anthropologist, Xavier Albó (2002, 77) 
puts it, ‘this was the golden age of the indigenous campesino Andean 
movement’. In 1990, over 300 indigenous men and women led by 
CIDOB participated in a historic march for territory and dignity (Marcha 
por el territorio y la dignidad), marching for 70 days to La Paz in protest of 
intrusions by logging companies deforesting their lands and demanding 
rights and recognitions. This pressure ‘from below’ led to a series of Su-
preme Decrees announced immediately by then President Jaime Paz 
Zamora recognizing nine indigenous territories (Assies 2000, 15). One 
year later, Bolivia became one of the first countries in Latin America to 
ratify the Indigenous and Tribal Peoples Convention of the International 
Labour Organization 169 (ILO 169), signalling the state’s obligation to 
respect and protect the rights of indigenous peoples. These actions set 
important precedents for future demands and struggles among the indig-
enous, who were now recognized as distinct from peasants (campesinos), 
signalling a renewed sense of pride as indigenous peoples.9  
From 1986-1992 the illegal expansion of cultivated areas by means of 
what is now known to be the result of ‘massive corruption in the distri-
bution and titling of lands’ (Kay and Urioste 2007, 58) led to rapid rates 
of deforestation and a rise in agricultural production. This period was 
preceded by Hugo Banzer’s military dictatorship from 1971-78 where 
‘millions of dollars of cheap credit subsidised agro-capitalists in Santa 
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Cruz’ (Webber 2011) and ‘hundreds of thousands of hectares of land 
were fraudulently distributed to political cronies for free (some up to 
50,000 hectares)’ (Urioste 2010, 2). Privileged individuals with ties to the 
military government benefitted immensely during this period, as their 
access to authority enabled them to benefit from Bolivia’s fertile re-
sources in the eastern lowlands (Ribot and Peluso 2003). According to 
Steininger et al. (2001) annual deforestation due to agriculture in Santa 
Cruz’s expansion zone went from 68,196 hectares in 1986 to 225,018 
hectares in 1992 – a 330% increase – with agro-industry (103,623 ha) and 
Mennonite farmers (89,954 ha) accounting for 86% of deforestation in 
1992. Further, in the expansion zone, cotton increased by 135%, soy-
beans by 194%, sorghum by 108% and wheat by 539% (see table 4.1). By 
1992, soy crops covered 200,000 of the 354,000 hectares in the expan-
sion zone.10      
 Table 4.1 
Annual deforestation by type of actors and expansion of cultivated areas 
  1986 1988 1990 1992 
A. Annual clearing (in ha) 68,196 83,539 149,152 225,018 
Lowland peasants 9,282 11,095 16,184 17,772 
Highland peasants (colonists) 6,956 11,573 14,424 13,669 
Mennonites 22,501 24,649 52,060 89,954 
Agro-industrialists 29,457 36,222 66,484 103,623 
B. Crop area (1,000 ha) in expansion 
zone 132.3 149.8 291.8 389.3 
Cotton 11.2 10.0 3.9 26.3 
Rice 13.7 16.2 18.2 18.2 
Corn/maize 17.1 14.2 19.7 35.4 
Soy 68.2 85.4 179.3 200.2 
Sorghum 12.1 20.0 30.0 25.2 
Wheat 10.0 4.0 30.0 63.9 
Sunflower  -- --  10.7 20.1 
 
Source: Steininger et al (2001) and Hecht (2005) 
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Highland peasants had a prominent role as major food suppliers at 
this time, producing rice, corn, wheat and other traditional crops for 
domestic consumption. Production of sunflowers, sorghum and maize 
also increased as part of the evolution of the oilseed complex and agro-
industry in general in a region that allows for two harvests per year. La-
bour-intensive crops such as sugarcane stagnated as highland peasants 
cultivated their own land, rather than serving as a reserve army of labour 
for large-scale capitalist farmers (Gill 1987). Soybeans were gaining im-
portance as an export, tripling in export value from US$19 to US$57 mil-
lion in just six years, deeming the oilseed crop an important economic 
activity (Pérez Luna 2007).  
In 1991, the World Bank’s (WB) ‘Eastern Lowland Project’ was im-
plemented to expand the production of agricultural commodities, partic-
ularly soybeans, with the aim of increasing exports to 200,000 tons per 
year and substituting imported wheat with production aimed at 30,000 
tons per year after the sector had been virtually destroyed by imports 
under PL480 (World Bank 1998). This project was explicitly oriented to 
consolidate large-scale industrial crop production under the rationale that 
it would accelerate economic growth and lead to ‘sustainable agricultural 
development’. Seven years later, the WB reported results of agricultural 
production, as follows:  
Bolivia's real annual agricultural growth since 1987 of 1.5 percent has been 
strongly influenced by the expanded production in the Eastern Lowlands, 
the most salient features of which are as follows: between 1990 and 1996, 
agricultural exports from Santa Cruz increased 400 percent; the gross value 
of the Department's agricultural output rose from US$350 million to 
US$685 million during the period 1990-96. It has been estimated that 37 
percent of the increased output could be credited to the project […] 
(World Bank 1998, iii). 
However, these outcomes were overshadowed by the failure to con-
trol deforestation. Perez (2007) concludes that the Eastern Lowlands 
Project was the main driver for deforestation, prioritizing export growth 
rather than sustainable development at the expense of the region’s rich 
native forests. This was also acknowledged in the World Bank’s ‘Imple-
mentation Completion Report’ where it states that ‘[i]n the process un-
fortunately, deforestation increased considerably, e.g., almost one million 
ha between 1989 and 1996. These actions far exceeded expectations, e.g., 
the project plan forecast only 25,000 ha of new land clearance in the ex-
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pansion zone over five years’ (1998, 4). Total deforestation was 40 times 
more than the World Bank’s original projection.  
This period entailed a rapid incorporation of frontier land into soy-
bean plantations as the form of production began to shift from labour-
intensive to extensive mechanization, driving deforestation (Barber et al. 
1996; Müller et al. 2013). Other crops such as sugarcane and cotton, re-
mained slow-growing commodities. Highland peasants and Mennonite 
settlers also began to expand cultivated areas to increase rice, maize and 
wheat production for the internal market. While large properties began 
to adopt capital-intensive farming, smallholders still had the advantage of 
controlling labour-intensive farming, maintaining their productive capac-
ity and their access to land and (family) labour. Peasant agriculture in the 
altiplano, however, suffered immensely as the state’s structural adjustment 
programme’s ‘landlord bias’ focused on developing the agro-industrial 
export sector in the east. As Kay and Urioste (2007, 53) point out, ‘up 
until the policies of structural adjustment of 1985, the internal (food) 
supply was able to meet the demand of the Bolivian population but, with 
the ability to freely import foodstuffs from 1985, the peasant economy 
declined as it could not compete with the better quality and cheaper im-
ports’. The subsequent stagnation of agricultural production in the west-
ern altiplano coincided with rapid increases in the eastern lowlands – in 
terms of cultivated land, productivity, and migration, as even more high-
land peasants went east in search for land or labour opportunities. This 
provided large-scale farmers with a stable supply of rural wage labour, 
even though labour requirements for production were gradually decreas-
ing 
In 1993, Gonzalo Sanchez de Lozada of the MNR was elected presi-
dent. Sanchez de Lozada was the former Minister of Planning for the 
Paz Estenssoro administration, and one of the ‘key managers of the ne-
oliberal project’ initiated in 1985 (Conaghan, Malloy, and Abugattas 
1990, 14). In order to gain the presidency, the former Minister made a 
political pact (Pacto de Gobernabilidad) to lead a coalition of parties, most 
significantly with Victor Hugo Cardenas of the Tupak Katari Revolu-
tionary Movement of Liberation (Movimiento Revolucionario Tupak Katari de 
Liberacion, MRTKL)11 who became Sanchez de Lozada’s Vice President 
in 1993. While Cardenas gained popularity as Bolivia’s first ever indige-
nous Vice President, the CSUTCB called him an ‘enemy and a traitor’ at 
the 1994 VI Congress due to his decision to ally with the MNR and their 
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neoliberal agenda (Van Cott 2005, 81–82). But while Paz Estenssoro’s 
New Economic Plan (NEP) in 1985 may be described as a ‘most radical 
approach’ or ‘shock treatment’ (Conaghan, Malloy, and Abugattas 1990), 
Sanchez de Lozada’s Plan for All (Plan de Todos) introduced some social-
ly-inclusive and participatory legislation, including a land reform pro-
gramme. After taking credit for the economic recovery of hyperinflation 
and a debt crisis in 1985, Sanchez de Lozada sought to maintain the capi-
tal accumulation function of the state while increasing its legitimacy. Pet-
ras and Veltmeyer (2005, 185) call this hybrid neoliberal model a form of 
‘social liberalism’ whereby ‘a neoliberal program of macroeconomic poli-
cy measures, including privatization, agricultural modernization, and la-
bor reform’ are accompanied with a new social policy targeted at the 
poor – a kind of structural adjustment with ‘a human face’. 
With an indigenous Vice President, Sanchez de Lozada attempted to 
sustain the neoliberal model based on free-market ideologies, privatiza-
tion, trade liberalization and deregulation, while gaining consent among 
the heightened class and ethnic consciousness of indigenous, peasant, 
and trade union groups. He also sought to ‘rebuild’ the state by ‘re-
establishing the authority of the state over society’, declaring that the 
state had been ‘practically destroyed’ lacking ‘mechanisms of control and 
oversight’ and ‘capacity to execute and implement any economic poli-
cy…’ (Sanchez de Lozada quoted in Conaghan, Malloy, and Abugattas 
1990, 118). The constitutional reform in 1994 aimed to do exactly this – 
reform state institutions to increase its capacity while gaining consent 
among the masses through decentralization, popular participation, land 
reform and increased indigenous rights without changing the underlying 
neoliberal order – or what Willem Assies (2000) called ‘neoliberal social 
reformism’. Article 1 of the Constitution was changed to recognize Bo-
livia as ‘multiethnic and pluricultural’, while Article 171 recognized indig-
enous groups and guaranteed their rights to ‘communal lands of origin’ 
(Tierra Comunitaria Originario, TCO), the establishment of Indigenous 
Municipal Districts (Distrito Municipal Indígena, DMI) and the right to ex-
ercise customary law within the TCO so long as it does not contradict 
existing legislation or the Constitution. However, neither the TCOs nor 
the DMI were granted any autonomous powers (Van Cott 2002). Im-
portant legislation was also passed during the Sanchez de Lozada admin-
istration (1993-1997) including the Law for Popular Participation (Ley de 
Participacion Popular), Law for Capitalization (Ley de Capitalizacíon), Law for 
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Education Reform (Ley de Reforma Educativa) and the Land Reform Law 
(Ley INRA).  
Of particular significance is the Law for Popular Participation (LPP) 
which served an explicit legitimating function by guaranteeing more ef-
fective representation for all citizens, direct elections for mayors and 
municipal councils, and direct financial transfers (20% of national tax 
revenues) to local governments based on municipal population (Grindle 
2000, 94). This was complemented by the Law of Administrative Decen-
tralization which ‘deconcentrated national-level management of social 
services (health, education, and social assistance) and devolved adminis-
trative responsibilities for transportation, tourism, environment, rural 
electrification, and investment fund management to the departmental 
(regional government) level’ (Grindle 2000, 95). The LPP recognized 
traditional organizations, including neighborhood councils, ayllus12, ca-
bildos13, and other forms of community organizations which were labeled 
as Territorial Base Organizations (Organización Territorial de Base, OTB) 
(Albó 2002). A total of 311 municipalities were consolidated and would 
receive direct financial transfers from the central government (Albó 
2002, 79). This enabled state institutions to re-establish their ‘authority’, 
‘control’, and ‘oversight’ over society, as sought by Sanchez de Lozada. 
Prior to 1994, for example, the majority of Bolivian territory and most of 
the rural population – some 42% of the total population – had no formal 
local government (Grindle 2000, 96). However, many of the new munic-
ipal jurisdictions did not coincide with existing indigenous organizations 
or territories and effectively fragmented the ability of indigenous groups 
to organize as they became subject to the larger strategy of the munici-
pality, whereby decisions were often made by the local elites (Assies 
2000). Despite more ‘representation’ and ‘participation’ among the 
OTBs, they lacked ‘political weight’ and became absorbed and ‘subservi-
ent’ to the municipal government. As such, the LPP became a veiled 
form of control and worked to fragment indigenous organizations and 
their effective political participation. Rather than increase the state’s ca-
pacity and control over the national territory through centralization, the 
LPP ‘provided a lifeline for local development’ and thereby enabled the 
central government to penetrate the national territory using a form of 
‘social inclusion’ which aimed to subside organized resistance against the 
state without actually giving the marginalized more voice or autonomy 
(Grindle 2000, 118). Yet, while both CSUTCB and COB were against the 
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LPP for fears that it would destroy their informal local autonomy and 
organic forms of socio-political organization, regional economic elites 
also opposed the legislation due to the fact that they would lose some 
control over decision-making and resource distribution. Regional oli-
garchs, established during the Banzer military regime as well as prior to 
the 1952 revolution, were at times pushing for separation and regional 
sovereignty due to the relative absence of state institutions and state ca-
pacity in their regions. However, Sanchez de Lozada and the political 
elites of La Paz wanted to render the country more ‘governable’ and ex-
pand their political control across the country. As Sanchez de Lozada 
(1997) put it: 
I thought it was important to break down federalism in this country; it was 
important that the country not be separated into different regions. Those 
cities only saw the rural areas as hinterland, they were never going to do 
anything for the rural areas. We were protecting ourselves from the pres-
sure groups in those urban areas. We were very conscious of the fact that 
if you cede power, you get stronger, you get power (Grindle 2000, 119).  
The ability of state managers to pursue policies against the immediate 
interests of the regional oligarchy demonstrates the relative autonomy of 
the state, especially during this period whereby nearly half of the popula-
tion was not represented by a local government. As state institutions and 
their capacities expanded and increased throughout the country, local 
and regional elites began to integrate and infiltrate such institutions and 
over time, the LPP reinforced existing local and regional power imbal-
ances, reflecting the existing class structure in society. However, that is 
not to say that the LPP and the recognition of indigenous rights, pluri-
ethnicity, and multi-culturality are insignificant – on the contrary, they 
opened up new spaces and most importantly raised class-consciousness 
among the marginalized majority, which would come to have great im-
plications over the course of the next decade. Such policies fit within a 
framework of what Charles Hale calls ‘neoliberal multiculturalism’, 
‘whereby proponents of the neoliberal doctrine pro-actively endorse a 
substantive, if limited, version of indigenous cultural rights, as a means 
to resolve their own problems and advance their own political agendas’ 
(Hale 2002, 487). 
The second agrarian reform under Law 1715 of 1996 (Ley INRA) was 
also initiated during the Sanchez de Lozada administration. One of the 
key objectives of the reform was to formalize property rights 
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(saneamiento) as a form of state-building in order to ‘make society legible’ 
(Scott 1998). By doing so, the state could generate tax revenues from 
agricultural lands and thus stimulate production by making sure lands did 
not sit idle for speculative accumulation and fulfilled a socio-economic 
legal function (Función Económica y Social, FES) (Albó 2002). Indigenous 
territories (TCOs) and small farms were also prioritized with new legal 
protections and tax exemptions. Law 1715 aimed to recover illegal land-
holdings to redistribute to peasant and indigenous communities. On the 
one hand, this initiative pursued legitimate principles of social justice for 
the peasant and indigenous majority. On the other hand, economically 
and politically powerful groups launched an open confrontation with the 
intention of neutralizing the state-led initiative to expand its control over 
the lowlands of Santa Cruz.  The legal struggle became a political strug-
gle (Valdivia 2010).  
The implementation of the new Land Law implicated that all fallow 
lands should be reverted to the state. However, large-scale landowners 
represented by the National Agricultural Confederation (Confederación 
Nacional de Agricultura, CONFEAGRO) reinforced their demands for the 
protection of private property and fought against any redistribution of 
pre-existing property (Urioste 2007).  This sectorial political resistance, 
with heavy economic and political clout in Santa Cruz, was extremely 
effective as the land titling process produced marginal results below 10% 
by the end of 2004. As Valdivia (2010) explains, the Santa Cruz elite 
formed a regional hegemony representing themselves as ‘successful pro-
ducers’ built on legitimation narratives proclaiming that small-scale pro-
ducers and peasants, too, could become successful capitalist agricultural 
entrepreneurs. In addition to the political resistance of agri-business, an-
other factor which led to the Land Law’s ineffectiveness in redistribution 
was that the unproductive lands of the early 1990s became controlled by 
capitalist farmers from Brazil, Argentina, and Bolivia who bought huge 
tracts of land and expanded their landholdings. This hampered the rever-
sal of large and medium-sized properties since previously idle land was 
now being put into production, meeting all requirements to protect their 
private property. The land reform was left largely ‘unfinished’ with an 
estimated 100,000 families left landless and the persistence of rural pov-
erty as a ‘landlord bias’ in the eastern lowlands continued to marginalize 
peasants, small-scale farmers, and rural wage labourers – and most se-
verely indigenous people and women (Kay 2009; Kay and Urioste 2007).  
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4.4 Foreign capital and soybean expansion: Brazilian 
experiences 
The 1990s was a decade with visible incursions of foreign capital, not 
only in the soybean sector, but also towards acquiring cattle ranches in 
remote areas of the frontier. In just fifteen years (1985-2000) the area 
under soybean cultivation increased from 50,000 to 500,000 hectares 
(ANAPO 2015). The rapid expansion of the agricultural frontier over a 
relatively short time period was carried out with little regulatory over-
sight regarding legal land tenure. The land market was ‘open for busi-
ness’ as one Brazilian farmer working in Bolivia explained (Klaus, per-
sonal communication, April 2014). In the 1990s, the Bolivian 
government was so eager to attract investment that land was almost giv-
en away for free. Farmers were buying land in what is now called the 
‘expansion zone’ for $20-$30/ha. Today, these same lands sell for $2000-
$5000/ha (field notes, 2014-15). The agrarian law was inoperable as for-
mal and informal land transactions were widespread and the land market 
was attractive for capitalized farmers with rising production costs in 
neighbouring countries. 
Iglenio Klaus, for example, is a large-scale landowner from Rio 
Grande do Sul, Brazil. He grew up in Brazil’s southern-most state during 
the initial soy boom triggered by trade relations with Japan in the 1970s. 
As land prices increased dramatically in his home state in Brazil, Klaus 
saw Bolivia as an opportunity to expand his landholdings and continue 
farming with much lower costs of production. He arrived to San Julián 
in 1990, purchased 1,400 ha of land for USD $30/ha which he now uses 
for soybean production (700 ha) and cattle pasture (700 ha). At the time, 
there was virtually no mechanized agriculture, as labour-intensive pro-
duction prevailed. Klaus brought his machinery from Brazil as did many 
others during the 1990s. Klaus explained that he could now sell his land 
for at least USD $3000/ha, but that similar land just across the Brazilian 
border in the state of Mato Grosso would be between USD $20,000 to 
$30,000/ha. Furthermore, production costs are much lower in Bolivia as 
diesel is subsidized by the state, making it approximately 30% of the cost 
in Brazil. Klaus explained, ‘not only is Brazil’s land more expensive, 
along with the cost of inputs, it is also harder to maintain fertility, the 
quality of land in Bolivia (in this region) is much better because it is 
younger’ (Klaus, personal communication, April 2014). Since the majori-
ty of the Bolivian lowlands were native forests only a decade before, the 
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soil fertility has likely not reached the point of exhaustion and salinity 
from agro-chemical inputs as land in Brazil which has undergone pro-
duction since the 1970s.  
When asked about the Bolivian government, Klaus was relatively sat-
isfied. He said, ‘the government has been good for producers and the 
economy in general, prices and exchange rates have been stable, private 
property is more secure, and you can work your land in peace’ (Klaus, 
personal communication, April 2014). But while such laws are favourable 
for large-scale producers and landowners, Klaus explained that smaller 
farmers suffer. ‘Soy is a business for big producers’ he explained, ‘the 
smaller ones cannot survive without government support. With the cur-
rent government’s policies, there is no future for small producers, they 
will eventually have to sell and move to the cities’ (Klaus, personal com-
munication, April 2014). While there can be a tendency to villainize for-
eign large-scale capitalist farmers, Klaus was critical of the state for not 
supporting smallholders. He thought they need to invest in what he 
called ‘agro-villages’ which could work as cooperatives, sharing farm 
equipment and building strong farmer-to-farmer networks, but would 
require technical assistance and rural infrastructure. He was also critical 
of the land concentration in general, revealing that loopholes in the land 
ceiling of 5000 hectares allow people to simply register properties under 
different family member names. His Brazilian friend owns 50 properties, 
but none of them are in his name, so he is able to control some 20,000 
hectares without any problems. In this way, he said, the system works for 
the interests of large-scale farmers but against those of smallholders. De-
spite living in Bolivia for over 20 years, Klaus still did not feel part of 
Bolivia or his community. His wife is Bolivian, but feels Bolivians dis-
criminate against him because of the land he owns and the fact that he is 
a foreigner.  
Another Brazilian producer, Claudio Batista Vega from Parana, went 
to Bolivia in 1996 to take advantage of the much cheaper and available 
land. Batista owns 430 hectares, works another 270 hectares for farmers 
with no machinery, and recently bought properties from his neighbours 
(40 ha each) at a price of USD $1,200/ha. He also owns land in Brazil, 
but left that for his children to work as he went across the border to ex-
pand production. He continues to travel between Bolivia and Brazil 
based on sowing and harvest cycles, living in both countries throughout 
the year. Batista explained that he purchased his 430 hectares for USD 
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$50/ha and he believes he could sell it now for USD $6000/ha since it is 
top quality fertile land producing 3.5 tons/ha which is almost double the 
region’s average. Similar to Klaus, Batista did not feel part of the Bolivi-
an community and felt discriminated against for being a foreign land-
owner. However, he has never had any problems with the Bolivian state 
and works his land in peace, which, for him is all that he needs. When 
asked about the possibility to expand his landholdings, Batista said ‘there 
is no opportunity to expand, though the government says there is land, it 
is poor quality; all the good land in Bolivia worth working is already tak-
en’ (Batista Vega, personal communication, May 2014). 
These two portraits of Brazilians working the land in Bolivia are ex-
emplary of the changing relations of access and control over land 
prompted by the development of the soy complex and new capitalist ac-
tors. These are the middle and large-scale landowners from Brazil, Ar-
gentina, and Bolivia who engage in contract farming schemes with agro-
industries such as Cargill, ADM, Gravetal, FINO, etc., where they pur-
chase seeds and agro-chemical inputs and establish forward contracts 
which establishes the price paid at harvest based on the Chicago Board 
of Trade (CBOT). These capitalized farmers with motorized tractors and 
harvesters are the minority in the region, representing just 6% of total 
producers in San Julián and 17% in Cuatro Cañadas (INE 2015a). These 
farmers are incorporating and absorbing the lands of under-capitalized 
farmers either by various contract arrangements usually referred to as the 
‘partida’ arrangement and through outright land purchases, as explained 
by Batista who bought the adjacent parcels of his neighbours. These 
processes which are referred to as productive exclusion are discussed in 
more detail in the next chapter. 
The following Map 4.1 and Table 4.2 show the various settlement 
zones of agricultural expansion in Santa Cruz. The Integrated Zone (A), 
around the city of Santa Cruz de la Sierra where early settlers and colo-
nizers first established their farms; the Expansion Zone (B), where Cu-
atro Cañadas is located and which has become the center of soybean 
production and expansion since the late 1980s; the Northern Expansion 
Zone (C), where San Julián is located and where many highland peasants 
established settlements and which has become the new frontier for soy-
bean expansion; the Northern Integrated Zone (D), consisting of tradi-
tional landowners from Santa Cruz and agro-industrialist; and the Colo-
nization Zone (E) which represents those settlement areas of Yapacaní 
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created by National Institute for Colonization (INC) as well as the pro-
tected Amboró National Park. 
Map 4.1 
Agricultural expansion zones, Santa Cruz14 
 
Source: McKay and Colque, 2016 
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Table 4.2 
Land occupation by actors and five zones (documented until 2004) 
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(Ha) (Ha) (Ha) (Ha) (Ha) (Ha) (Ha) % 
Zone A 584,905 45,639 23 192,592 151,101 140,801 22,601 17 
Zone B 29,941 530,731 42,648 259,847 964,310 0 257 27 
Zone C 7,716 191,821 433,133 13,634 186,282 425,574 525 18 
Zone D 374,175 348,711 141,990 4,872 5,228 92,432 208 14 
Zone E 317,824 0 351,725 67,966 69,421 624,311 203,382 24 
Total by 
actors 
1,314,562 1,116,902 969,519 538,912 1,376,343 1,283,118 226,973 
 
% by actor 19% 16% 14% 8% 20% 19% 3% 100% 
Source: Adapted from Killeen et al. (2008), Pacheco (2006) and INE (2001) 
 
 
By 2004, all five zones were occupied, put into production and in-
curred massive deforestation. Evidently, these zones do not operate in 
isolation from one another, but represent the various settlement patterns 
and the present-day municipal boundaries. As the data reveals, ‘Cruceño 
farmers’ (landowners originally from Santa Cruz) are most prominent in 
Zones A, D, and E, west of the main settlement and expansion zones. 
Agro-industrialists, medium and large-scale landowners controlled most 
of their lands in zone B, though also have a significant presence in zone 
D. Cattle ranchers, who are also large scale landowners who engage in 
industrial crop production, are also most prominent in Zone B, but in 
recent years there has been a tendency for cattle ranchers to change land-
use for agriculture and move toward new areas on the frontier. Highland 
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peasants (colonizadores) predominantly controlled land in Zones C and E, 
but not exclusively, as these lands overlapped with those of Cruceño 
farmers and were disputed since the 1960s. By the mid-2000s highland 
peasants were consolidated as producers of traditional crops for domes-
tic consumption and as agro-industry and larger-scale farmers were pri-
oritized for export-oriented agro-commodity production. The agricultur-
al expansion zones in Santa Cruz rapidly transformed unproductive 
large-scale estates (latifundios) with undefined property rights to produc-
tive agricultural lands in just two decades. The expansion of the agricul-
tural frontier had occurred in all five zones by the early 2000s and agri-
culture was becoming highly mechanized. Highland peasants would soon 
enter the relations of commodity production resulting in the differentia-
tion of the peasantry further discussed below. 
The boom in oilseed production contributed to the increased com-
modification of land. As a result, land redistribution remained unfinished 
with growing economic interests resulting in increased concentration of 
control and a new mechanized, industrial oilseed production model came 
to dominate. As production, productivity, and land expansion increased, 
smallholders and peasants became excluded from these processes; unable 
to access more land but able to capture a marginal share of the produc-
tive surplus via their position as small-scale rentiers. 
These agrarian dynamics coincided with important struggles in urban 
areas. Severe inequalities particularly between classes of capital and la-
bour, but also between urban and rural, men and women, non-
indigenous and indigenous were accentuated when President Hugo Ban-
zer (1997-2001), in collusion with foreign capital, privatized Cochabam-
ba’s water supply company, EMAPA (Servicio Municipal de Agua Potable y 
Alcantarillado), which drastically increased water tariffs. The 15 years of 
neoliberal reforms which cut public spending, privatized public services, 
deregulated the economy and liberalized trade culminated during Cocha-
bamba’s Water Wars when an unprecedented alliance among various 
class fractions of labour, including the Federation of Irrigators’ Organi-
zations of Cochabamba (Federación Departamental Cochabambina de Regantes, 
FEDECOR), the Federation of Factory Workers of Cochabamba (Feder-
ación Departamental de Trabajadores Fabriles de Cochabamba, FDTFC), neigh-
borhood associations, potable-water committees, CSUTCB, indigenous 
groups, and others concerned about their rising water bills – all united 
under the representation of the Coordination for the Defense of Water 
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and Life (Coordinadora por la Defensa del Agua y la Vida) (Assies, 2003). 
They united against not only the privatization of the water supply, but 
against the neoliberal reforms which led to their continued exclusion and 
marginalization since 1985 (Assies 2003). The clear state-capital alliance 
became evident among classes of labour, leading to a legitimacy crisis of 
the state as class alliances from the urban to the rural and across sectors 
converged in protest. It was a unique moment whereby an alliance 
among such diverse urban and rural workers, peasants, NGOs and oth-
ers in the community formed under the umbrella of the Coordinadora. Ra-
ther than a formal organization, the Coordinadora was more of a network-
based structure linking together different types of organizations.  
This movement was accompanied with intellectual support from the 
‘Commune group’ (grupo Comuna) led by leading Marxist-oriented schol-
ars such as Luis Tapia, Raúl Prada, Raquel Gutiérrez Aguilar and now 
Vice President Álvaro Garcia Linea, among others – who we might refer 
to as ‘organic intellectuals’ representing the interests of the excluded, 
marginalized and exploited classes (Gramsci 1971). The Comuna pub-
lished a series of works beginning in 1999 criticizing neoliberal capital-
ism’s assault on Bolivian society over the previous fifteen years and more 
broadly throughout the Latin American region. Their work revived Bo-
livian Marxist scholarship with an ethnic dimension located within class 
analyses and inspired by the works of renowned Bolivian sociologist 
René Zavaleta Mercado, particularly his concept of Bolivia as a ‘motley 
society’ (sociedad abigarrada) representing the complexity of Bolivia’s eth-
nic and class dimensions (Zavaleta Mercado 1986). Indeed, Gutiérrez 
Aguilar and Garcia Linera were part of the earlier Katarista movement 
which facilitated the coalition of indigenous, peasant, and worker move-
ments in the 1970s. Members of the Comuna were not just intellectuals, 
but activists and, in the case of Garcia Linera, later formed part of the 
political party that gained state power.  
A ‘new social movement’ had emerged demanding new forms of par-
ticipation and direct democracy with cross-sectoral, class, gender, genera-
tional and ethnic alliances (Assies 2003, 34). These ‘new social move-
ments’, in all of their complexity required scholars to go beyond ‘an 
economistic form of class analysis that ignores the subjective aspects of 
class formation on the one hand, and an overall subjectivist and idealist 
postmodernist interpretation on the other’ (Veltmeyer 1997, 149). But 
understanding the complexity of new forms of alliances and social organ-
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ization does not require us to throw the baby out with the bathwater. As 
Veltmeyer puts it, ‘this resistance and opposition to neoliberal policies 
took different forms, but it has an undoubted class basis, postmodernism 
notwithstanding’ (1997, 153). In a similar vein, Arsel et al. (2015, 391) 
argue that understanding new environmental struggles which build on 
cross-class alliances require ‘a more flexible understanding of class that 
goes beyond direct relationship to production and distribution of eco-
nomic surplus’ to one that gives primacy to exclusion. They reveal how a 
unique coalition between peasant activists and an NGO formed in Tur-
key based not on their shared class positions, but on their shared forms 
of resource and political exclusion. The environmentalism of the peas-
ants and what they call the ‘environmentalism of the malcontent’ pro-
duced a ‘mutually beneficial collaboration’ (Arsel, Akbulut, and Adaman 
2015, 376) similar to the convergence of social movements, NGOs, and 
intellectuals beginning with the Water Wars in Cochabamba through to 
the election of Evo Morales and the MAS. Austerity measures brought 
on by neoliberal policies only ignited the subjective self-awareness of the 
marginalized, exploited and excluded classes. Women, youth, indigenous, 
peasants, rural and urban workers, NGOs and intellectuals alike gained 
strength in the collective unity of their subjective identities based in their 
broader position as the excluded and marginalized classes. 
The movement, or convergence of movements, remained vibrant as 
the ‘gas wars’ which erupted throughout the next 5 years and peaking in 
2003 – over the control of Bolivia’s natural gas reserves – led to the res-
ignation of two presidents and ultimately the election of Bolivia’s first 
indigenous President Evo Morales and the MAS. Nearly 60% of the 
population was impoverished by the mid-2000s and over one third in 
extreme poverty, signaling the exclusion and marginalization of the Bo-
livian majority (Weisbrot, Ray, and Johnston 2009). Neoliberal govern-
ments which held state power for the previous 20 years had finally 
reached a crisis of legitimacy which could no longer be reconciled with 
the kinds of residual fixes inherent in ‘neoliberal social reformism’ 
(Assies 2000) or ‘neoliberal multiculturalism’ (Hale 2002). The new social 
movements of convergence represented a political shift as the excluded 
and marginalized became a powerful united majority as the neoliberal 
ideology lost its legitimacy and a virtuous circle of class consciousness 
and political participation dismantled existing unequal structures of pow-
er. Promising to restore Bolivia’s sovereignty over its natural resources 
Processed on: 6-4-2017
509436-L-bw-McKay
 Land Control: Bolivia’s Agrarian Structure and Frontier Expansion 115 
and redistribute the country’s wealth to the marginalized majority with a 
new vision of ‘communitarian socialism’, Evo Morales restored the legit-
imacy of the state among the masses and discursively ostracized the oli-
garchic and economic elites.  
4.6 Conclusion 
This chapter has provided an overview of the historical development of 
Bolivia’s agrarian structure from pre-revolution to neoliberalism. The US 
influence through the Bohan Plan’s ‘march to the east’ and the World 
Bank’s ‘Eastern Lowland Project’ were significant reforms initiated by 
external actors which shaped the formation of Bolivia’s present-day 
agrarian structure. Brazilian agro-capitalist looked to Bolivia as market 
conditions and frontier expansion offered new sites for capital invest-
ment. The neoliberal transition, accompanied with multicultural reforms, 
inadvertently led to the emergence of new social movements which chal-
lenged the neoliberal state. The dual functions of the state and the rela-
tions among state, societal and capitalist actors reveal the contested rela-
tions that make up the state and lead to socio-economic and political 
outcomes. Despite attempts, genuine or not, at agrarian reform, an une-
qual agrarian structure emerged and was maintained. In the next chapter, 
the politics of agrarian change under Evo Morales and the MAS are ana-
lyzed as capital-intensive production becomes ubiquitous, transforming 
agrarian social relations through new forms of exclusion. 
Notes 
 
1 Parts of this chapter have been published in McKay and Colque (2016) 
2 In 1979, CNTCB restructured into CSUTCB and became much more au-
tonomous in terms of its relation with the state than its predecessor (Albó 
2002, 77). 
3 For Kay and Urioste (2007), ‘the 1953 law legitimated disguised forms of 
neo-latidfundism, under the generic heading of ‘enterprise’.’ 
4 One of the founders of the Revolutionary Nationalist Movement (Mo-
vimiento Nacionalista Revolucionario, MNR) in 1941 
5 Many of Hugo Banzer’s economic advisors were educated at the Harvard 
Kennedy School and travelled to Cambridge in the spring of 1985 for a semi-
nar with Harvard economist Jeffrey Sachs who then became an economic 
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advisor for Paz Estenssoro’s ‘New Economic Plan’ (Conaghan et al., 
1990:13). 
6 Such as those part of the Paris Club as well as the World Bank, International 
Monetary Fund and Inter-American Development Bank. 
7 Local varieties of maize, potato, onions, wheat, quinoa, broadbeans, alfalfa 
8 Industrial crops in Santa Cruz include maize, wheat, rice, sugarcane, cotton, 
soybean, sunflower, and sorghum. 
9 Despite there being clear theoretical distinctions between the terms peasants 
(campesino) and indigenous, ‘in Bolivia both terms are equally applicable in the 
countryside – the overwhelming majority of the rural population is indige-
nous, in terms of its identity and ethnic and cultural origins, and at the same 
time campesino, because of its means of subsistence or social class’ (Albó 
2002, 74). 
10 Other crops such as wheat and cotton were also growing quickly but to-
wards the end of this period both declined recurrently, returning nearly to 
1980s levels. 
11 The MRTKL was an offshoot of the MITK but did not have support from 
the important campesino movement, CSUTCB. 
12 Traditional indigenous communities 
13 Local village councils 
14 The five zones have been defined adapting expansion zones identified by 
Fifer (1982) and Pacheco (2006) to current municipalities (INE 2001). Classi-
fication of actors and their relation with deforestation are adapted from 
Killeen et al (2008). The information about land-use has been disaggregated 
according these five zones and by types of actors.   
15 From 1954 to 1964, some 3,200 Japanese (mostly farmers) immigrated to 
an agricultural settlement now called Okinawa Colony (Colonia Okinawa) in 
Santa Cruz, Bolivia. They were some of the earliest settlers to the region, 
along with Mennonites, and are now Bolivian citizens (Amemiya 2004). 
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5 State Control: The Politics of Agrarian Change under Evo 
 
5.1 Introduction 
The many contradictions that exist regarding Bolivia’s agricultural devel-
opment model in the context of state rhetoric for an Agrarian Revolu-
tion, a law of mother nature, and commitment to food sovereignty 
(McKay, Nehring, and Walsh-Dilley 2014) reflect the broader process of 
what some describe as ‘reconstituted neoliberalism’ taking place 
throughout the country (Webber 2011). This process is characterized by 
social and economic policy changes at the margins without undergoing 
major structural changes of the political economy (Brabazon and 
Webber 2014). State rhetoric has become more of a ‘legitimating dis-
course’ (Kersson 2013) than a structural transformation, while key social 
movements have been co-opted by the state, resulting in a loss of auton-
omy and lack of empowerment among those in the movements (McKay, 
Nehring, and Walsh-Dilley 2014). As Brabazon and Webber (2014, 461–
462) point out, the trajectory of agrarian change in Bolivia is ‘reinforcing 
rather than dismantling the concentration of quality productive land 
among medium- and large-scale agrarian capitalist’. Instead of breaking 
with the past, current state policies have actually ‘reproduced dependen-
cy relationships with agro-industrial capital’ (Cordoba and Jansen 2014, 
497), thereby not providing any alternative pathways for small farmers or 
peasants through ‘neocollectivist agrarian development’ but rather by 
reinforcing a model attuned to the World Bank’s proposed pathways out 
of poverty: (1) Advance as a capitalist farmer within the agro-industrial 
system; (2) become rural wage labourers working on or off the farm; (3) 
migrate to the city (World Bank 2007a).  
This chapter analyzes the politics of agrarian change throughout the 
contemporary period regarding the relations among the state, its main 
constituents represented by the major social movements of the Unity 
Pact (Pacto de Unidad)1, and various class fractions of capital. From 
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launching an Agrarian Revolution in 2006 to a Productive Revolution in 
2011 the MAS has sought to transform the agrarian structure in the pur-
suit of food security, food sovereignty, and the recognition of indigenous 
territorial rights since taking state power in 2006. Yet, along the way, the 
agro-industrial and landowning elites in the fertile lowlands of Santa 
Cruz have gone from rivals of the MAS government to forming a new 
state-capital alliance with shared interests in expanding the agricultural 
frontier. As a result, small farmers, rural wage labourers, and indigenous 
peoples have been further marginalized and excluded as agricultural pro-
duction has taken on a very extractivist character (McKay 2016). New 
political dynamics, alliances, tensions and conflicts within and among 
these entities have important implications for trajectories of agrarian 
change in Bolivia. The capitalist state’s dual and often contradictory 
function of facilitating capital accumulation and maintaining social legit-
imacy is central to understanding these processes and the changing dy-
namics within the state-society-capital nexus. This chapter analyzes the 
changing state-society-capital relations, investigating the politics of agrar-
ian change in the context of a socially progressive leftist government 
which came to power promising an Agrarian Revolution and the subse-
quent expansion of the agro-industrial soy complex.  
5.2 The Agrarian Revolution: reclaiming state legitimacy 
In June 2006, President Evo Morales announced the beginning of an 
Agrarian Revolution in the lowlands of Santa Cruz – a region dominated 
by large-scale agro-industrialists and the country’s economic elites. With 
thousands of supporters, including indigenous, peasants, and rural wage 
labourers, President Morales presented 60 indigenous communities with 
communal land titles (TCOs) representing over 7.5 million hectares 
(Fabricant 2012, 140). While this, indeed, represented important formal 
recognitions of territorial rights for indigenous communities, it should 
not be confused with (re)distribution as these communities had already 
occupied and controlled those lands which had been inactive in the 
INRA database for the previous 10 years. Promising an additional 20 
million hectares would be distributed to Bolivia’s 2.5 million rural poor 
over the next 5 years, President Morales exclaimed, ‘The great landown-
ers of the Oriente are crying. They are hysterically crying because they 
know that their glory days are over…. We will seize their unproductive 
land and give it to poor campesinos!’ (quoted in Fabricant 2012, 140). Five 
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months later, Law 3545 (Reconducción Comunitaria de la Reforma Agraria) 
was enacted, formally launching the Agrarian Revolution. 
The principle objectives of the Agrarian Revolution under Law 3545 
are (1) to ensure that all land serves a ‘socio-economic function’; (2) to 
redefine the terms of expropriation of medium and large-scale landhold-
ings for the public good and to ensure the indigenous communities have 
access to sufficient land-based resources for their sustainable reproduc-
tion; (3) to redefine the terms and prioritize the distribution of public 
lands for indigenous and peasant communities; (4) and to reform INRA 
as an institution which lacked legitimacy under the neoliberal period with 
increased transparency and execution to transform the agrarian structure 
(INRA 2010, 7). The law prohibits any forms of forced labour or unpaid 
services, while also allowing ‘popular movements, departmental and mu-
nicipal authorities, indigenous federations, unions, and communities to 
participate in saneamiento, reversion, expropriation, and land granting’ 
themselves, empowering rural populations by enabling their direct partic-
ipation in the reform process (Valdivia 2010, 74). While the Agrarian 
Revolution has led to some progress in terms of formalizing land tenure 
and recognizing indigenous territorial rights, it has failed to dismantle the 
prevailing unequal agrarian structure which continues to exclude and 
marginalize the majority of the population and most particularly small-
scale and peasant farmers (McKay and Colque 2016; Colque, Tinta, and 
Sanjinés 2016). The Agrarian Revolution is better understood as tenure 
reform, or formalization, rather than redistributive land reform. As Byres 
explains, ‘tenurial reform concerns the terms on which the operational 
holding is held and worked, and seeks to eliminate those aspects of the 
tenurial relationship…that are held to dull incentives, reduce the where-
withal to invest and impede efficiency, and so prevent the emergence of 
an efficient, dynamic and growing agriculture’, while ‘redistributive land 
reform is, in principle, more radical, and seeks to redistribute operational 
holdings, taking land from those with large operational holdings and 
transferring it either to those with no land at all (landless peasants and 
wage labourers) or those with tiny holdings (poor peasants), and impos-
ing ceilings on the size of operational holding’ (Byres 2004, 3). As Borras 
demonstrates in his study of land reform in the Philippines, ‘to be truly 
redistributive, a land reform must effect on a pre-existing agrarian struc-
ture a change in ownership of and/or control over land resources, 
wherein such a change flows strictly from the landed to the landless and 
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land-poor classes or from rich landlords to poor peasants and rural 
workers’ (2007, 281). Borras reveals that effective redistribution does not 
necessarily exclude the use of public lands or leasehold reforms, nor does 
it necessarily include officially reported redistribution on private lands 
(2007). Beyond questioning the reliability of ‘official’ land data collection, 
Borras (2006, 76) points out that ‘numerous land-based production rela-
tions between landlords and peasants are located not in private lands, but 
in lands that are officially categorized as public despite having been ap-
propriated privately’ rendering real reforms not ‘immediately apparent to 
observers and have been erroneously dismissed by scholars’. What is im-
portant is the transfer of land-based wealth and political power from the 
landed elites to the marginalized rural poor which can take various 
forms. 
Tenure reforms and the formalization of land rights which are not 
necessarily redistributive, for example, are certainly important in instanc-
es where existing democratic land access is under threat and there is an 
urgent need for recognition and protection of people’s democratic access 
(Franco, Monsalve, and Borras 2015). Particularly for indigenous peo-
ples, the recognition and protection of their autonomous and communal 
territorial rights is extremely important, especially in the context of the 
global resource rush and the push for individualized and tradeable pri-
vate property rights reforms (see de Soto 2000). Yet in situations where 
the landholding structure is highly unequal, the formalization of land 
rights can reinforce and consolidate existing unequal land access if it is 
carried out in a ‘depoliticized, technical-oriented’ manner (Franco, 
Monsalve, and Borras 2015, 67). In other words, context matters and we 
cannot take an either/or perspective on tenure reform versus redistribu-
tion. In the case of Law 3545 in Bolivia, tenure reforms and land rights 
formalization has been applied to an unequal agrarian structure in terms 
of both landholdings and political power. Formalization then, has effec-
tively reinforced and consolidated the pre-existing unequal agrarian 
structure. However, we cannot ignore the importance of the formaliza-
tion process for indigenous peoples. This has, on the one hand, been 
considered an achievement on behalf of the MAS government. On the 
other hand, Supreme Decree 2366 of May 2015 effectively rolled back 
this protection by legalizing hydrocarbon extraction within pre-
established protected areas, including national parks, nature reserves, and 
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indigenous territories (Campanini 2015). These extractivist dynamics and 
expanding extractivist frontiers are further discussed in Chapter 7.  
Despite a very progressive and radical discourse, the Agrarian Revolu-
tion in Bolivia has indeed been a formalization process of land tenure 
relations. The application of the ‘socio-economic function’ (FES) at-
tempts to encourage people to invest for ‘an efficient, dynamic and 
growing agriculture’ (Byres 2004, 3). Rather than imposing land size ceil-
ings on operational holdings as is necessary for any redistributive land 
reform, loopholes in the legislation have virtually eliminated land ceilings 
altogether. The gap between state discourse and practice is part and par-
cel of the MAS’ political strategy to maintain state power through the 
balancing of popular legitimating discourses of resource wealth distribu-
tion and the continued accumulation of capital via an extractivist devel-
opment model. 
One of the main functions of Law 3545 was to extend the period of 
saneamiento which had expired in October 2006 under INRA Law 1715 of 
1996. From 1996 to 2006, the saneamiento only managed to formally title 
approximately 12% of the roughly 106.8 million hectares of total rural 
(public and private) lands which were to be regularized during this period 
(INRA 2010). Despite this shortcoming, important advances for indige-
nous rights were established through the designation of autonomous and 
communally owned indigenous TCOs. Bolivia’s Constitution of 1994 
and INRA Law 1715 legislated the recognition of ‘inalienable, indivisible, 
irreversible, collective’ TCOs which ‘may exercise administrative and ju-
dicial functions in accordance to their own norms, practices and proce-
dures, provided they are not contrary to the Constitution and existing 
laws’ (Article 171, CPE, 1994).  From 1996-2006 over 8 million hectares 
were formally recognized and titled as TCOs, representing an impressive 
64% of the total amount of land titled during this period, yet a far cry 
from the 16.4 million hectares of TCOs that were to be recognized by 
INRA during these 10 years (Colque, Tinta, and Sanjinés 2016).  
From 2006-2009, the MAS government claimed to have titled and 
‘regularized’2 31.5 million ha of public and private land – tripling in just 4 
years what was achieved in the ten year duration of Law 1715 (INRA 
2010).  While this is indeed impressive, it should be noted that nearly 
half (15.2 million ha) of the total was titled as ‘public land’ (tierras fiscales), 
while some 18.8 million ha were already in the process, but not yet for-
malized, and thus carried over from the pre-2006 period (Colque, Tinta, 
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and Sanjinés 2016, 165). The formalization of public lands does not 
mean that public lands were distributed, but rather that they were titled 
and registered as public, rather than private or protected lands. These, of 
course, may be subject to distributive reforms in the future, though many 
are located on forested lands and areas not suitable for cultivation 
(Colque, Tinta, and Sanjinés 2016).  Nonetheless, the state was able to 
use the 31 million ha figure to increase its legitimacy through public dis-
course without actually challenging the existing agrarian structure 
through zero-sum land-based transfers of wealth. Expropriation, or re-
version, of unproductive latifundios in terms of the technical-legal criteria 
was not applied, but rather ‘used selectively as a political tool against cer-
tain Bolivian opposition leaders considered to be separatists’ – namely 
conservative landowning political activists Branko Marinkovic and 
Osvaldo Monasterios (Urioste 2012, 453). 
This politically contentious period represents an important political 
conjuncture in which the historically marginalized masses represented by 
the Pacto de Unidad had become part of, and appeared represented by, 
state institutions. A renewed sense of class and identity politics reinvig-
orated indigenous and peasant populations in particular as they were, in 
large part, responsible for the rise of Evo Morales and the MAS after 
years of struggle against neoliberal reforms of the previous two decades. 
The country’s economic elites, on the other hand, could no longer count 
on state managers and their institutions to support their economic inter-
ests. Populist discourses of resource nationalization and the Agrarian 
Revolution rendered their future uncertain, prompting a coalition among 
the ‘Media Luna’3 led by Santa Cruz Governor and opposition leader 
Ruben Costas. Divisions within the country became increasingly stark 
and visible – between the highlands and lowlands, indigenous and mesti-
zo, and classes of labour and capital. After oppositional forces of the 
Media Luna pushed for autonomy, a national recall referendum was held 
in August 2008 with results showing overwhelming (67%) support for 
President Evo Morales and Vice President Alvaro Garcia Linera. In Sep-
tember, violent protests erupted throughout the country as the ‘autono-
mist right’ led by Costas attempted a civic coup by occupying and burn-
ing public institutions across the country4 – ultimately coming to a halt 
after the Porvenir Massacre in which clashes between the right-wing civ-
ic movement and supporters of the MAS led to the death of 19 people 
and many more wounded (UNASUR 2008). The state mobilized the 
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armed forces and, with widespread support among its social bases, re-
took control over its public institutions and successfully demobilized the 
oppositional forces and their attempted coup d’état. For Garcia Linera, 
this was the point of bifurcation, a ‘clash of material forces’, which solid-
ified the MAS’ control over state power through the mobilization and 
support it received from societal forces, effectively forcing the opposi-
tion to retreat (García Linera 2011, 22).  
While the political opposition had diminished and was in decline, they 
still held a majority in the Senate, signalling some negotiating power in 
the final version of the 2009 Political Constitution of the State (CPE).  
Of particular significance for the politics of agrarian change is the revi-
sion of Article 315 concerning the maximum land-size ceiling of 5000 ha 
as mentioned in Chapter 4. In previous drafts of the CPE developed 
with the social movements of the National Coordination for Change 
(CONALCAM)5, ‘it was decided that no one, by any means, could have 
landholdings larger than 5000 hectares’ (Francescone 2012, 68). The final 
version of the CPE states that the land ceiling is not applied retroactively 
(meaning existing landholdings over 5000 ha are legal) and that the 5000 
ha land ceiling applies to each individual associate (meaning a company 
can easily fix its associate to land ratio), effectively rendering the land 
ceiling inapplicable (McKay and Colque 2016, 597). In fact, the unaltered 
legalization of genetically-modified (GM) soybean seeds, and the more 
recent legislation which increases deforestation limits (Law 741), pardons 
previous unauthorized deforestation (Law 739) and extends regulatory 
inspections for the FES from 2 to 5 years (Laws 740), is quite telling. 
The Agrarian Revolution is not transforming the highly unequal agrarian 
structure, but is better described as a tenurial reform designed to render 
rural areas more legible while facilitating the continued control over 
land-based natural resources by the agro-industrial and landowning elites. 
The question, therefore, is how to interpret and understand the politics 
behind these processes and the state-society-capital dynamics after the 
‘point of bifurcation’ which had seemingly solidified the MAS’ control 
over state power.  
5.3 The Productive Revolution:  
the state-capital alliance 
When the MAS took state power in 2006 they were highly dependent 
upon the support from the Pacto de Unidad. In fact, many of the leaders 
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of the organizations of the Pacto were also leaders of the MAS and thus 
became absorbed into key positions within state institutions. While the 
movements may not have been completely co-opted by the state, they 
certainly lost much of their autonomy as their leaders entered into a very 
close and mutually beneficial (sometimes for personal over organization-
al gain) relationship with the MAS. Forming a strong state-society rela-
tion in this particular sense, the MAS was able to gain and maintain legit-
imacy by working closely with key leaders of the Pacto who would then 
extend the state’s legitimacy via the dispersion of social expenditures to 
their regional and municipal organizational factions (field notes, 2014-
15). By way of absorbing the Pacto within the Constituent Assembly, the 
MAS was able to develop a strong relationship with constituents across 
the country and particularly among the indigenous and peasant popula-
tions rural areas with substantial increases in public sector investments. 
With support and participation from leftist intellectual groups such as 
the Comuna and Duende including now Vice President Álvaro García Lin-
era and the Minister of Economy and Public Finances, Luis Arce Cata-
cora, the MAS put forth a New Economic, Social, Communitarian and 
Productive Model (Nuevo Modelo Económico, Social, Comunitario y Productivo) 
which was to challenge the neoliberal model and lead to a structural 
transformation of the political economy. 
According to the Minister of Economy and Public Finances, Luis 
Arce Catacora, Bolivia’s new model is based on four pillars: 1) growth 
and development based on the use of natural resource to benefit Bolivi-
ans; 2) appropriation of the economic surplus; 3) redistribution of the 
extractivist rents; 4) reduction of inequality and poverty (Arce Catacora 
2015). Surpluses generated (largely through rent) from strategic sectors 
(which include hydrocarbons, mining, electricity, and natural resources) 
are to be transferred to sectors which supposedly generate income and 
employment (which include industrial and artisanal manufacturing, tour-
ism, agricultural development, housing, commerce, transportation and 
other service sectors) (Arce Catacora 2011, 7). The ‘state’, framed as a 
Weberian-type fully autonomous and capable bureaucratic entity, is seen 
as the central actor in this model designated to redistribute extractivist 
rents in order to foster industrialization, thereby retaining surplus value 
production, generating employment and overcoming the reliance on raw 
material exports. The model follows the kind of structural change pro-
posed by Kuznets whereby the share of output and employment in the 
Processed on: 6-4-2017
509436-L-bw-McKay
 State Control: The Politics of Agrarian Change under Evo 125 
primary sector declines as the country develops, moving to industrial, 
manufacturing and service sectors. The ‘redistributive state’ also uses its 
revenues for inequality and poverty reduction through cash transfer pro-
grammes which include Bono Juancito Pinto6, Renta Dignidad7 and Bo-
no Juana Azurduy8.  
Despite the stated intentions to challenge the neoliberal economic 
model and pursue a structural transformation towards a socialist society 
(Arce Catacora 2015, 4), severe shortcomings have led to processes of 
exclusion, value appropriation by a concentrated agro-industrial oligopo-
ly, and new forms of economic, social and environmental extraction 
which further threaten the historically marginalized populations. Agricul-
tural development, which is supposed to be an income and employment 
generating sector according to the model, has done just the opposite. 
The agro-industrial bias and capital-intensive soy complex excludes the 
rural majority and is controlled by a market oligopoly which appropriates 
the majority of the surplus generated. Further, Bolivia’s primary product 
exports have increased during the Morales administration, while the pro-
duction of industrial value-added goods (heavy machinery) and pro-
cessing take place abroad. Moreover, while labour should move out of 
agriculture and into industry, the lack of forward and backward linkages 
and sectoral articulation associated with the soy complex renders labour 
surplus to the needs of capital accumulation. The resultant lack of struc-
tural change has led to the persistence of primary export dependence and 
an economic model in which extractivist rents are captured by political 
and economic elites while legitimacy is maintained through cash transfers 
to the poor facilitated by favourable commodity prices. 
The commodities boom of the early 2000s combined with the partial 
nationalization of key sectors of the economy increased the state’s budg-
et some 445% -- from US$5.9 billion in 2005 to US$32.1 billion in 20159 
(MEFP 2015). During the same period, public investment increased 
from US$629 million in 2005 to US$6.179 billion – an impressive 882% 
increase. These massive increases in the state’s budget have increased the 
capacity of state managers and institutions to simultaneously fulfil both 
its accumulation and legitimization function (O’Connor 1973). As 
O’Connor explains, ‘State expenditures have a twofold character corre-
sponding to the capitalist state’s two basic functions: social capital and 
social expenses. Social capital is expenditures required for profitable pri-
vate accumulation; it is indirectly productive’ while ‘social expenses con-
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sists of projects and services which are required to maintain social har-
mony—to fulfil the state’s ‘legitimization’ function’ (1973, 6-7). In other 
words, social capital expenditures include investments in physical eco-
nomic infrastructure, research and development, as well as investments 
to lower the reproduction costs of labour, such as social insurance. While 
social insurance can also contribute to social harmony and therefore le-
gitimacy (through worker’s compensation, old-age pensions, unemploy-
ment insurance and healthcare) it also subsidizes (or socializes) private 
sector costs (i.e. wages) facilitating higher profits for private capital 
(O’Connor, 1973). Social expenses, on the other hand, ‘are not even in-
directly productive’ and are best represented by social welfare pro-
grammes to appease surplus populations (surplus labour) no longer 
needed for capital accumulation. O’Connor also includes military spend-
ing as a social expense as ‘surplus productive capacity (or surplus capital) 
creates political pressures for aggressive foreign economic expansion’ 
(O’Connor 1973, 150). But while the fiscal capacity of the Bolivian state 
has led to substantial absolute increases in public expenditures across all 
sectors10, the relative increases are much more revealing. Prior to the 
MAS taking state power, 30% of public investment went to the social 
sector (basic sanitation; education; health; urbanization and housing; so-
cial security; sport and culture). With the MAS in power, the average so-
cial sector investment over the past 10 years has actually decreased to 
27%, while preliminary data for 2016 estimates a drop to 20% (MEFP, 
2015). The vast majority of public investment is allocated to energy and 
hydrocarbon development (40%) and transportation infrastructure (29%) 
which together account for nearly 70% of the public investment budget 
for 2016 (MEFP, 2015). 
As a percentage of GDP, gross national savings have averaged 25.3% 
since 2006, while total investments have only averaged 17.6% (World 
Bank 2016a; Quandl 2016). In a developing country like Bolivia, which 
lacks robust value-added industrial and manufacturing sectors (forward 
and backward linkages), a home market in agriculture as well as a more 
specialized, skilled, and educated workforce, such a high savings-
investment ratio constrains productive transformation. According to 
Jayati Ghosh, when domestic savings are higher than investment there is 
‘a process of squeezing out savings from the population as a whole but 
not investing it within the economy to ensure future growth’ (Ghosh 
2015, 11). Ghosh argues that developing countries (and most primary 
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producing export-oriented economies) should not have a high savings to 
investment ratio as this signals a lack of investment in economic diversi-
fication for productive transformation, particularly in value-added indus-
tries and education (Ghosh 2015). Bolivia’s international reserves have 
increased almost 400% since the MAS came to power – from US$3.178 
billion in 2006 to US$15.123 billion in 2014 (BCB 2016). While interna-
tional reserves do help fend off financial crises, the lack of investment in 
diversifying the economy and educating a skilled workforce perpetuates 
the dependence on export-oriented extractive enclaves which are more 
susceptible to volatile international commodities markets. Thus, while it 
is important to maintain a comfortable level of reserves when transition-
ing away from commodity market dependence, maintaining a savings-
investment ratio as high as Bolivia unnecessarily deprives the economy 
and population from much needed investment in productive, value-
added transformation. 
State expenditures reveal the priority of social capital investments to 
serve accumulation interests, particularly in the extractive sectors, though 
without enough emphasis on developing forward and backward, value-
added, linkages with a highly skilled and productive workforce. Develop-
ing value-added inter-sectoral linkages does not seem a priority for Boliv-
ia’s capitalist elites nor the state. Capitalist elites are invested in extractive 
sectors (mining, hydrocarbons and soybeans) and thus are interested in 
extraction, rents, and external markets for export. State actors remain 
interested in political power and thus balancing the economic interests of 
capital while maintaining social harmony among the masses. This re-
quires simultaneous economic stability for extractivist interests, fending 
off potential economic crises with high savings and reserves, and redis-
tributing some of the resource wealth through cash transfers to the mar-
ginalized and excluded through social expenses and welfare. This neo-
extractivist development model enables both the ‘state’ and ‘capital’ to 
benefit from the fruits of the extractive sector. But while the partial na-
tionalization of the sectors has allowed the state to collect more rents, 
‘they end up reproducing the same productive processes, similar relations 
of power, and the same social and environmental impacts’ as under pri-
vate or foreign control (Gudynas 2010a, 12). These dynamics have ena-
bled a state-capital alliance to emerge with mutually reinforcing accumu-
lation interests while the initial state-society relations between the MAS 
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and Pacto de Unidad and the expanded and increased social sector invest-
ments have contributed to political legitimacy of the state.  
After the 2009 general elections, Evo Morales and the MAS won a 
convincing 64.2% of the vote and, for the first time, controlled both the 
lower (Chamber of Deputies) and upper house (Senate) of the Plurina-
tional Legislative Assembly with a two thirds (absolute) majority. Yet, 
instead of pursuing structural reforms, they continued with a model of 
development based on a neo-extractivist logic. In the agrarian sector, 
agricultural development has taken the form of ‘agrarian extractivism’ 
with similar economic, social and ecological forms of extraction as its 
traditional extractivist sectors such as mining and hydrocarbons. In June 
2011, Law 144 for a Productive Revolution (Ley de la Revolución Productiva 
Comunitaria Agropecuaria) was enacted with its principle objective to 
achieve ‘food sovereignty’ and establish the institutional, political, tech-
nical and financial capacity for increased production, transformation, and 
commercialization of agricultural and forestry products (Article 2, Law 
144). Despite the law being filled with popular and inclusive language for 
a pathway towards food sovereignty – such as communitarian and organ-
ic production, the recuperation of soils and native seeds, and respect for 
Mother Earth for ‘good living’ – the lack of structural reforms, including 
a redistributive agrarian reform, the increased dependence on food im-
ports for food security and the continued concentration of control over 
land-based natural resources and decision-making have eroded the pos-
sibilities to develop pathways towards food sovereignty in practice 
(McKay, Nehring, and Walsh-Dilley 2014, 1193). Even the development 
of the soy complex and expansion of the agricultural frontier – principal-
ly for export-oriented agro-industrial flex crops -- is now being framed as 
a form of ‘food sovereignty’ and ‘food security’, despite the obvious con-
tradictions and the substantial increased dependency on food staple im-
ports (Vicepresidente 2012). Despite being a net agro-food exporter, Bo-
livia remains dependent on imports for staple foods for household 
consumption (INE 2015b). Food imports have increased some 62% 
from 2010 to 2014, while food import prices jumped a disproportionate 
92% (IBCE 2016; Quispe 2015). Further, currency devaluations in 
neighbouring Argentina and Brazil have also enabled their producers’ 
products to undercut Bolivia’s small-scale traditional crop producers 
(Quispe 2015). This is due, in large part, to the agro-industrial bias of the 
Productive Revolution which lacks effective support for the majority of 
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Bolivian farmers. Rather than any meaningful changes in terms of access 
and control over resources and decision making processes, the Produc-
tive Revolution is rooted in a new institutional economics approach 
which attempts to minimize market imperfections, connect farmers to 
market-based mechanisms, and increase productivity and efficiency par-
ticularly through the establishment of recognized and enforceable private 
property rights (see North 1995; de Soto 2000).  
Market-based institutional mechanisms such as the Universal Agrarian 
Insurance (Seguro Agrario Universal) (Article 30) and the Credit Communi-
tarian Fund (Fondo Crediticio Comunitario) (Article 51) are designed to ben-
efit small-scale, peasant, and indigenous farmers, yet require bureaucratic 
procedures which remain vague and undefined (field notes, 2014-15). 
They also require transactions with private financial entities in urban cen-
tres not always easily accessible for the rural majority and are only of-
fered ‘upon available resources’ (Article 51) meaning there is no guaran-
tee that the funding will be accessible (Villegas 2011). Many small-scale 
farmers in the expansion zone of Santa Cruz avoid these credit schemes 
altogether for fears of indebtedness and landlessness if they experience a 
poor harvest and cannot repay their loans (field notes, 2014-15). Others 
say that there are too many pre-requisites and that ‘financial institutions 
are always trying to get the best of them’ (Leonila Cruz, personal inter-
view, April 2014). This perception of financial institutions and debt is 
certainly common among small farmers in communities located in Santa 
Cruz’s soybean expansion zone such as Cuatro Cañadas and San Julián, 
with the vast majority indicating access to credit as among the top three 
obstacles for small farmers (field notes, 2014-2015).11 Leaders of the re-
gion’s most important and largest small producer associations, including 
the Integral Communitarian Association of Agricultural Producers of 
Cuatro Cañadas (Asociación Comunitaria Integral de Productores Agropecuarios 
de Cuatro Cañadas, ACIPAC), the Small Producer’s Association of the 
Orient (Asociación de Pequeños Productores del Oriente, APPAO), and the Ag-
ricultural Chamber of Small Producers of the Orient (Cámara Agropecuaria 
de Pequeños Productores del Oriente, CAPPO) have established credit access 
for their members by negotiating with agribusiness or financial institu-
tions with pooled resources from the association, but they still 
acknowledge that problems persist, especially among those who are seek-
ing to diversify their production since agribusiness contracts are contin-
gent on cultivating agro-industrial crops such as soybeans, sunflower, 
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sorghum, and wheat (field notes, 2014-15). But even through the associa-
tion, farmers are still subordinated vis-à-vis agro-industry and enter into 
relations of debt and dependency (field notes, 2014-15). Many rely on 
either collecting land rents and engage in rural wage labour as they are 
excluded from the production process as will be further discussed 
(McKay and Colque 2016).  
To support small-scale farmers with input-supply and market access 
with just prices, the state-run public procurement company, EMAPA 
(Empresa de Apoyo a la Producción de Alimentos, EMAPA), was established. 
However, EMAPA has been severely constrained by its lack of capacity 
and implementation failures as it excludes the most marginal producers 
and reinforces a model of intensive agriculture as a way forward which is 
not suitable for the majority of the small-scale producers it claims to 
support (Cordoba and Jansen 2014). For Roberto Churata, one of the 
founders of CAPPO, the region’s largest small farmer association with 
15,000 members, EMAPA ‘has no vision, and suffers from a lack of 
planning….it does not function’ (personal interview, San Julián, January 
2015). Churata explained how EMAPA should be cooperatively owned 
and operated by the farmers in the region, not by the central state, be-
cause ‘they don’t have the proper people running the industry’ (personal 
interview, San Julián, January 2015).  As Cordoba and Jansen (2014, 497) 
conclude, EMAPA has, perhaps paradoxically, facilitated ‘the integration 
of small producers into this internationalizing agro-industrial complex’ 
which reproduce relationships of debt and dependency with agro-
industrial capital. These market-based, residual approaches to poverty 
reduction view poverty ‘as a consequence of being ‘left out’ of processes 
of development, on the assumption that development brings economic 
growth which, sooner or later, raises everybody’s income’ (Bernstein 
1992, 24). With this approach the policies of the Productive Revolution 
have failed to address the underlying relational aspects of poverty and 
marginalization in terms of the social relations of production and repro-
duction as well as property and power (Bernstein 1992, 24). Without 
challenging the unequal agrarian structure, Bolivia’s agricultural devel-
opment policies have reinforced and reproduced the existing dominant 
forms of (agro-industrial) production and thus the concentration of re-
source wealth and control through new mechanisms of exclusion. 
Highland peasants have increasingly transitioned their smallholdings 
for soybean production, substituting subsistence crops (rice, maize, roots 
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and tubers) with soybeans due to the better prices and market access of 
the growing soy complex. Small scale producers continued to become 
integrated (and excluded) in the soy complex mediated by a few agri-
businesses. Many structural elements of the soy complex such as de-
pendency on mechanization, imported seeds, chemical fertilizers and 
credits have exposed this sector to cyclical risks and put them at a disad-
vantaged position vis-à-vis large scale farming. Their lack of access to the 
capital and technology necessary to participate and compete as soy pro-
ducers has marginalized their ability to fully benefit from their land. Ac-
cess to markets and other exchange relations are monopolized by multi-
nationals controlling many facets of the soy complex – from GM seeds, 
agro-chemical inputs, machinery, land, storage facilities and export mar-
kets. The industrialization of agricultural production has also eliminated 
labour opportunities. The adoption of Monsanto’s glyphosate herbicide 
for example, has replaced the need to hire workers. As one farmer ex-
plained, ‘we used to employ 60-70 people to clean the fields after har-
vest; now the glyphosate kills everything so we don’t need to hire any-
body’ (Freddy, personal communication, October 2014). This is 
commonplace across the entire soy expansion zone. The development of 
highly mechanized agro-industrial production continues to exclude 
smallholders and peasants in a double sense: their inability to access capi-
tal, technology and therefore machinery to put land into production; and 
their inability to access viable labour opportunities in a highly productive 
rural area. This is not inherently problematic, but becomes so if this ex-
clusion is not accompanied by other means of labour absorption else-
where. 
5.4 Mechanisms of social and economic exclusion 
Highland peasants already settled in Santa Cruz and highland peasants 
seeking land access in the expansion zone are confronted with a new sit-
uation in which the mechanisms of access to land and agro-capital are 
more complex and inherently exclusive to those with certain access 
mechanisms12 while excluding the capital-less workforce. The majority of 
those who were fortunate to gain a small parcel during the previous 
‘march to the east’, despite being small-scale landowners, lack other ac-
cess mechanisms to advance as a small scale capitalist producer due to 
their dependence on agribusiness in terms of access to technology, capi-
tal, and markets. Rural people, especially the poor, seeking land access 
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are not only excluded from land (as it now sells for $2000-$5000/ha) but 
are no longer required as a labour force since the model of production 
has changed from labour intensive to capital intensive. Access mecha-
nisms for production have thus become ‘appropriated’ by agro-industry, 
requiring farmers to integrate with industrial value-chain agriculture in 
order to work the land. Yet, in order to integrate, smallholders are, in 
effect, excluded from production since they need to hire out all land-
related services (sowing, fumigating, harvesting) and enter into a contract 
for inputs from agro-industry. Access mechanisms thus become mecha-
nisms of social and economic exclusion, leading to relations of debt and 
dependency, contradictory class positions, and social differentiation.  
Migration flows and workforce dynamics over time demonstrate the 
trends towards rural-urban migration. Data suggest that migration to the 
lowlands has decreased substantially as well as the labour force employed 
in the agricultural sector (INE, 2001;2012). According to census data, the 
share of the economically active population (EAP) has decreased in the 
heart of the soybean expansion zone. In Cuatro Cañadas, the share of 
EAP in agriculture has decreased from 83.1% in 1992 to 45.1% in 2012; 
while in San Julián the share decreased from 70% in 2001 to 47.3% in 
2012 (INE, 2001;2012). This data shows that the agricultural sector in 
Santa Cruz is based on an economic model that continues to grow eco-
nomically and expand geographically without the need for additional la-
bour supply (Colque 2014). One important qualitative feature that these 
quantitative data do not reveal is the differentiation of smallholders. Of-
ficial data consider those who lease their lands as ‘small farmers’ – but 
they are not engaging in productive activity as the capital-intensive model 
has rendered them subject to processes of productive exclusion. This is a 
situation where the fundamental problem is not a direct dispossession of 
land, but the denial of access to agro-capital for small-scale landholders 
and the separation of the workforce from the accumulation dynamics of 
agrarian capitalism.  
Comparing and contrasting the frontier and the rest of Bolivia from a 
labour perspective reveals that a large number of highland peasants have 
abandoned their farms, not to get land on the frontier or to become part 
of the rural labour force, but to migrate to the city. In fact, many peas-
ants left their highland farms largely due to impoverishment and a lack 
of state support and have been excluded from access to frontier land.  It 
has also become evident that the severe reduction in the internal migra-
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tion flow to the lowlands is a structural change and is consistent with the 
findings which show how land is systematically controlled by agrarian 
elites. The next section examines the current agrarian changes taking 
place in Santa Cruz in which the original highland peasants are also un-
dergoing another transition in their insertion into the soy complex. 
5.4.1 The ‘partida’ arrangement: a new mechanism of exclusion 
The ‘partida’ arrangement is a form of land leasing that was not practiced 
before the soybean ‘boom’ but has now become common in the low-
lands where land is relatively scarce. ‘Partida’ or ‘al partir’ means to share 
or split harvest or usufruct benefits among those working the land and 
those who hold tenure rights to the land. With the official adoption of 
genetically-modified seeds in 2005, the mechanization of the soybean 
production process has intensified and what was once a labour-intensive 
agrarian production region has become dominated by capital-intensive 
production. Soybean production today requires very little labour power, 
eliminating employment opportunities for the majority of the rural popu-
lation. Thousands of hectares can now be cultivated by just a few work-
ers, as massive sowers and harvesters work the vast monocrop planta-
tions. Despite the high investment requirements to engage in this type of 
agricultural production, market prices and demand from large multina-
tionals controlling storage, processing, and distribution entice even capi-
tal-poor family farmers with less than 50 hectares of land and no access 
to machinery to enter the ‘soy complex’. The transition to cash crop 
production in the ‘expansion zone’ of Santa Cruz is understandable. In 
the past 10 years, soybean prices have doubled in Bolivia and the world’s 
largest agro-multinationals – ADM, Bunge, Cargill, Louis Dreyfus, 
among others – have moved in, controlling vast market shares of Boliv-
ia’s storage, processing, and export markets (ANAPO 2015; AEMP 
2013). For small farmers, this provides a guaranteed market at a generally 
favourable price relative to the risks they would take on producing other 
crops. However, the way small farmers participate in soy production is 
much different than statistical data would suggest. 
Among soybean producers in Santa Cruz, for example, large-scale 
farms (over 1000 ha) who represent just 2% of the total farmers, control 
some 71% of the land; while small-scale farmers (50 ha or less) who rep-
resent 78% of total farmers control just 9% of the land under soybean 
cultivation (see Figure 5.1). 
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Figure 5.1 
Landholding structure for soybean producers, Santa Cruz, 2011 
Source: ANAPO (2011) 
 
 
In terms of the entire rural area in the country’s most fertile expan-
sion zone, small-scale farmers – representing 82.9% of the total land ti-
tles formalized under the saneamiento – control just 16.9% of the land ar-
ea, while medium (with an average of 325.8 ha) and large-scale farms 
(with an average of 1,926.8 ha) representing 12% of formalized land ti-
tles control 61.6% of the total13 (Colque, Tinta, and Sanjinés 2016, 200–
201). Despite such land-based inequalities, we cannot dismiss the im-
portance of the advances made under the Morales government in recog-
nizing indigenous territories (TCOs) and preventing the consolidation of 
what Colque at al. (2016) call ‘speculative estates’ (latinfundio especulativo).  
Similarly, we cannot ignore the fact that the agrarian structure has been 
left largely unchanged as new forms of marginalization, exclusion, and 
debt relations exacerbate existing rural inequalities (McKay and Colque 
2016; McKay 2017).  
Despite the unequal landholding structure, these data would suggest 
that soybean production does provide a livelihood for 11,000 small 
farmers and their families. While this is in some ways true, a deeper un-
derstanding of soy production dynamics reveals that the soy complex is 
leading to relations of productive exclusion.  
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Production in the two principal municipalities in Bolivia’s expansion 
zone, Cuatro Cañadas and San Julián, is completely dependent on capi-
tal-intensive mechanization – something that an estimated 86% of small 
farmers lack (Suárez, Camburn, and Crespo 2010, 83). Production re-
quires access to heavy machinery such as a tractor, sower, harvester, fu-
migator, and transport truck, among other inputs such as genetically 
modified seeds and chemical-based fertilizers, pesticides, and herbicides. 
For small-scale farmers, this requires either entering into some form of 
contract agreement or accessing credit from a financial institution. Since 
the Land Law prohibits small farmers (less than 50ha) from using their 
land as an asset to secure a loan, credit rates for ‘risky’ clientele such as 
small farmers are extremely high. This leaves few options for small farm-
ers but to enter into a contract agreement with large-scale agro-industry 
or with other farmers with access to machinery. But while the former 
option still requires renting tractors, harvesters, and fumigators, the latter 
offers a more secure sow-to-harvest service.  
The Land Law also prohibits landowners from renting out their land, 
meaning that the land is only for those who work it. For capital-poor 
small farmers however, this is quite difficult given the high investment 
costs of production. Small farmers are therefore resorting to what is 
known as a ‘partida’ arrangement where one party supplies the land and 
the other the equipment and inputs. The suppliers of land, in this case 
the small farmers, usually receive between 18- 25% of the harvest, but 
this is ultimately based on negotiation between the two parties. For small 
farmers, this is an attractive alternative which does not require entering 
into debt relations. Smallholders are not required to make any invest-
ments or rent any equipment; rather they let someone else work their 
land and collect between 18-25% of the profits after expenses. With 
costs of production in Bolivia’s soy expansion zone averaging between 
$400-$500/ha, the stakes are quite high for small farmers if they choose 
to take on the risks themselves, hoping that they do not run into prob-
lems such as drought, pests, erosion, floods, etc., while also depending 
on yields of at least 2 tons/ha, which, over the past decade have hovered 
around this mark, but have been increasingly volatile due to unpredicta-
ble weather patterns (Díez 2016). Table 5.1 shows the costs for soybean 
production for the summer harvest in the expansion zone. 
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Table 5.1 
Soybean Production Costs, Expansion Zone, summer harvest (USD/ha) 
Inputs USD/ha Operations USD/ha 
Seeds 60 Soil preparation 7 
Seed treatment 13 Sowing 30 
Herbicides 57 Agro-chemical applications ($7 X 5 applications) 35 
Insecticides 50 Harvest 55 
Fungicides 60 Transportation ($15/ton X 2 ton/ha) 30 
Pre-harvest Desiccant 13 
 
 
 
 
Inputs Total 253 Operations Total 157 
Total 410 
  
 
Source: Author’s own elaboration based on interviews in Cuatro Cañadas and San Julián 
 
Data from Bolivia’s Institute of Foreign Trade (Instituto Boliviano de 
Comercio Exterior, IBCE) estimates costs for soybean production in the 
summer seasons to be USD $421 in the Expansion Zone (Zone B) and 
USD $560 in the Integrated Zone (Zone A). An average of the three 
gives us an estimated total cost of production of USD $464 per hectare 
of soybean cultivation. In 2008 and 2011 the price offered to producers 
in Bolivia for soybeans peaked at USD $400/ton, but since the fall in 
commodities prices, soybeans have decreased to a ten-year low of USD 
$230/ton in 2016 (ANAPO 2016; ANAPO 2015). With average yields at 
2 tons/ha, producers would receive USD $460/ha which does not even 
cover the costs of production assuming one does not have machinery 
and must hire services. Since the soybean price for 2016 is the lowest 
since 2007, we can estimate the income of soybean producers during the 
‘peak’ years from 2008 to 2015 when prices averaged USD $339/ton. 
Given a minimum expected yield of 2 ton/ha, this would generate USD 
$678/ha for profits per hectare amounting to USD $214. Assuming 
smallholders negotiate a 25% return for the ‘partida’ arrangement, they 
would receive USD $53.5 per hectare, which, for a small-scale parcel of 
50 ha generates an income of USD $2676.8 for the summer harvest. In 
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the winter harvest, many producers cultivate wheat, sunflower, sorghum 
or maize as soy cultivation decreases to less than a third of the summer 
total (in land area and production). Yields and prices decrease substan-
tially in the winter and, since costs of machinery and inputs are relatively 
inelastic, producers estimate that they receive 30% of their annual in-
come in the winter harvest (field notes, 2014-15). This amounts to an 
annual income of USD $3830 which is USD $677 more per year than the 
national minimum wage (INE 2016a). While these estimates may seem 
adequate for the costs of living in rural areas, it is important to consider 
that these calculations assume relatively ideal conditions – in terms of the 
peak years of soybean prices, consistent yields, and a complete 50 hec-
tares harvest for smallholders. Nonetheless, it is primarily for these rea-
sons that the majority of the small farmers in Cuatro Cañadas and San 
Julián have opted for the ‘partida’ arrangement rather than taking the 
high risks associated with putting land into production.14 
5.5 ‘Productive exclusion’ and implications for agrarian 
change 
While the ‘partida’ arrangement may be viewed by some as a ‘win-win’, it 
is important to consider the implications of this trajectory of agrarian 
change given the new forms and relations of production and the broader 
political economy and ecology. First, soybean prices reached historic 
heights from 2008 to 2015, averaging USD $339/ton, allowing small-
holders to reap the benefits of the commodities boom. Data from the 
household survey reveals that most smallholders only started cultivating 
soybeans in 2010, as prices were favourable and policies and infrastruc-
ture were geared towards the soy complex. From 1996 to 2007, the dec-
ade prior to the boom, soybean prices averaged USD $173/ton. Since 
soybean prices have been steadily declining since a peak in 2011, it is not 
likely that prices will increase to levels during peak years on a consistent 
basis, given the likely end of the commodity boom cycle (World Bank 
2016b). Further, prices of agro-commodities such as soybeans are in-
creasingly volatile as new financial instruments enable investors to influ-
ence prices despite being far removed from actual production, distribu-
tion and consumption – a new kind of distancing, as Jennifer Clapp puts 
it, ‘by facilitating the entry of new actors taking profits along, in and 
around agrifood commodity chains, and by encouraging more abstrac-
tion of the commodity from its original form, in this case into a “virtual” 
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financial derivative product’ (Clapp 2014, 810). As the global food sys-
tem becomes increasingly financialized, the unpredictability of market 
prices escalates, rendering vulnerable those dependent on such prices. 
Second, and this point will be elaborated on further in the next chapter, 
the oligopoly-controlled upstream and downstream components of the 
soy complex and the technological and pesticide treadmill this form of 
production entails has increased production costs an estimated 76% 
since 2002.15 Third, nature has responded to the high rates of deforesta-
tion, large quantities of agro-chemicals applied to the soil, and compac-
tion due to heavy machinery with increased  climate volatility, soil ero-
sion, flooding, and new weeds and pests which contribute to the 
technological and pesticide treadmill. This third point will also be dis-
cussed further in Chapter 7.  
The ‘partida’ arrangement renders smallholders completely dependent 
on external factors beyond their control. Indeed, they have lost control 
of their land as a productive asset. The majority of those classified as 
small farmers are no longer agricultural producers, but class fractions of 
labour better characterized as semi-proletarians and petty bourgeois ‘ren-
tiers’. They are the taxi drivers, shopkeepers, bus drivers, roadside and 
construction workers, mechanics, among others. The transition of agri-
cultural production from a labour-intensive to capital-intensive model 
has divorced, or excluded, the rural majority from accessing the factors 
of production. They are ‘neither dispossessed of all means of reproduc-
ing itself nor in possession of sufficient means to reproduce itself’ as Bern-
stein puts it in reference to ‘classes of labour’ (2009, 73, italics in origi-
nal). The ‘partida’ arrangement is, in some ways, a form of disguised 
proletarianisation as described by Roger Clapp in reference to contract 
farming, whereby agribusiness ‘secures the farmer’s land and labour, 
while leaving him/her with formal title to both’ (Clapp 1988, 16; see also 
Watts 1994). Smallholders in Bolivia engaging in the ‘partida’ arrange-
ment are indeed ‘disguised’ since they are considered small-scale farmers 
in official government statistics, yet they do not actually work their land. 
What is distinct in the ‘partida’ arrangement with that of Clapp’s contract 
farming is that agribusiness has no need to secure control over the 
smallholder’s labour. Indeed, as Tania Li (2011, 286) puts it ‘their land is 
needed, but their labor is not’ in reference to plantations in Southeast 
Asia which exclude local populations. While land ownership is certainly 
still an important issue since many depend on land rents for their in-
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come, it does not necessarily dictate the terms of control and access.  
Many medium and large scale agro-capitalists may only have title to a 
certain amount of land, but they actually benefit from much more land 
due to ‘partida’ arrangements with smallholders. The penetration of in-
dustrial capital and the development of the ‘soy complex’ in the Bolivian 
lowlands is leading to a very exclusive producer environment where the 
need for labour has decreased substantially and the relative surplus value 
captured by agro-industry has increased. 
This transition has several implications for not only the agrarian struc-
ture in the lowlands, but also the broader rural-urban linkages concern-
ing employment. If the majority of the 11,000 smallholders ‘cultivating’ 
soybeans are no longer actually producing on their land, they are likely 
becoming disconnected from their status as a farmer. Traditional farming 
practices have been eroded by the adoption of high-modernist capitalist 
production, and the next generation of would-be family farmers are no 
longer learning how to produce on the family plot, they are looking to 
the cities for alternative opportunities. Based on the survey data, the av-
erage age of farmer heads-of-household is 48 years old, the vast majority 
with incomplete primary education. With this demographic, level of edu-
cation, and rural background, the prospects for employment in urban 
areas are bleak. For the youth still interested in farming, families with 4-5 
children are not able to make a living with a plot of less than 50 hectares 
within the ‘soy complex’. Medium and large scale agro-capitalists and 
large agro-industry are extending their reach, first through ‘partidas’ and 
later through outright land purchases. Based on a combination of data 
from the survey of 303 households, the recently published agricultural 
census of 2013, key informant interviews with ANAPO’s agricultural 
technicians, and a study published by Probioma, an estimated 80%-95% 
of farmers lack complete agricultural machinery16 and therefore depend 
on others to work their land, either partially or completely (INE 2015a; 
Suárez, Camburn, and Crespo 2010, 83). The concentration of the land-
holding structure is not (principally) occurring through the physical 
means of displacement, but rather a through a gradual process of ‘con-
trol grabbing’. With the majority of the rural youth in this region looking 
to the urban centres, the implications for this type of agrarian transition 
point to a massive rural-urban migration and a re-concentration of the 
agrarian structure.  
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Given this trajectory one must question where the current and next 
generation of smallholders will go. Whether, where and the extent to 
which they will be absorbed in the urban economy is an important ques-
tion worth further exploration. The capital-intensive soybean production 
model is not creating, but eroding employment opportunities. Fearnside 
(2001, 27) for example, found that soybean production in Brazil displac-
es 11 agricultural workers for every one it employs. In Bolivia, prior to 
mechanization, it would take approximately 10 labourers to work one 
hectare of land in a day. With mechanization, one person can sow 50 
hectares in 15 to 16 hours, fumigate in 5 hours, and harvest in 2 or 3 
days. Labour requirements have decreased drastically as a few people can 
now work several hundred hectares in a much shorter period of time. 
The only downfall to this technological innovation is the lack of available 
labour opportunities and the exclusion of the majority of the rural popu-
lation. If this type of ‘creative destruction’ offered new employment op-
portunities through new types of value-added industrial development, 
the excluded populations could be absorbed elsewhere. However, what 
we observe in Bolivia is a lack of labour opportunities in the countryside 
with no clear pathway or opportunities in urban centres.  
Employment that has been created as a result of the soy complex has 
tended to be precarious, seasonal, contractual, and uncertain. Opportuni-
ties such as transportation during harvest, maintenance and cleaning of 
silos, roadside bush clearing, etc., offer some employment but are very 
temporary, sporadic and under flexible arrangements. According to gov-
ernment data, employment in agriculture has decreased from 36.8% in 
2000 to 29.6% in 2011, but if we consider those actually engaged in agri-
cultural activity this would be much, much lower due to the processes of 
‘productive exclusion’ previously mentioned. IBCE and ANAPO claim 
that the soy complex generates over 100,000 direct and indirect jobs 
(IBCE, 2014). Over 70,000 of these jobs are classified as ‘producers’; yet 
the vast majority of these ‘producers’ are excluded from the production 
process. As Suárez et al. (2010) elaborate, the other ‘direct’ and ‘indirect’ 
employment consists of agricultural commercial stores, internal transpor-
tation, storage and processing facilities, transportation for export, and 
seed facilities (see Table 5.2). 
While these estimates are used among agro-industry proponents and 
various state actors to justify the continued development and expansion 
of the soy complex, the claim of generating 100,000 jobs is misleading. 
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Aside from the exaggeration of ‘direct’ employment, the other significant 
employment claims in storage (1,431) and transportation (26,824) are 
temporary and precarious. Many of the storage and processing facilities 
employ between 2-6 full time staff, 7-14 part time technicians and anoth-
er 7-14 part time general labourers (field notes, 2014; 2015). Further, the 
transport truck drivers (internal) are hired during harvest which spans 
only a few months of the year and does not offer any type of job security 
or benefits. These numbers provided by ANAPO are also for the soy-
bean summer harvest – the busiest and most lucrative time of the year 
for agricultural production. For winter harvests, the estimates for total 
employment drop to just over 40,000 yet include the same, part-time, 
precarious jobs. Measuring employment generation of an industry should 
consist of stable, annual employment; not precarious 1-2 month seasonal 
labour opportunities.    
Table 5.2 
Soy complex employment generation, summer harvest 
Source of Employment Number of people employed 
Direct employment 
Farmers and agricultural workers 70,652 
Agricultural commercial stores 872 
Storage Facilities 1,431 
Processing Facilities 700 
Seed facilities 242 
Indirect employment 
Internal transportation 20,299 
Transportation for export 6,525 
Total Indirect 26,824 
Total Direct 73,897 
Total Direct and Indirect 100,721 
Source: ANAPO, 2005; Suárez et al., 2010 
 
5.5.1 Gender and generational forms of exclusion 
For the rural youth – the children of Andean colonist farmers – oppor-
tunities for employment are few. In the context of soybean farming, a 
small plot of 50 hectares or less is insufficient if divided between siblings, 
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deeming it necessary to acquire more land or find employment else-
where. The lack of industrialization and secure and stable employment 
opportunities affiliated with the soy complex is problematic, as rural 
youth are pressured to find employment in urban centres with no clear 
pathway or opportunities available to do so. This raises questions as to 
where the rural youth will go and what options are available. In reference 
to Bernstein’s (2004) agrarian question of labour put forth in Chapter 1, 
the soy complex in Bolivia is not capable of generating sufficient or suf-
ficiently secure employment in order to provide a living wage to the great 
majority (see Li 2009; 2011). This is particularly problematic for the rural 
youth who are actually eager and interested to become farmers in the 
mechanized agricultural sector in Santa Cruz. However, they are not only 
‘confronted by the narrowing and sometimes complete closure of access 
to land’ (White 2012, 12) but also confronted high costs of production, 
and a lack of access to machinery, capital and credit.  
Leader of the Organization of Young Patriots of Cuatro Cañadas (Or-
ganizacion de Jovenes Patriotas de Cuatro Cañadas, JPCC), Alfredo Armellon, 
says the rural youth will not back down from their right to a dignified 
livelihood in their community and to a sustainable and healthy environ-
ment in harmony with Mother Earth (Armellon, personal communica-
tion, November 2015). These are rights guaranteed to the rural youth 
(ages 16-28 years) in Law 342 of 5 February 2013.  Through the Plurina-
tional Youth Council (Consejo Plurinacional de la Juventud) the youth can 
participate in the political process at multiple levels of government, pro-
pose policies, plans, programmes and projects, and evaluate their execu-
tion (Article 15, Law 342). Armellon and the JPCC are hoping to use this 
new political space in order to open a university in Cuatro Cañadas, 
promote cultural activities and more economic opportunities in the mu-
nicipality so the youth can stay in Cuatro Cañadas and help in its devel-
opment. Armellon says the current situation offers little opportunity for 
the youth and many are forced to migrate to the city, eroding the very 
social base of society as outsiders with little interest in a more robust de-
velopment process are controlling all the land, exploiting it for its value 
and destroying the natural environment. For Armellon and the JPCC, 
using the formal political process and interacting with the state is im-
portant, but they are also mobilizing from below.  
Armellon joined the Bolivia’s Landless Peasants’ Movement (Mo-
vimiento Sin Tierra, B-MST) in 2008 and has taken part in land occupa-
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tion on many occasions. However, the influence of agro-industry (CAO, 
ANAPO, CAINCO, etc.) combined with new complex state-society rela-
tions characterized by populist, pro-‘indigenous originary peasant’ dis-
courses and the MAS government ‘explicitly instructing the MST to stop 
occupying land’ with unfulfilled promises of an Agrarian Revolution has 
simultaneously led to less land occupations by the MST and facilitated 
the continued power and control over land for the landed and agro-
industrial elites (Brabazon and Webber 2014, 449). In December 2013, 
Law 447 ‘Against Land Occupation and Trafficking’ (Ley Contra el Ava-
sallamiento y Trafico de Tierras) was established which outlawed any form of 
land occupation and trafficking and increased the legal sentence to be-
tween three to eight years for those who take part in such action (Article 
8, Law 447). Armellon confirms that people are now moving north in 
search of land, to San Jose, Guarayos, Concepcion and San Javier. ‘The 
youth are not giving up hope just yet’, he explains, ‘mobilizing to force 
the state to implement the Agrarian Revolution it promised in 2006’ 
(Armellon, personal communication, 2015). For Armellon, this is a re-
gional problem and the politics of the process are complicated as landed 
elites and agro-industry remains highly influential. But waiting for the 
state to take action is not an option – the youth, with other associations 
are mobilizing to act and take their land back. With six siblings, Ar-
mellon knows that his father’s 50 hectares is not enough for everyone 
and cannot be divided. This is why he is taking action, both through 
formal political channels with the JPCC and through direct action from 
below.  
For the youth in Cuatro Cañadas, migrating to the city is still a last re-
sort rather than an aspiration. Evidently, the majority of the rural youth 
are not as actively engaged and enthusiastic at Armellon and must mi-
grate or migrate seasonally or temporarily to the city in order to provide 
for their own families and/or extended families (field note, 2014-15). 
The youth cannot wait for many years in order to take over the farm, 
much less if it entails becoming a type of rentier smallholder. If this tra-
jectory continues, the majority of the rural youth will likely be forced to 
migrate elsewhere. This brings us to some fundamental questions posed 
by Ben White: 
 
will young men and women still have the option, and the necessary sup-
port, to engage in environmentally sound, small-scale, mixed farming, 
providing food and other needs for themselves, their own society and 
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others in distant places? Or will they face only the choice to become 
poorly paid wage workers or contract farmers, in an endless landscape of 
monocrop food or fuel feedstock plantations, on land which used to be-
long to their parents, or to move to an uncertain existence in the infor-
mal sector of already crowded cities?’ (2012, 16).  
 
In other words, ‘who will own the countryside?’ (White 2011; 2012) and 
what will be the socio-economic, environmental and political implica-
tions? 
Even among the youth, opportunities for employment are by no 
means equal. Being a woman in a rural community, especially in the 
agro-industrial expansion zone of Cuatro Cañadas and San Julián, is 
much more difficult for a variety of reasons. For young rural women, job 
prospects are much more limited, as mentioned in Chapter 1. The nature 
of the agro-industry tends to be much more male-dominated, as it is ex-
tremely rare – socially and culturally – for women to operate heavy ma-
chinery in the field. In the household survey of over 300 households, just 
14% identified a woman as the ‘head’ of the household and decision-
maker. In most instances, this was due to widowed or single mothers 
who have stayed in rural areas. Through participant observation it was 
also clear that women, for the most part, do not engage in mechanized 
production in Cuatro Cañadas and San Julián. This gendered social con-
struction that women cannot or should not use heavy machinery has 
been reinforced by women’s predominant role in the unpaid domestic 
labour market outside of the formal economy, in charge of important 
components for social reproduction such as child care, meal preparation 
and cooking, household work, elderly care, among many other tasks.  
Though this unpaid labour is equally or more important as operating 
heavy machinery in the field, it is the men who assume the wage-
receiving productive activity in the formal economy, giving them more 
power in the household and the community in general. Importantly, for 
married couples, private property is now titled in the name of both the 
husband and wife, but this does not equate to real changes in the intra-
household social relations. Men, as the survey indicates, are still the pre-
dominant decision makers, but we cannot assume that all members of 
the household necessarily have the same interests (see White 1986; 
Razavi 2009). Furthermore, for those smallholders who have access to 
machinery and actually put their land into production, it is the male 
youth who engage in such productive activity (field notes, 2014-15). 
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Women are rarely considered to inherit the property, but are expected to 
marry young and move to their husband’s property to work in the un-
paid domestic labour market for social reproduction. 
However, operating heavy machinery is not the only form of em-
ployment that excludes women; they also face obstacles as agricultural 
engineers and agronomists. These types of extension services, which are 
growing in the community, require engineers to travel alone during the 
week, visiting farmers in very isolated areas in the countryside. Accord-
ing to agricultural engineers working in and around Cuatro Cañadas and 
San Julián, as well as young rural women, these jobs tend to be more 
male-dominated for two main reasons. First, due to the patriarchal struc-
ture of gender relations, known as ‘machismo’, heads of the farming 
household – predominantly men – are reluctant to take the advice of 
women in managing their production. Second, both men and women 
have informed me that male partners are uncomfortable when their fe-
male partner is travelling alone, long distances, and visiting male-
dominated farms. These gendered issues may be overlooked or seem in-
significant to some, but they have very significant implications for wom-
en, especially the youth, living in these areas. 
Like the rural youth, women are not passive actors in this story. The 
leader of the Women’s Federation for Intercultural Agricultural Produc-
ers of Cuatro Cañadas (Federacion de Mujeres Interculturales Productores Ag-
ropecuarios Cuatro Canadas), Mrs. Vargas, continues to work with women 
in the community to implement projects directly targeted for women. 
Mrs. Vargas is a widow with 10 hectares of land – seven of which are 
rented in a ‘partida’ arrangement for soybean production and the other 
three are unsuitable/fallow lands (personal communication, March 
2014). She has three children which have already migrated elsewhere due 
to the lack of opportunities in the region. For her, the greatest challenge 
in the community now is finding opportunity for employment. This is 
why she initiated the women’s federation which helps support women 
with productive activities and increase their representation in the eco-
nomic, social and political issues in the community. Along with 20 other 
women, she is currently involved in a chicken coop cooperative which 
has roughly 6000 chickens (Ibid., 2014). For Mrs. Vargas, her vision is to 
create more opportunities for women to earn their own income since 
agricultural production has become highly mechanized and there is no 
available land left in or near the community. Her plans for the future in-
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clude projects that enable the community to benefit from processing 
their raw materials, such as chickens and soybeans, so they can sell these 
consumer products within the community and create more employment 
(Ibid., 2014).  
While these small projects can provide women with income generat-
ing opportunities, they can also be fraught with their own internal ten-
sions. Another prominent women smallholder, Mrs. Choque, said that 
women’s organizations are broken, divided, and unorganized (personal 
communication, December 2014). Mrs. Pisaro, the leader of another vil-
lage-based women’s organization in San Miguel de los Angeles, also ex-
pressed her doubts. She participated in a women’s chicken coop cooper-
ative but says 50% of the members have dropped out due to the 
bureaucracy to get project funding, the time and investment, and the lit-
tle revenue they have received to date (personal communication, De-
cember 2014). However, the larger issue here is that women are excluded 
from the soy complex, forced to find other innovative ways to generate 
income in the productive economy, and continue to work as unpaid do-
mestic labourers in the sphere of social reproduction. Even within the 
processes of ‘productive exclusion’ and the new forms of control central 
to this study, women are faced with deeper levels of exclusion within the 
household and class relations. Delving deeper into the intersectionalities 
of class, gender, generation, and ethnicity goes beyond the scope of this 
study, but are nonetheless important issues to consider in the political 
economy of agrarian change. 
5.5.2 Toxicity and health hazards 
Aside from the exclusiveness, precariousness and lack of employment 
generated by the soy complex, the nature of working with and consum-
ing the agro-chemicals associated with GM seeds is also highly danger-
ous for public health. The majority of farmers, especially smaller-scale 
farmers and rural wage labourers, mix the agro-chemicals by hand and 
are further exposed to the chemical substances during spraying, cleaning 
and disposing of containers. Long term exposure and ingestion of these 
chemical substances are highly dangerous and should be handled with 
safety equipment (including gloves, proper mixing equipment, dust 
masks, goggles) which is extremely rare in the two central communities 
in Santa Cruz’s soy expansion zone, Cuatro Cañadas and San Julián. The 
main agro-chemicals used in Bolivia are glyphosate, 2,4-D, atrazine and 
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paraquat – all of which are highly controversial due to their high levels of 
toxicity and association with neurological and reproductive disorders 
(Catacora-Vargas et al. 2012). Paraquat, for example, has been linked to 
Parkinson’s Disease (Tanner et al. 2011; Kamel 2013), while atrazine to 
reproductive disorders (Tillitt et al. 2010; Hayes et al. 2011). Glyphosate, 
the active ingredient in Monsanto’s Roundup Ready herbicide was re-
cently evaluated by the World Health Organization’s International Agen-
cy for Research on Cancer (IARC), which found that the most heavily 
used chemical in the soybean sector is classified as ‘probably carcinogen-
ic to humans’ meaning that there is ‘sufficient evidence of carcinogenici-
ty in experimental animals’ and a positive association between exposure 
to the agent and cancer in humans, but other explanations cannot be 
completely ruled out (IARC 2015; Guyton et al. 2015). Atrazine and par-
aquat have been banned in the European Union, while glyphosate has 
been banned in a few countries but remains controversially legal in the 
EU. Data from the Ministry of Health reveals that the incidence of agro-
chemical poisoning in Santa Cruz has increased from 183 cases in 2010 
to 475 in 2015 which an average of almost one per day over the past five 
years (Ministerio de Salud, personal communication, August 2016). 
Health workers and hospital staff in Cuatro Cañadas and San Julián con-
tend that while they do not have long term data on cancer rates, com-
mon health problems which are increasing in the community and are as-
sociated with the use of agro-chemicals include skin disease, 
gastrointestinal disorders, and neurological problems (dizziness, head-
aches). While farmers themselves have expressed their concerns over 
newly developed health problems (skin irritation, headaches), the long 
terms effects and broader health impacts for the community at large are 
still unknown (field notes, 2014-15). 
The extractive nature of Bolivia’s soy complex is reducing labour op-
portunities and worsening conditions. Bolivia’s soy complex is particular-
ly discriminatory towards the youth seeking to remain in their communi-
ties, women looking for jobs in the sector, and more generally to those 
with limited access to capital and/or land. The lack of forward and 
backward linkages produced within Bolivia to create value-added pro-
ductive opportunities limits employment associated with the soy com-
plex. Instead, exclusion, youth and gender discrimination, and health 
threats for producers and consumers characterize the labour conditions 
of the soy complex. 
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5.6 The simple reproduction ‘squeeze’ and surplus 
population 
Although many small-scale farmers have maintained their formal rights 
over their original landholdings, they are increasingly ‘squeezed’ by new 
commodity forms of productive relations. Land has become increasingly 
scarce and expensive, labour almost obsolete, and means of production 
(GM seeds, agro-chemical inputs, machinery) appropriated by industry 
and expensive, small-scale landholders are experiencing a ‘simple repro-
duction squeeze’ which excludes them from reproducing themselves as 
farmers, yet does not provide opportunities for their transition into wage 
labourers (Bernstein 1979, 427; field notes, 2014-15). The rural majority 
residing in Bolivia’s soy expansion zone could very well be subject to 
what Tania Li refers to as ‘surplus populations’ (2009). Li distinguishes 
this concept from Marx’s ‘relative surplus population’ which becomes 
part of a reserve army of labour serving to keep wages low for increased 
capital accumulation. In Li’s formulation, however, she points to new 
dynamics in which ‘places (or their resources) are useful, but the people 
are not, so that dispossession is detached from any prospect of labour 
absorption’ (2009, 69). In Bolivia’s soy expansion zone, dispossession is 
occurring through productive exclusion as capital-poor farmers lack ac-
cess mechanisms to put their land into production. As Li states, ‘the key 
to (peoples’) predicament is that their labour is surplus in relation to its 
utility for capital’ (2009, 68, emphasis in original). Labour is no longer 
sought after in Bolivia’s soy expansion zone and the lack of forward and 
backward linkages within the Bolivian economy is not promising for fu-
ture labour prospects. 
If we recall the three pathways out of rural poverty suggested by the 
World Banks’s WDR08, farmers who are not productive enough to 
compete as capitalist agro-entrepreneurs should find other employment 
or migrate to cities. The key assumption here is that their labour is need-
ed elsewhere, or they will be absorbed in the urban economy. While the 
former prospect is certainly not available in Bolivia’s soy expansion zone, 
there are no guarantees for the latter option either. Seven out of every 
ten employed people work in precarious conditions in the informal sec-
tor without social security, health insurance, or pensions (CEDLA 2014). 
Among youth between the ages of 20 and 34, unemployment is 16.6%, 
while overall urban unemployment among those with higher education 
(professionals or skilled tradesperson) is 10.5% (CEDLA 2016a, 493). 
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Unemployment is lowest among those with little or no education (6.4%), 
discouraging youth from pursuing higher education. Precarious work 
remains widespread and those most affected are the youth, women, and 
higher educated population. This is due to the lack of quality, value-
added employment requiring highly-skilled workers. The economic struc-
ture has remained ‘extractivist’ without a domestic home market or in-
dustrialization process which could absorb relative surplus populations. 
This is why Mrs. Vargas and the Women’s Federation hope to help and 
support women with productive activities in order to overcome the big-
gest challenge in the community: lack of employment (personal commu-
nication, March 2014). The Women’s Federation which she represents is 
attempting to do exactly that, ‘so women and families do not have to 
leave the community’. If families want to stay, she says, they have to find 
alternative ways to make a living since soybean production provides very 
few job opportunities. Madelaine, a 23-year-old women from Cuatro Ca-
ñadas, says that since the expansion of soybeans there are less jobs for 
those who are not working directly as producers and do not have land. 
For her and her family there is less work because everything is mecha-
nized and requires less labour, while new opportunities are non-existent 
(personal communication, March 2014). For Madelaine, the expansion of 
soybeans has brought benefits only to those producing; for others (like 
herself) it has negative implications. There is less work, land is more 
scarce and expensive, and people are trying to force them off their land 
(person communication, March 2014). Anthony, a recent high school 
graduate, is in a similar situation. He says there is no land available for 
him and the vast majority (an estimated 80%) of his schoolmates are in a 
similar position. He works for Mennonites as a labourer from time to 
time, but says there is not much opportunity for the youth since labour 
opportunities are scarce and land too expensive (personal communica-
tion, March 2014). 
Overall employment in agricultural activities decreased from 37% in 
2000 to 26% in 2009 (INE 2012). The percentage of the population 
working in extractive industries, construction, and industrial manufactur-
ing also dropped slightly from 17.2% to just under 17% during the same 
period, while the percentage of ‘unskilled workers’ increased 4% and the 
‘precarious’ workforce with no benefits or stability continues to grow 
(INE 2012). According to CEDLA, the relative surplus value appropriat-
ed by workers, in relation to private capital and the state, has decreased 
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from 34.5% in 2003 to 25.6% in 2013, while the state’s share has almost 
doubled from 13.6% to 26% and private capital’s share has slightly in-
creased from 52.2% to 52.8% (CEDLA 2016b, 7). In other words, la-
bour exploitation has increased vis-à-vis the state and classes of labour, 
who now appropriate nearly 75% of surplus value production (field 
notes, 2014-15). The persistence of an economy characterized by extrac-
tive enclaves, including the agricultural sector, leaves few prospects for 
the rural youth. So what will happen to the rural youth in Cuatro Caña-
das and San Julián once they are squeezed out by an expanding ‘soy 
complex’? Whether they become absorbed in the urban economies or 
become ‘surplus populations’ of no utility for capital accumulation re-
mains to be seen, but nonetheless are important implications of this type 
of agro-industrial restructuring.  
Yet, while this agrarian transition continues to exclude capital-poor 
farmers, organized forms of resistance opposing the process are relative-
ly weak. As semi-proletarian and petty bourgeois rentiers, smallholders 
are caught in contradictory class positions hindering forms of resistance. 
Since many have maintained formal ownership over their land (though 
are subordinated via access and control relations) and receive the large 
majority of their income through land rent, they do not identify with the 
proletariat. However, their lack of control over physical capital and con-
tinual dependence on land rents does not parallel the interests of the pet-
ty bourgeoisie since many still self-identify as peasants (campesinos). Many 
smallholders thus find themselves located between particular class rela-
tions and unable to organize as a ‘class for itself’ as their diversified in-
come strategies intersect with their individual histories and identities 
(field notes, 2014-15). 
Bolivia’s landless worker’s movement (B-MST) is mostly absent in 
this region and has largely been incapacitated by the current govern-
ment’s policies against land occupations. Law 477, for example, prohibits 
land occupations – the B-MST’s primary strategy of resistance and de-
fense of territory – and incarcerates those who illegally occupy lands for 
three to eight years.17 In Cuatro Cañadas, many small farmers have 
voiced their frustrations with efforts to organize in the community to 
make demands to the state and/or resist the terms of their insertion into 
the soy complex. According to several small, but prominent, farmers in 
the community, the distinct histories, identities and resultant demands 
and expectations of the very diverse group of ‘small farmers’ has created 
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difficulties for organizing and alliance building among the ‘coloniza-
dores’. Their mix of geographical origin, personal experiences and histo-
ries and to a smaller extent ethnicity has resulted in many barriers to pro-
actively organize and act as a ‘class for itself’. As Betty Rueda, former 
President of the Women’s Organization of Cuatro Cañadas, puts it: 
 
One of the biggest challenges of the community is unification; everyone 
migrated to these communities from all over Bolivia and therefore have 
different mindsets, perspectives, and norms. It’s hard to organize, unify 
around a cause and make things happen because people don’t see eye-to-
eye on many issues, they have different ideas, values, and so on’ (Rueda, 
personal communication, May 2014).  
 
Further, the penetration of capital into the countryside has not affected 
everyone equally or evenly – and since many have retained access to their 
small landholding plots, there is no desire to join a landless worker’s 
movement.  
For Roberto Churata of CAPPO, the general acquiescence among the 
colonizadores is their loyalty to the MAS. After decades of dictatorships 
and unfavourable neoliberal states, Evo Morales and the MAS symboli-
cally and discursively represent their interests. Churata explained that 
many smallholders migrated from cities which are MAS strongholds – 
Cochabamba, Potosi, Sucre, Oruro – and became part of the struggle to 
bring Evo Morales and the MAS to power. ‘Their blind faith is fueled by 
indigenous and pro-peasant discourses which favours their interests’, he 
said. He continued: 
Just imagine if the people here wanted to block roads and destroy the 
main transportation links for soybeans and other products. It would put so 
much pressure on the government. But that doesn’t happen because 
smallholders have become chained and dependent on agro-industry. If 
they block roads it will immediately have negative impacts on their liveli-
hoods. People here live harvest to harvest, so to mobilize against the same 
industry for which they now depend is against their best interest (Churata, 
personal communication, January 2015). 
For Alcides Vadillo, former Director of Bolivia’s Institute for Agrari-
an Reform (INRA) and now regional Director of Fundación TIERRA in 
Santa Cruz, social movement have lost their independence and ability to 
mobilize to make demands against the state – they have become co-
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opted (Vadillo, perdonal communication, January 2015). Mrs. Choque, a 
colonizadora, smallholder and shopkeeper who arrived to Cuatro Caña-
das in 1992 has a similar perspective. She claims that that the small 
farmer and peasant associations are corrupt, ‘the dirigentes (leaders) and 
people at the top of the associations are the only ones who benefit and 
the rest of the population is left with nothing’ (Choque, personal com-
munication, December 2014). Mrs. Choque explained that soybean pro-
duction has changed the community’s social cohesion. ‘The community 
has become individualistic, without unity we cannot advance together’ 
she explained.  
Without such forms of organization and resistance, neither from so-
cial movements or the state, the ‘soy complex’ continues to develop and 
extend its reach in the Bolivian lowlands as control over the country’s 
most important agro-export becomes more and more concentrated in 
the hands of a few. Such particular class relations have enabled a state-
capital alliance to persist by means of a functional dualism between class 
fractions of capital and labour, facilitating the MAS’ control over state 
power and agro-capitalist elites’ control over the soy complex  (de Janvry 
1981).   
5.7 Functional dualism and the state-society-capital nexus 
5.7.1 Functional dualism  
The co-existence of capitalist and subsistence agriculture represents what 
de Janvry (1981) calls ‘functional dualism’ in which expanded accumula-
tion is made possible by the downward pressure on wages through the 
presence of semi-proletarians. Since labour is not fully proletarianized, 
subsistence needs are partially derived from own production which per-
mits capitalists to reduce wages to a level below the minimum require-
ment to maintain and reproduce a fully proletarianized labour force. As 
Kay (2006, 472) puts it, ‘semi-proletarianization is the only option open 
to those peasants who wish to retain access to land for reasons of securi-
ty and survival or because they cannot find sufficiently secure employ-
ment as wage workers, either in the rural or urban sector, to risk perma-
nent out-migration.’ In the case of the soy complex is Bolivia, wage 
labour on the farm is almost obsolete, forcing smallholders to find non-
farm rural employment or become innovative entrepreneurs through co-
operative project initiatives such as those of the Women’s Federation 
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previously mentioned. In contrast to de Janvry’s original conceptualiza-
tion of functional dualism, the Bolivian context is characterized by the 
co-existence of capitalist agriculture and smallholder rentiers whose sub-
sistence needs are not primarily derived from own production but from 
the partida arrangement. Not fully divorced from the land, smallholders 
therefore do not become fully proletarianized, yet lack the necessary ac-
cess mechanisms to fully benefit from the fruits of their land. Situated in 
contradictory class positions, the semi-proletarianized smallholders have 
interests as landowners, wage labourers, simple commodity producers, 
etc. and are thus less likely to organize as a ‘class for itself’. This ‘dualism’ 
is particularly functional in sectorally and socially disarticulated econo-
mies whereby ‘forward linkages in the production of raw materials (plan-
tation and mining) and backward linkages in industrial production (out-
ward- and inward-oriented) do not exist’ and where ‘the necessary 
relation between production and consumption capacities does not imply 
a relationship between return to capital and return to labour’ (de Janvry 
1981, 33–34). Under disarticulation, market expansion does not originate 
in rising national wages, but rather in export markets abroad and through 
rents. From the perspective of capital, labour represents a loss for profits 
as it does not contribute to the consumer capacity and domestic market 
expansion as it would in socially and sectorally articulated economies (de 
Janvry 1981). While functional dualism facilitates increased capital accu-
mulation, it also ‘implies the increasing proletarianization and impover-
ishment of the rural masses’ (de Janvry 1981, 85).  
In Bolivia’s eastern lowlands, a type of functional dualism has 
emerged as a result of a largely unchanged agrarian structure and the de-
velopment and expansion of an agro-industrial soy complex. With the 
ubiquitous use of genetically modified seeds and the influx of largely for-
eign agro-capital, small scale farmers have been squeezed by rising pro-
duction costs18, the concentration of landownership, and the monopoli-
zation of the market by agro-industry (McKay 2017). Yet as landowners, 
their economic interests remain aligned with large-scale landowners and 
agro-industrial elites – that is, for the continued expansion of the agricul-
tural frontier (in hopes of getting access to more land) and increased 
productivity (yields) and market prices (based on the Chicago Board of 
Trade). Instead of mobilizing around labour issues or support for small 
farmers in relation to medium and large scale farmers, they have been 
incorporated into and thus become dependent on the soy complex. This 
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has demobilized key social movements in the region and enabled a state-
capital alliance to develop without a serious threat to legitimacy of the 
MAS government. As farmers remain tied to the land and usually reserve 
a small portion to partially support household subsistence, they other-
wise remain dependent on rents and wage labour activities with little op-
portunity for advancement in the current political economy. The state, 
however, justifies the development and expansion of the soy complex 
with the claim that nearly 80% of soy ‘farmers’ are small scale which 
contributes to agricultural sector employment and food security 
(Vicepresidente 2012; INE 2013; ANAPO 2011).  
The semi-processing of soybeans in Bolivia creates very few and tem-
porary jobs, and the ‘value-added’ it derives is minimal as it is still ex-
ported as a raw input mainly for animal feed (McKay 2017). Since sec-
toral linkages (upstream and downstream) depend on external markets 
(importing value-added capitalized goods and exporting semi-processed 
or raw soybean) and demand is derived abroad, the soy complex repre-
sents a sectorally and socially disarticulated economic enclave with la-
bour surplus to the needs of capital accumulation.19 Even domestic con-
sumption does not contribute to expanding the internal market for 
capitalist producers, meaning there is no incentive for the industry to 
increase wages or support labour since it has been reduced to a net loss 
for capital accumulation. Nonetheless, by collecting rents and engaging 
in other precarious income-generating activities small farmers are able to 
subsist and support the interests of capital due to their contradictory 
class positioning. This type of functional dualism has enabled a state-
capital alliance to emerge without (yet) having to overcome a legitimacy 
crisis. So long as functional dualism is maintained the state-capital alli-
ance will be able to pursue capital accumulation interests at the expense 
of the rural majority. 
5.7.2 State-society-capital nexus: signs of crises within and 
beyond the soy complex 
At least five interrelated dynamics of the state-society-capital nexus have 
enabled the MAS to gain and maintain state power by appeasing classes 
of labour and capital without entering a legitimacy and accumulation cri-
sis: (1) the strong state-society relations which emerged as a result of the 
Pacto de Unidad both leading up to and after 2006; (2) the inclusion and 
absorption of key social movement leaders within state institutions; (3) 
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the commodities boom, allowing state revenues to increase to historic 
levels and thus increase public investment albeit with a residual approach 
to poverty reduction; (4) state discourse and identity politics; (5) func-
tional dualism and sectoral/social disarticulation. Yet, many of these fac-
tors remain dependent on the extractive sectors and thus highly contin-
gent on commodity prices to fuel the neo-extractivist development 
model. With the fall in commodities prices and the socio-economic and 
ecological crises of soybean production starting to surface, the state-
capital alliance may be soon facing a crisis of legitimacy.20  
The economic crisis for producers due to falling soybean prices has 
been exacerbated by long periods of drought, severely affecting yields 
and leading to widespread indebtedness. Furthermore, food prices in the 
soybean expansion zone such as Cuatro Cañadas and San Julián have 
increased substantially, especially for basic food staples such as fruit and 
vegetables (Fernandez Cutiño, personal communication, June 2016). 
These factors are putting a squeeze on small farmers who are increasing-
ly opting not to sow the soil in fear of indebtedness. The combination of 
these economic and ecological crises are likely to force capital-poor small 
farmers off their land to being fully proletarianized, eroding the func-
tional dualism which has partially enabled the state-capital alliance to 
persist. 
But even beyond the soy complex, the MAS has jeopardized its rela-
tionship with the Pacto de Unidad and the strong state-society relations 
which brought the party to state power in 2006. The controversial con-
flict in the Territorio Indígena del Parque Nacional Isiboro-Sécure (TIPNIS), in 
which the state authorized the construction of a highway through the 
TIPNIS indigenous territory and national park without proper free, prior 
and informed consent, led to widespread conflict between indigenous 
groups and the MAS and created tensions among the Pacto de Unidad, 
eventually leading to a split among its organizational members (see 
Webber 2015). The administrative capacity of the state and political cli-
entelism was further evident with the corruption scandal of the Indige-
nous Fund (Fondo Indigena) in 2015. Almost 70% of the projects had ‘ir-
regularities’ with over US$180 million unaccounted for, leading to the 
prosecution of several indigenous leaders as well as the resignation of the 
Minister of Land and Rural Development, Nemesia Achacollo (Funda-
ción Pazos Kanki 2015, 5).  
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To make matters worse, these tensions were intensified by the fall in 
commodities prices. With state revenues (and state expenditures) highly 
dependent on rents from the extractive sector, the fall in commodities 
prices triggered the need for expanded production in order to maintain 
revenues. This prompted the controversial passing of Supreme Decree 
2366 in 2015 which authorizes hydrocarbon exploration and extraction 
in existing protected areas, despite declarations by the official ombuds-
man (Defensor del Pueblo), Rolando Villena Villegas, that the decree is un-
constitutional and violates the rights of indigenous communities (Defen-
soria del Pueblo, 2016). In addition, the state, along with agro-industrial 
representatives, announced the expansion of the agricultural frontier 
from 3 million to 13 million hectares within 10 years. Agro-industry is 
also pushing for the legalization of more genetically modified seeds, in-
cluding rice, wheat and maize. But this issue has raised concerns among 
many, particularly the CSUTCB and the rest of the Pacto de Unidad who 
organized collectively during the recent Cumbre Agraria to stop the at-
tempt to legalize these GM varieties. CSUTCB’s leadership also publicly 
announced that they did not support the MAS’s attempt to change the 
constitution in order to stay in power for another term. This perhaps 
surprising move signals CSUTCB’s increased relative autonomy or polit-
ical positioning and the deteriorating relations with the MAS in their 
quest for state power. The fall in commodities prices and the necessity to 
maintain accumulation interests by means of increased geographical ex-
pansion has threatened the state’s legitimacy and fractured the strong 
state-society relation, revealing a mutually beneficial state-capital relation 
dependent upon the accumulation of capital and political power. 
All of these factors together, including minor political scandals21, have 
begun to unravel the dynamic state-society-capital nexus which has ena-
bled the MAS to maintain state power while appeasing both classes of 
labour and capital through the partial fulfilment of both its objective and 
subjective functions.  
5.8 Conclusion 
Agrarian dynamics in Bolivia’s lowlands are undergoing an important 
transition. This chapter has analyzed the politics of agrarian change since 
Evo Morales and the MAS gained control over the state. From the 
Agrarian Revolution which formally recognized territorial rights for 
many indigenous communities, but remained characterized as tenurial 
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reform rather than redistributive reform, to the Productive Revolution 
with its agro-industrial bias and emergent state-capital alliance. As the 
land market became saturated and means of production commodified, 
smallholders were increasingly excluded from productive activity but 
maintained ownership over their parcels. Capital-poor smallholders lack 
the structural and relational access mechanisms necessary to integrate as 
producers in the soy complex. As a result, smallholders enter into ‘par-
tida’ arrangements whereby they rent their land to capital-rich farmers 
with access to technology, capital, markets, and authority. These mecha-
nisms of exclusion have differentiated smallholders into semi-
proletarians and petty bourgeois rentiers, hindering their ability to organ-
ize as a ‘class for itself’ as they transition into contradictory class posi-
tions between labour and capital. This chapter reveals how such process-
es of productive exclusion are unfolding, pointing to a trajectory of 
agrarian change which will leave the rural majority in very precarious po-
sitions with few employment opportunities.  
Bolivia’s economic model based on raw material exports still lacks an 
industrialization process in which relative surplus labour might be ab-
sorbed. These agrarian dynamics are part of a larger economic model 
based on the extraction of natural resources for export (minerals, hydro-
carbons, soybeans). If opportunities for a viable alternative in agriculture 
develop – which would require substantial changes in the Bolivian pro-
ductive pattern but also stronger and more organized movements ‘from 
below’ –  many would likely stay in rural areas. Such challenges, however, 
require structural transformations concerning relations of production 
and property and are increasingly difficult to overcome due to the rapid 
advancement of state policy to expand the agricultural frontier and its 
turn from an Agrarian Revolution to a Productive Revolution (Ley Nº 
144 de la Revolución Productiva Comunitaria Agropecuaria).  
Smallholder, capital-poor farmers are increasingly facing a simple re-
production ‘squeeze’, as they lack the access mechanisms necessary for 
mechanized agricultural production. Without access to capital, technolo-
gy, markets, and even authority, smallholders are subordinated by the 
unequal power relations in the countryside. Landed elites, agro-
capitalists, and agro-industry have imposed a culture of modernization, 
expansion, and capital-intensive production which has subordinated the 
rural majority. Their power is not only land and capital-based, but is le-
gitimized with discourses of agro-industrialization and advancement. 
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Control over the value-chain has further enhanced these power dynamics 
and the ability to appropriate more surplus value from the production 
process. In the next chapter, the agro-industrial value-chain is analyzed, 
revealing who controls and appropriates surplus value from the upstream 
and downstream components of the soy complex.  
Notes 
 
1 The Unity Pact is a social movement alliance formally articulated in 2004 
consisting of peasants (CSUTCB), intercultural communities (CSCIB), in-
digenous, peasant and ‘originario’ women (CNMCIOB-BS, Bartolina Sisa), 
indigenous peoples (CIDOB), and Ayllus y Markas of Qullasuyu 
(CONAMAQ). 
2 Known as ‘saneadas’ referring to those parcels in the last stages of formal-
ization for title. 
3 The ‘Media Luna’ (half-moon) refers to the geographic shape of a group of 
four departments in Bolivia (Pando, Beni, Santa Cruz, and Tarija) which 
were controlled by the opposition upon the election of the MAS in 2006. 
4 Including the National Institute for Agrarian Reform (INRA). 
5 CONALCAM (Coordinadora Nacional por el Cambio) was founded in 2007 by 
the MAS, the Pacto de Unidad, and other organizations to draft the new con-
stitution and participate in the formation and execution of the ‘Process of 
Change’ (Proceso de Cambio). 
6 Grants 200 bolivianos (USD $29) per year to children enrolled in public ed-
ucation through to the sixth grade (Exchange rate 1 USD = 6.86 BOB from 
www.xe.com 21/01/2017). 
7 Grants 1800 bolivianos (USD $258) annually to low-income residents aged 
60 and over who receive Social Security payments and 2400 bolivianos (USD 
$344) to those without Social Security. 
8 Grants 50 bolivianos (USD $7) to uninsured mothers for four pre-natal 
medical visits, 120 bolivianos (USD $17) for the childbirth, and 125 bolivia-
nos (USD $18) per medical appointment for up to two years (Weisbrot, Ray, 
and Johnston 2009). 
9 Converted to USD at a rate of 1 USD = 6.89 Bs. Original data from 
source is Bs 40.543 billion in 2005 to Bs 221.181 billion in 2015 (MEFP, 
2015). 
10 The Ministry of Economy and Public Finance (MEFP) uses the following 
sectorial categorizations: infrastructure; productive; social; and multisectori-
al.  
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11 Data from the household survey conducted in 2014-15. 
12 I refer here to the structural and relational access mechanisms, such as 
technology, capital, markets, labor, knowledge, authority, identities, and social 
relations (Ribot and Peluso 2003, 162). 
13 Including communitarian properties, TCOs, and lands not yet formalized. 
14 These recent changes in the relation between small-scale landowners and 
capitalist farmers are influenced by the Argentinian modality known as pools de 
siembra where an ‘entrepreneur’ organizes a production plan, offers investors 
an implementation strategy and then leases the land (Benchimol 2008). 
15 Author’s calculation based on data from CAO, IBCE, and field notes 
(2014, 2015). 
16 Includes a tractor, harvester, and fumigator. 
17 See UNIR y TIERRA 2014. 
18 From 2002 to 2014, costs of production for soybean farmers increased 
from USD $263/ha to USD $475/ha (field notes, 2015). 
19 Prior to mechanization, one worker could harvest one-tenth of one hec-
tare per day. With machinery one worker can harvest 25 ha per day (field 
notes, 2015). 
20 See for example, a recent news article in Pagina Siete, titled, ‘Is our agricul-
ture dying? Pests and low prices threaten production (Díez 2016). See also 
(McKay and Colque 2016). 
21 Such as the infamous affair between President Morales and former man-
ager of China’s CAMC Engineering Company, Gabriela Zapata, who’s 
company received five public contracts worth some USD $5 billion (Molina, 
2016). 
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6 Value-Chain Control:  Relations of Debt and Dependency1 
 
6.1 Introduction  
This chapter analyzes Bolivia’s industrial value-chain agriculture, dis-
aggregating the agro-industrial value chain and revealing where the ‘val-
ue’ being generated is appropriated and how the terms of control and 
access are changing. The legalization of genetically-modified soybeans 
and the resultant ‘appropriationism’ has opened new spaces for capital 
accumulation and enabled capital to penetrate, particularly from Brazil, 
Argentina, and China. By examining the upstream and downstream 
components of the soy complex, this chapter reveals the sectoral disar-
ticulation of agriculture in Bolivia. While the ‘partida’ arrangement has 
rendered smallholders in contradictory class positions, value-chain agri-
culture has created new relations of debt and dependency among those 
who put land into production. This is understood as ‘value-chain control’ 
which binds farmers through contracts while the majority of the value is 
appropriated by industries upstream and downstream. This is conceptu-
alized using David Harvey’s idea of the ‘spatio-temporal fix’ as new 
forms of commodification have developed and small farmers are becom-
ing absorbed into value-chain relations, threatening their ability to work 
their land now and in the future.  
6.2 Industrial value-chain agriculture and transnational 
capital 
The rapid expansion of soybean plantations, which doubled in cultiva-
tion area since 20002, was driven, among other factors previously men-
tioned, by favourable soybean prices which spiked in 2003, 2008 and 
2011 during the super-cycle of commodities prices. This substantial land 
use change and the associated value-chain relations have transformed the 
forms and relations of production in Santa Cruz.  
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Figure 6.1 
Soybean prices – 1996-2016 
 
Source: ANAPO 2016, FAOSTAT 2016, IndexMundi 2016 
 
 
While boom prices certainly encouraged farmers to transition to 
oilseed crop production, the transition to soybean monocultures was ini-
tiated with the migration patterns from the 1970s onwards and in partic-
ular the arrival of Brazilian agro-capitalist in the 1990s. As new capital 
started to penetrate the region in the 1990s, discourses of modernization, 
progress, and technological advancement via the agro-industrial model 
also emerged. By the mid to late 2000s, those who had not already made 
the transition to soybean cultivation did so, as the economic opportuni-
ties of converting one’s land from traditional crop production to mono-
crop soybean production were attractive and offered farmers the chance 
to ‘advance’, ‘modernize’, and obtain a disposable income. This, howev-
er, came at the cost of entering into value-chain relations of debt and 
dependency and for some, the loss of control over their land. 
Economic incentives were not the only reason many abandoned di-
versified crop production for monocultures. Mrs. Choque, for example, 
arrived to the soy expansion region in the late 1980s. The daughter of a 
colonizador and trade union leader of Villa Primavera, her family used to 
produce maize, rice, yucca, plantains, tomatoes, onions, and other vege-
tables; while they also had a few heads of cattle and pigs. The only things 
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they needed to buy, she explained, were salt and oil. They worked their 
land using family labour, mainly producing for household consumption, 
while selling surplus production in the local markets and exchanging with 
neighbours. In the early 2000s, the Brazilian agribusiness Sojima, which 
controls over 100,000 ha in the region, purchased vast amounts of land 
nearby their family’s parcel for large-scale GM soybean production. The 
company uses aircraft fumigation for their crops, contaminating the 
nearby area with agro-chemicals such as glyphosate, 2,4-D, Atrazine and 
Paraquat. As the soil of all nearby parcels became contaminated due to 
aircraft fumigation and run-off, farmers were forced to make the transi-
tion to GM (glyphosate resistant) crop production (Choque, personal 
communication, December 2014). This is a common story not only in 
her community but throughout the agricultural expansion zone in Santa 
Cruz (field notes, 2014-15). 
In her community of Villa Primavera, only two out of twenty families 
have agricultural machinery. The rest, like herself, engage in a ‘partida’ 
arrangement with someone who has machinery to work their land. She 
says a Brazilian landowner works the majority of the land in the commu-
nity, and though he doesn’t formally own the land, he has direct access 
to it and derives the most benefits from it. When asked about the future 
of small farmers in the region, Mrs. Choque’s response was quite grim. 
‘In the future, small farmers are not going to be able to produce’, she 
says. ‘Every year the costs of production are increasing as we need to buy 
more and more chemicals. The weather has also changed, it is less pre-
dictable and we have less rainfall. And since the majority of us (small 
farmers) don’t have access to machinery we are dependent on others and 
have to wait until they have time to work our land, losing out on the best 
times for sowing, fumigating, and harvesting.’ She went on to explain 
that in the near future her family plans on transitioning their land back to 
a diversified production system for self-consumption with a variety of 
vegetables, cattle and pigs, and transition to the peasant way of life that 
they had before. While she worries about the surrounding contamination 
of the air, land and water, she was tired of not having any control over 
her land and the production process. For her, this was not farming as she 
knows it, but an industrial process exploiting the land and people for 
profits (Choque, personal communication, 9 December 2014). Despite 
an increase in household income, the loss of control over the land and 
the production process, combined with increasing costs for household 
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consumption (i.e. food) is leading to a kind of ‘economic upgrading but 
social downgrading’ of smallholders integrated into the soy complex val-
ue chain (see Pegler 2015). Social downgrading in the soy complex is un-
derstood here as ‘productive exclusion’ (see Chapter 5), but the social 
values and peasant identities of present-day smallholders are also being 
eroded as they become incorporated into value-chain relations and sub-
stitute traditional crops for industrial ‘flex’ crops. Women in particular, 
like Mrs. Choque, have been further ‘downgraded’ or ‘excluded’ in the 
highly-mechanized form of production due to their lack of participation 
in heavy machinery operations (field notes, 2014-15). 
While most smallholders are renting their land or entering into an ar-
rangement ‘al partida’, others have advanced and built up enough savings 
to buy a tractor and have become fully integrated into the ‘soy complex’, 
dependent on corporate controlled agro-industrial inputs such as GM 
seeds and agro-chemicals (i.e. the ‘technological package’ complete with 
growing instructions). Short term credit and growing contracts have 
bound farmers into relationships of dependency with agribusiness as 
they enter into a cycle of indebtedness and control. As McMichael (2013, 
671) puts it, ‘the producer enters a particular kind of value relation that 
has the potential to become an instrument of control, debt dependency 
and dispossession’. This is precisely the type of value relation which has 
come to control farmers in Santa Cruz. Farmers’ autonomy over their 
land is threatened, as it becomes nearly impossible to break away from 
these ‘chains of dependency’ due to both economic (supplier contracts, 
indebtedness) and ecological (soil degradation, contamination, large-scale 
spraying activity) circumstances.   
The introduction of GM soybeans has opened up new market oppor-
tunities for agribusiness as Bolivia’s untapped agricultural market 
launched a new frontier of accumulation. Rather than land purchases, 
transnational capital can still appropriate value from industrial agriculture 
via agro-inputs, storage and processing facilities, credit and debt rela-
tions, and export markets. This is another form of control grabbing in 
Bolivia’s agricultural sector. While existing medium and large-scale land-
owners are expanding their landholdings via appropriation, land pur-
chases, and control grabbing via ‘partida’ arrangements (Colque 2014; 
McKay and Colque 2016), transnational agro-capital is penetrating the 
market via control over seeds, agro-chemical inputs, silos, processing and 
export markets. Four of the top six companies which control 85% of the 
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soybean market for storage and processing (silos) are owned by foreign 
capital (AEMP 2013). With oligopoly control over the soybean market, 
these six companies are able to set prices and greatly influence crop pro-
duction. Through supply contracts, these companies have a high degree 
of control over the production process as they demand specific quality 
standards which require the use of certain inputs and technological pack-
ages. They also have access to export markets and therefore control over 
the gateway to where the country’s soybeans realize their value. Without 
actually owning the land or having legal land tenure rights, the relations 
of control and access to land and its productive resources are largely in 
the hands of agro-industrial capital. Farmers bear the majority of the risk 
in this value relation. International price volatility, drought, floods, pests 
and weeds, etc., are all potential threats that must be absorbed by the 
producer. Meanwhile, agribusiness benefits from the sale of agro-inputs 
– such as seeds, agro-chemicals, machinery, technical assistance, credit – 
and often binds the buyer of its products (the producer) into selling his 
or her crops, in their entirety, back to the corporation’s silos/processing 
facilities. 
While we should not under-estimate the importance of land and the 
unequal agrarian structure, other components of the ‘soy complex’ are 
also indicative of the changing agrarian dynamics and processes of con-
trol. Those who control storage, processing, distribution, and exports 
can have much more influence over the soy industry than landowners 
and producers. The following shows the main actors controlling Bolivia’s 
soy complex – six companies control the export of 95% of Bolivia’s soy.  
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Figure 6.2 
Market share of Bolivia’s soy (+derivatives) export market, 2012 
 
Source: Adapted from AEMP (2013) 
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Table 6.1 
Agribusiness established in Bolivia in the value chain of oilseed economy 
Agribusiness Main characteristics Relation with foreign capital 
Gravetal 
Bolivia S.A. 
Largest soy processor in Bolivian agro-
industry.  Produces crude oil and soybean 
meal. 100% export oriented. Controls 31% of 
Bolivia’s soy and soy derivative exports. Rep-
resents approximately 10% of foreign currency 
income derived from Bolivian exports in 2011. 
Direct employment generated in Bolivia 
reached 4.500 positions per year. 
Since 2008, 99% owned by 
Capital Inversoja SA, a trans-
national company based in 
Venezuela 
Industria de 
Aceites S.A 
(FINO) 
 
Second major soy and sunflower exporter and 
produces cooking oil, butter, margarine, soap 
and other cosmetic products for the internal 
market. Controls 22% of Bolivia’s soy and soy 
derivative exports. 
74% controlled by Urigeler 
International S.A., a transna-
tional company that is part of 
Grupo Romero from Perú. 
ADM SAO 
S.A. 
 
One of the world’s largest transnational agro 
industrial companies operating in more than 
75 countries with sourcing, transportation, 
storage and processing assets. In Bolivia, ADM 
sells and exports vegetable oils and protein 
meals from soybeans and sunflower seeds. It 
started operating in Bolivia in 1998, buying 
50% of the Bolivian SAO company. Controls 
13% of Bolivia’s soy and soy derivative ex-
ports. 
Multinational based in the 
United States. 
Industrias 
Oleaginosa 
S.A. 
 
Bolivian-owned oilseed processor that handles  
grain purchases, storage, processing facilities 
and marketing. Controls 9% of Bolivia’s soy 
and soy derivative exports. Main external 
markets are in the Andean region, North 
America and European countries. 
Owned by the notorious 
Marinkovic family (Croatian 
immigrants). Branko 
Marinkovic is a Bolivian politi-
cian and businessman who fled 
Bolivia after being accused of 
planning an armed rebellion to 
overthrow the current gov-
ernment.  
  
Cargill   
Bolivia S.A. 
 
Started operations in Bolivia in 1998. Sells 
industrial food, exports agricultural commodi-
ties and offers financial services. In Bolivia, 
Cargill has silos and warehouses where it can 
store up to 27.000 tons of grain.  It also has 
partnerships with other silo owners in 12 
locations. Controls 11% of Bolivia’s soy and 
soy derivative exports. 
Multinational based in the 
United States. Cargill is an 
international producer and 
marketer of food, agricultural, 
financial and industrial prod-
ucts and services. This compa-
ny employs 140,000 people in 
65 countries. In 2012, their 
income reached USD 116.000 
million. 
GRANOS Controls 9% of Bolivia’s soy and soy derivative 
exports. 
Established in Bolivia. Interna-
tional investors/capital un-
known. Exports to Peru. 
 
Source: Adapted from Pacific Credit Rating PCR (2012), Nueva Economia (2011), AEMP (2012), 
Jubileo (2013) and respective websites. 
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Excluding Industrias Oleaginosas S.A. and Granos, the rest of the six 
listed companies are owned by transnational agribusinesses, which in-
clude US-based multinationals ADM and Cargill.  Many began to operate 
at the end of the 1990s in Bolivia through the acquisition of local com-
panies in Santa Cruz using their previous Brazilian and Argentinean sub-
sidiaries to enter the country. The companies are mainly characterized by 
activities such as grain purchases, storage, processing facilities, marketing 
and export. These companies operate through contract farming schemes 
mainly with medium and large-scale landowners, as well as producer as-
sociations. Many provide producers with the appropriate ‘technological 
packages’ which include seeds and agro-chemical inputs with instructions 
for applications, exact number of days from sow to harvest, and the 
grain quality which meets the standards of the industry. Producers are 
not obliged to purchase these ‘technological packages’ from these com-
panies per se, but they take on additional risk if they ‘outsource’ their 
productive inputs. Contracts can vary, but usually entail a predetermined 
price and quantity to be purchased upon harvest. This type of forward 
contract gives producers guaranteed market access and allows them to 
hedge against price fluctuations. Evidently, more bargaining power and 
therefore better prices are given to those producers who can deliver larg-
er quantities. The producer then repays the initial loan for his or her in-
puts upon delivery of the harvest. Some producers, particularly Mennon-
ites, often pool their land together in order to increase their bargaining 
power vis-à-vis agro-industry, thereby getting a better price per ton. The-
se are smaller forms of the pools de siembra more common in Argentina 
and Brazil, but rather than the participation of outside investors, they 
include smaller groups, associations or communities of farmers. Further, 
the ‘partida’ arrangement operates within these contract farming schemes 
since the capitalized-farmers working the lands of non-capitalized farm-
ers have contracts with agro-industrial companies. In other words, while 
the capitalized-farmers appropriate much of the surplus from the non-
capitalized smallholders, agribusiness companies appropriate surplus 
from the producers through contract farming. The value-chain dynamic 
thus works as a chain of control with subsequent value appropriation 
along the chain.   
The terms of access and control have thus become transformed. 
Owning land is no longer a sufficient asset when one enters into this par-
ticular type of value relation, becoming both dependent on agribusiness 
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for the necessary factors of production and to sell the final product. 
McMichael, for example, breaks down the value-chain relation as estab-
lishing ‘chains of dependency, with smallholders entering markets over 
which they have no ultimate control’, while serving to ‘generate value 
that can be appropriated by agribusiness and its financiers – in the com-
modity form of food, feed and agrofuels for elite consumers, redistrib-
uting value from producers to corporate financiers (whether in agribusi-
ness or any other economic sector)’ (McMichael 2013, 672). All the risks 
of production are therefore assumed by the producers, while the value 
that they add is through labour power and the ecological value extracted 
from their lands. At the time of harvest, producers sell their crops to the 
agro-industry, receiving a price per ton which is bound to the Chicago 
Board of Trade (CBOT) and discounted, on average USD $70/ton ac-
cording to the adjustments agreed upon by the six companies which con-
trol Bolivia’s silo and export markets (FAOSTAT 2016; ANAPO 2016). 
In order to clear/prepare the land and make the necessary initial invest-
ment for the next season, indebtedness through supplier contracts is 
usually a necessity. Debt is therefore a key mechanism of control within 
the value-chain relation, ‘constituting the ‘chain’ through which such new 
contract farming is activated, reproduced and, in some cases, dispos-
sessed’ (McMichael 2013a, p. 672).  Of course, those with more access to 
capital, credit, land, and machinery have greater control over the produc-
tion and decision making process. Approximately one-third of farmers in 
Cuatro Cañadas and San Julián own a tractor, meaning that they at least 
need to hire operational services such as harvesting and transportation or 
enter into a ‘partida’ arrangement to carry out production from sow to 
harvest (INE 2015b; field notes 2014-15). Relations of value-chain con-
trol thus vary, as farmers with different access mechanisms are incorpo-
rated accordingly.  
While it is possible to quantify the value appropriated (or retained) by 
smallholders in the ‘partida’ arrangement, given that the terms between 
smallholders and capitalized producers fluctuate between 18-25% and 
the costs of production and soybean prices are available; it is much more 
difficult to quantify the value appropriated by agribusiness companies in 
the contract farming schemes. However, we can determine the concen-
tration of control of the upstream and downstream components of the 
value-chain and the origins of capital and manufacturing. For processors, 
it is also possible to calculate the ‘crush’ value of the soybean industry. 
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The soybean crush is the process of converting soybeans into soybean 
meal and soybean oil and the relationship between their prices is called 
the Gross Processing Margin (GPM) (CBOT 2006). The crush spread, or 
GPM, is a measurement of the profit margin for soybean processors. 
While many factors affect the soybean crush spread, according to a re-
port by the Chicago Board of Trade, ‘soybean prices are typically lowest 
at harvest and trend higher during the year as storage, interest, and insur-
ance costs accumulate over time’ (CBOT 2006, 1). Evidently, this means 
that producers receive the lowest price for the oilseed grain at harvest, 
and agribusiness companies who store, process and trade the crop ap-
propriate more value as the price increases along the chain. Soybeans are 
crushed into meal (73.3%), oil (18.3%), hulls (6.7%) and waste (1.7%). 
To calculate the GPM or soybean crush, we use a common denominator 
of US dollar per metric ton and use the following equation:  
 
  
 
Based on prices from the Chicago Board of Trade, the soybean crush 
spread for July 2016 is USD $28.15/MT. This means that for every met-
ric ton of soybean produced in Bolivia, agro-industry appropriates USD 
$28.15, given the soybean crush spread for July 2016. In the summer 
harvest of 2014-15, Bolivia produced 2,106,600 MT of soybeans. Assum-
ing a GPM of USD $28.15, agro-industry would appropriate USD 
$59,300,790 from the crush for that harvest alone. Table 6.2 denotes the 
net revenue gains (or losses) based on data from two periods. Several 
assumptions are made: first, the hypothetical is based on the ‘partida’ 
arrangement (25:75), costs of production are based on the average calcu-
lated in the last chapter (USD $463.62/ha), soybean prices are based on 
Bolivian prices in 2016 and the average during the boom years from 
2008 to 2014; yields are assumed at 2 tons/ha; and the GPM is based on 
CBOT data from July 2016. 
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Table 6.2 
Revenue distribution of the soy complex:  
Smallholders, producers and agro-industry 
Net revenue for soybean production, 2016 prices 
  Small-holder Producer Agro-
industry Partida contract 25% of net revenue 75% of net revenue 
Costs of Production ($USD/ha)  463.62   
Soybean Price  230   
Yield (ton/ha) 
 
2   
Gross Revenue/ha  460   
Total Net Revenue/ha  -3.62   
Net Revenue/ha 0 (-)3.62 X ha   
Net Revenue/ton 0 net loss 28.15 
	 	 	 	Net revenue for soybean production, average prices from boom years (2008-14)	
  Small-holder Producer Agro-
industry Partida contract 25% of net revenue 75% of net revenue 
Costs of Production ($USD/ha) 
 
463.62   
Soybean Price  338.88   
Yield (ton/ha)  2 
  
Gross Revenue/ha 
 
677.76   
Total Net Revenue/ha  214.14   
Net Revenue/ha 53.54 160.61   
Net Revenue/ton 26.7675 80.3025 28.15 
Source: Author’s own based on field notes 2014-15. 
 
As we can see, agro-industry maintains a consistent revenue based on 
the Gross Processing Margin rather than directly correlated with soybean 
prices alone. Producers, who are the capitalized farmers working the land 
of smallholders, take on most of the risk as they invest in agro-inputs to 
put land into production often through debt relations, and are thus sub-
ject to price and yield volatility and natural disasters. Smallholders forfeit 
the use of their land and may benefit minimally (as during the boom 
years from 2008 to 2014) or may receive nothing (as in 2016) but avoid 
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entering into debt. During boom years, producers did retain significant 
profits of approximately USD $160/ha when working the land of small-
holders in a ‘partida’ arrangement. When working their own land with 
access to all means of production (tractor, harvester, fumigator) and thus 
do not incur costs of operations (machinery rentals) producers retain 
profits upwards of $207/ha based on 2016 figures and $425/ha during 
the boom years. This is the ideal type of producer profile which all 
smallholders aspire and which pulls farmers into the soy complex. How-
ever, those who retain such profits represent between 5% and 20% of 
the total population of soybean producers. Most smallholders are in-
creasingly marginalized, forced to sell their labour power as income de-
rived from the ‘partida’ arrangement is uncertain, subject to volatile pric-
es, unpredictable climate conditions and inconsistent yields. Agro-
industry on the other hand, not only appropriates surplus value from the 
soybean crush, it also has transformed natural components of the agri-
cultural production process into industrial activities to be re-incorporated 
as agricultural inputs, appropriating value from these new agro-industrial 
inputs (Goodman et al., 1987).   
Capital penetration via industrial value-chain agriculture has managed 
to ‘create sectors of accumulation by re-structuring the inherited ‘pre-
industrial’ rural production process’ (Goodman et al. 1987, 8). As capital 
accumulation is restricted in agricultural production due to inherent nat-
ural plant cycles and processes, industrial capital seeks to appropriate any 
and all factors of production including seeds, organic inputs, labour, and 
land. This has been accomplished in Bolivia’s lowlands with GM seeds, 
agro-chemicals, agricultural machinery, and land markets. At the other 
end of the value-chain, agricultural crops are increasingly being substitut-
ed or ‘flexed’ as an industrial input – what Goodman et al have termed 
‘substitutionism’. This is even more evident today, as crops can be used 
in multiple ways (food, animal feed, fuel, industrial material) and can be 
(or thought to be) ‘flexed’ according to market conditions (Borras et al 
2016). Soybeans, for example, can be used as animal feed, food and oils, 
biodiesel and as a petroleum replacement for manufacturing (Oliveira 
and Schneider 2014); sugarcane for refined sugar, ethanol, fertilizer, ani-
mal feed, bioelectricity (bagasse), and biopolymers (plastics) (McKay et al 
2016); corn for food, feed, and ethanol (Gillon, 2016); trees, used not 
only for timber and pulp, but for second-generation bio-energy, biomass, 
and carbon-credit markets (Kroger 2016); among a growing number of 
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other ‘flex’ crops (see Borras et al 2016). Through scientific and techno-
logical advancement, industrial value-chain agriculture appropriates and 
substitutes the natural inputs and outputs of farming to render it as ‘in-
dustrial’ as possible and open new frontiers for commodification and 
capital accumulation. 
‘Appropriationism’ and the technological packages complete with 
seeds, agro-chemicals, and application instructions has led to increases in 
both costs and quantity of inputs used in production. In 2004 for exam-
ple, Bolivia imported 198 tons of soybean seeds at an average cost of 
US$301/ton; in 2012, seed imports amounted to 9,862 tons, an increase 
of nearly 5000% with an average cost of US$738/ton (INE, 2012; 
AEMP, 2013). During the same period, soybean cultivation area in-
creased from 852,000 ha to 1,103,390 ha (29.5%). This exponential in-
crease of seed imports which vastly outpaces area expansion is largely 
due to the influx of GM soybean seeds after legalization in 2005. The 
increase reveals the dependency on seed imports over domestically pro-
duced seeds. In 2005, GM seeds from Argentina came to dominate the 
market, accounting for an average of 99.9% of Bolivia’s soybean imports 
from 2005 to 2014 (INIAF, 2005-2014). Although this has led to a pro-
liferation of agro-chemical and GM seed distributors, just four compa-
nies control 86% of Bolivia’s GM seed distribution market. 
Figure 6.3 
Soybean seed import market 2014 (99.8% from Argentina) 
 
 Source: Author’s elaboration based on data from INIAF (2014). 
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Figure 6.4 
Soybean production in Santa Cruz: Land area and yields, summer harvest 
 Source: ANAPO 2015 
 
Since GM soybean seeds are engineered to tolerate the herbicide 
glyphosate, it comes as no surprise that a positive correlation exists be-
tween the increase in both the use of GM soybean seeds and herbicides, 
not only in Bolivia but throughout Latin America (see Catacora-Vargas 
et al. 2012). The increased use of glyphosate combined with the adoption 
of a no-tillage seeding system has resulted in the ‘appearance of weeds 
resistant to glyphosate in GM soybean production…resulting in greater 
application of complementary herbicides’ (Catacora-Vargas et al. 2012, 
32). Almost all farmers interviewed in Cuatro Cañadas and San Julián 
acknowledged the presence of new pests and weeds since the introduc-
tion of GM seeds (field notes, 2014-15). Mr. Fehr, a Mennonite who 
came to the region in 1983 from Mexico to work the land, explains:  
 
Before the agro-chemicals were better, one chemical took care of every-
thing. Now the technological packages require one product for one pest, 
another for a different pest, another for a weed and so on. Almost every 
year we have a new type of weed or pest that must be dealt with. Costs 
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are increasing, but our yields are not. The only ones who keep benefiting 
are the agribusiness companies selling the chemicals’ (Fehr, personal 
communication, January 2015).  
 
In San Julián, Marcos Churquina Cabezas, the president APPAO who 
arrived to the region in 1982 from Potosi has a similar assessment of 
GM seeds and agrochemical use. ‘In the 1980s’, he said, ‘we worked with 
our own labour, no agro-chemicals, no heavy machinery. Now, there are 
more pests and bad weeds and you cannot harvest anything without 
agro-chemicals, everything has changed’ (Churquina Cabezas, personal 
communication, November 2014). Churquina Cabezas explained that 
many farmers transitioned to GM soybean production due to contamina-
tion caused by fumigator planes which affected neighbouring land, de-
stroying crops not resistant to glyphosate and other agro-chemicals.  
CAPPO’s founder, Roberto Churata, also shared his insights regard-
ing GM seeds and agro-chemical inputs for small farmers: 
Many farmers today cannot even name the agro-chemical they used last 
year, or what pests and weeds are affecting their crops. The separation of 
their relationship with the land has rendered them more individualistic and 
yield-focused. Of course, many do not know the science behind GM seeds 
and are not aware that agro-chemicals remain in the soil for many years af-
ter application. They are caught up in the vicious circle of dependence on 
technology, increasing costs, and more pests and weeds. But it is almost 
impossible for them to escape this technological trap since they are think-
ing on a day-to-day or harvest-to-harvest basis. Questions about sustaina-
bility and land for future generations come secondary and will be dealt 
with down the road (Churata, personal communication, January 2015). 
Churata, who in 2015 was a Senior Official for the mayor’s office in 
San Julián and also works as a private consultant in rural development, is 
one of the most important political figures representing the interests of 
small farmers in Santa Cruz. He remains an important advisor and affili-
ate of the region’s largest small farmer associations (APPAO and 
ACIPAC) with a deep understanding of the politics and socio-economic 
changes taking place regarding the soy complex. 
Another key informant who works as an agricultural engineer and 
agronomist for ANAPO in San Julián also said that pests and plant dis-
eases are increasing every year which require more and more agro-
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chemicals. This agronomist works with over 1000 farmers in the region, 
making daily visits to multiple farms each day. Working for ANAPO for 
nearly ten years, he has seen first-hand the changes taking place on the 
land as pests and weeds which never existed in the region are suddenly 
appearing. When asked about the future of smallholders given the cur-
rent trajectory, this informant’s perspective was regrettably grim. ‘Small 
farmers with less than 50 hectares and no or little machinery won’t sur-
vive in this region; they will eventually be bought out, go into debt and 
be forced to sell their land. It’s difficult to say, but I have seen this pro-
cess unfold over the past 7 years’ (anonymous, personal communication, 
January 2015). Similar stories and farmer testimonies could be men-
tioned, but data on agro-chemical imports is also quite telling.     
Figure 6.5 
Origin of agro-chemicals in Bolivia, 2009-2014 
 
Source: Author’s elaboration based on data from SENASAG (2014). 
 
According to Bolivia’s National Service for Agricultural Health and 
Food Safety (Servicio Nacional de Sanidad Agropecuaria e Inocuidad Alimen-
taria, SENASAG), from 2010 to 2014 the quantity of agro-chemicals reg-
istered in Bolivia increased from 12.6 million kg/l to 38.3 million kg/l in 
2014 – a 204% increase, while area under cultivation increased by just 
28% (SENASAG, 2014; ANAPO, 2013). Based on both quantitative and 
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qualitative data, it is clear that since the introduction of GM soybean 
seeds, agro-chemical consumption has increased at rates much higher 
than cultivation area increases. Further, Figure 2 shows the origin of the-
se agro-chemicals over the same time period, with China, Argentina, 
Brazil, and Paraguay accounting for 84% of Bolivia’s agro-chemical mar-
ket. 
The six companies that have a monopoly over Bolivia’s soybean pro-
cessing, silos and exports, controlling 95% of the market share are also 
among the top 50 largest revenue-earning companies in the country. 
However, their contribution to the country’s national tax revenue is 
much lower than their relative revenue ranking, as seen in Table 6.3. The 
agricultural sector as a whole only contributed 0.9% of the national do-
mestic tax revenue in 2013, meaning that not even the state appropriates 
much value from industrial value-chain agriculture. 
Table 6.3 
Agro-industry: Market share, revenue ranking and tax contribution 
Company Origin of Capital 
Principal export 
markets 
Percentage 
of market 
share 
Revenue 
Ranking 
2013 
Rank and 
contribution 
to total 
national tax 
revenue 
Gravetal 
Bolivia S.A. Venezuela 
Venezuela, Co-
lombia, Peru, 
Ecuador 
31% 16th 77th (0.1%) 
Industrias 
de Aceite 
S.A. (FINO) 
Peru Colombia, Peru, Chile 22% 9
th 38th (0.2%) 
ADM SAO 
S.A. USA 
Colombia, Peru, 
Chile, Ecuador 13% 11
th 41st (0.2%) 
Cargill   
Bolivia S.A. USA 
Colombia, Peru, 
Chile, Ecuador, 
Spain 
11% 48th Not ranked (n.r.) 
Industrias 
Oleaginosas 
S.A. (RICO) 
Bolivia 
Colombia, Peru, 
Chile 9% 28
th n.r. 
Granos 
S.R.L. Bolivia Peru 9% 34
th n.r. 
 
Source: Impuestos Nacionales 2014, Nueva Economía 2015 
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Just two of these six companies are owned and operated by Bolivian 
capital (Granos, 9%; Rico, 9%), and only two companies (Rico and 
FINO) produce value-added consumer products derived from soybeans. 
FINO, for example, takes advantage of the crops multiple and flexible 
uses, producing cooking oils (FINO), margarine butter (Regia and Pri-
mor), shortening (Karina and Gordito), and soaps and detergent (Uno, 
Azo, Oso). The majority (87%) of soybeans produced in Bolivia, howev-
er, are for export with the following make-up:  
Figure 6.6 
Soybean and derivative exports, % of total value (FOB, $USD), by type 
  
 
 Source: INE 2015 
 
 
While soybean flour and meal can be sold as consumer products 
mainly for animal feed, soybean oilcake is usually processed (toasted, re-
fined) further into meal. Crude soybean oil is also refined and sold as 
vegetable oil, biodiesel, or in a variety of consumer products from mar-
garine, paints, to soap, etc. This kind of semi-processing is the result of 
the soybean crush and is fully controlled by a market oligopoly, lacking 
sectoral linkages and value-added processing.  
Furthermore, heavy machinery – tractors, fumigators, and harvesters 
– which have replaced manual labour and changed the entire production 
process with substantial productivity increases are also imported, princi-
pally from Brazil (61%), United States (10%) and Argentina (9%) (INE 
2016b).  
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The development of industrial agriculture through value-chain rela-
tions opens up new frontiers for capital to circulate and accumulate. But 
what we see in Bolivia is the importation of agro-inputs (seeds, agro-
chemicals, machinery) and the exportation of raw or semi-processed 
agro-‘outputs’ (soybeans and derivatives). With both ends of this value-
chain largely controlled by foreign capital, the soybean complex in Boliv-
ia essentially extracts ecological value from its fertile lands, while the val-
ue-added activity (surplus value generated) is appropriated elsewhere. 
Due to its highly mechanized character, the need for labour is also di-
minished, resulting in processes of ‘productive exclusion’ (McKay and 
Colque, 2016). The extractivist nature of this type of agro-industrial de-
velopment – referred to here as ‘agrarian extractivism’ – parallels the 
non-renewable resource extractive economy (minerals, natural gas) which 
has characterized Bolivia for the past 500 years. Similarities can be drawn 
concerning the extractive character of Bolivia’s soy complex and the so-
cial, economic, and environmental impacts. These extractive dynamics 
will be discussed in the next chapter.  
6.3 Control grabbing and the spatio-temporal fix 
Going back to the definition of land grabbing proposed by Borras et al. 
(2012), their three key interlinked features include the power to control 
land and its productive resources; large in scale, in terms of capital or 
area involved; and as a response to the current crises and the emergence 
of new hubs of global capital accumulation. Urioste (2012), among oth-
ers, have shown that vast swaths of land that have come under the own-
ership of Brazilian agro-capitalist predominantly throughout the past 25 
years. The attempt here is to demonstrate how a new phase of control 
grabbing has developed via value-chain agriculture. The particular social 
relations of production this entails have enabled agro-industrial capital to 
control land and its productive resources without necessarily having ten-
ure rights to the land due capital-intensive access mechanisms facilitated 
by the appropriation and commodification of the means of production 
and value-chain relations of debt and dependency. 
In essence, value-chain agriculture has created a ‘spatio-temporal fix’ 
whereby surplus capital is able to circulate and accumulate, appropriating 
surplus value and later exported as a raw material for further value-added 
processing elsewhere. Harvey (2003, 115) explains the ‘spatio-temporal 
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fix’ as ‘a particular kind of solution to capitalist crises through temporal 
deferral and geographical expansion’. The ‘spatio-temporal’ fix requires:  
the production of space, the organization of wholly new territorial divi-
sions of labour, the opening up of new and cheaper resource complexes, 
of new regions as dynamic spaces of capital accumulation, and the pene-
tration of pre-existing social formations of capitalist social relations and in-
stitutional arrangement…(which)…provide important ways to absorb cap-
ital and labour surpluses (Harvey 2003, 116).  
As agro-industrial soybean production developed much earlier in 
neighbouring Argentina and Brazil – both growing hubs of global (agro)-
capital – Bolivia offered both a strategic and convenient space to absorb 
capital surpluses. In the 1990s for example, when many Brazilians pur-
chased land in Bolivia, the Brazilian land market was becoming saturated, 
expensive, and newer technologies were still developing to expand into 
the Cerrado region (Marques Gimenez 2010, Urioste 2012; field notes 
2014-15). This phase of investment was thus prompted by the opening 
up of Bolivia’s land markets in Santa Cruz, offering new and cheaper 
spaces for capital absorption. Medium and large scale Brazilian farmers 
such as Iglenio Klaus and Claudio Batista Vega mentioned in Chapter 4 
were among those who were looking for new greenfield sites for expan-
sion as land markets in the south of Brazil were inflated and saturated. 
While the re-settlement programmes in the 1980s were engineered to 
provide a ‘fix’ for labour surpluses after neoliberal policies and the tin 
price crisis generated widespread employment among the miners, the 
opening up of the fertile lowlands of Santa Cruz in the 1990s absorbed 
surplus agro-capital, particularly from Brazil and Argentina.   
With land markets in Santa Cruz at a point of near saturation and un-
certainty, capital has penetrated once again via value-chain technologies, 
‘appropriationism’ and debt relations. Capital has managed to penetrate 
peasant farming, transforming peasants into small-scale capitalist pro-
ducers, semi-proletarians, petty-bourgeois rentiers, and landless labour-
ers. This has and is drastically changing the social relations of produc-
tion, power, and property in this region. As Harvey (2003, 116) states, 
‘such geographical expansions, reorganizations, and reconstructions of-
ten threaten, however, the values already fixed in place (embedded in the 
land) but not yet realized’. Instead of producing crops for household and 
local consumption, producers now purchase increasingly expensive, ex-
ternal agro-inputs controlled and produced by foreign capital and after 
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adding labour and ecological value, sell this product to a market oligopo-
ly controlled by foreign capital for export. As a spatio-temporal fix for 
industrial agro-capital, value-chain agriculture ‘encompasses smallholder 
farms as ‘resource complexes’ to absorb and create capital’ (McMichael 
2013, 674). Since Bolivia does not have the capacity to absorb the sur-
plus value created, it is used as a space to temporarily absorb capital and 
add (mainly) ecological value, while China – which imports almost two-
thirds of the global soy trade – absorbs (indirectly) the surplus value cre-
ated on a global scale. This is the temporal aspect of the spatio-temporal 
fix. Very little of the value-added components of the soy complex are 
absorbed in Bolivia; capital temporarily penetrates the countryside, circu-
lates through the soil and is exported in its commodity form as a soybean 
to external markets where it is further processed and fed into the global 
grain-feed-meat complex. Taking a broader perspective on value appro-
priation, we can observe that China largely benefits from both ends of 
industrial value-chain agriculture for soybean production. First, as a pro-
ducer of agro-chemicals – a processed, value-added product exported 
around the world and second as the world’s largest importer and proces-
sor of soybeans primarily to feed a growing grain-feed-meat complex. In 
order to appropriate more value-added economic activity domestically, 
China adopted an import strategy through a differential import tax struc-
ture in 1998 which encourages whole soybean imports (3% import tariff) 
over soy meal (5%) and oil (9%) (Lee et al., 2016).  
The value-added of components upstream and downstream of the 
soy complex are thus absorbed elsewhere, rendering Bolivia’s soy com-
plex a consumer (importer) of manufactured goods and a producer (ex-
porter) of raw materials. Yet, soybean production continues to be pro-
moted as a driver of the Productive Revolution and a key component of 
the Plan for Economic and Social Development 2010-2016 (PDES) 
which seeks to overcome the model of raw material exports to a produc-
tive economy based on the industrialization of the country’s natural re-
sources (PDES 2015). The soybean sector is part of the National Devel-
opment Plan’s ‘productive pillar’ which is to generate value-added 
economic activity, employment and rural development (PDES 2015). 
The state continues to rely on ANAPO and IBCE for its access to in-
formation regarding the soy complex, resulting in a clear agro-industrial 
bias which distorts reality. IBCE, for example, claims that the sector 
generates more than 100,000 jobs, but as argued in Chapter 5 this is ex-
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tremely misleading (IBCE 2014). Further, ANAPO and IBCE’s expert 
agricultural economist, Hernán Zeballos Hurtado, claims that due to the 
adoption of GM seeds production costs have decreased, less agro-
chemicals are required, small farmers have adopted new technologies and 
the majority of soybean producers (77%) are small farmers (ANAPO 
2014). While this dissertation refutes many of these claims, Zeballos 
Hurtado is perceived as the expert and his secondary data analysis and 
conclusions remain highly influential for policy makers. Furthermore, the 
industry and the government alike promote soybean production as a way 
to achieve food sovereignty (PESD 2015; ANAPO 2014), though it is 
clear that this is little more than a legitimating discourse (see McKay, 
Nehring, and Walsh-Dilley 2014).  
As part of the country’s goal to guarantee ‘food sovereignty’, re-
strictions on soybean exports were put in to effect in 2007 (Decree 
29272) with the idea of guaranteeing the domestic food supply before 
prioritizing export markets and creating more value-added goods domes-
tically. While this policy may have had the best intentions, it has only 
worked to favour the oligopoly controlling processing and export mar-
kets while restricting small farmer cooperatives and associations from 
directly accessing export markets. Further, the Bolivian economy barely 
consumes any soybean products – mainly just cooking oil – as the cash 
crop itself has led to massive deforestation, replaced traditional crops for 
domestic consumption which could have served as a pathway towards 
food sovereignty, and has excluded the rural majority (McKay, Nehring, 
and Walsh-Dilley 2014; McKay and Colque 2016). With export regula-
tions on raw soybeans slowly being lifted, the ‘food sovereign-
ty’/industrialization policy has only worked to increase market concen-
tration, far removed from a pathway towards food sovereignty as the 
development and expansion of the soy complex has rendered Bolivia 
increasingly more dependent on food imports. From 2010 to 2014, the 
cost of food imports nearly doubled from USD $357.4 million to USD 
$689.1 million, while the import volume increase 62.1% (IBCE 2016; 
Quispe 2015). Though Bolivia is a net food exporter, this is mainly due 
to exports of soybeans and derivatives, as the country remains dependent 
on imports for key staples such as wheat flour, rice, animal products, 
fish, grain mill products, starches, sugar, and general ‘food products for 
household consumption’ (GCE 122) (INE 2016b). Fluctuating curren-
cies in Argentina and Brazil have also undercut the stable boliviano, ena-
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bling cheaper goods to flood Bolivia’s market at the expense of domestic 
producers. Nonetheless, in a recent study on prices of food baskets 
around the world, Bolivia had the second most expensive with a cost of 
63% of the national average wage (Pagina Siete, 2016). Table 6.4 shows 
land use change over time, exemplifying the agro-industrial bias which 
has generated increased dependency on food imports for domestic con-
sumption, rendering producers and consumers more dependent on vola-
tile agro-commodity prices and subject to the corporate controlled global 
food system, effectively eroding progress towards food sovereignty. 
Table 6.4 
Land area under cultivation, per crop type 
 
1 Cereals include rice, barley grain, quinoa 
2 Fruit include banana, peach, mandarin, orange, pineapple, plantain, and grape 
3 Vegetables include garlic, peas, onion, beans, corn, and tomato 
4 Roots, tubers and fodder include potato, yucca, alfalfa, barley and cabbage 
5 Industrial crops include cotton, sugarcane, sunflower, peanut, sesame, soya, maize, 
sorghum, and wheat 
*Maize, sorghum and wheat are included as industrial crops since they are cultivated in 
rotation with soybeans with similar relations and forms of production. 
Source: Elaborated by author from INE 2016. 
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The MAS government, in effect, is pursuing a rural development 
model based on the integration (or exclusion) of small farmers into in-
dustrial value chain agriculture, continuing ‘industrial’ crop production 
for export. The use of the term ‘industrial’ for these crops should be un-
derstood in the context of appropriationism and substitutionism, rather 
than a form of industrialization characterized by social and sectoral artic-
ulation which generates employment through value-added, forward and 
backward economic linkages and a home market in agriculture. Industrial 
crop production is similar to the notion of ‘extractive industries’ which 
extract raw materials in large quantities, destined for export with little 
processing. As Gudynas (2013) points out, governments and corpora-
tions adopt the term industry or industrial as a legitimating strategy for 
extractivist development models. However, similar to Bolivia’s other ex-
tractive ‘industries’ such as mining and hydrocarbons, soybeans are pro-
cessed into final consumer goods abroad, either as animal feed, biodiesel, 
vegetable oil and as an input into a variety of other consumer products. 
Industrial crop production in Bolivia is therefore ‘industrial’ because it 
contributes to the industrialization in other countries who appropriate 
the surplus value and land rents generated in Bolivia.  
6.4 Conclusion 
This chapter has attempted to disaggregate Bolivia’s value-chain agricul-
ture and demonstrate how a new phase of control grabbing has emerged 
via the penetration of agro-capital, particularly from Brazil, China and 
Argentina. This type of control grabbing does not necessarily entail hav-
ing tenure rights to the land, but rather having control over the land-
based resources via a value relation characterized by debt and dependen-
cy. This can be conceptualized as a ‘spatio-temporal fix’, first by the land 
market saturation in the south of Brazil which brought many Brazilian 
agro-capitalist to Bolivia’s lowlands, and second by the commodities 
boom in the 2000s and the subsequent crises (food prices, financial, cli-
mate) which triggered more global investment in land and natural re-
sources. The temporal aspect of the fix is due to the lack of value appro-
priation and absorption within Bolivia as imported value-added 
commodities (GM seeds, agro-chemicals, machinery) circulate through 
Bolivian soil controlled a market oligopoly and is then exported in its 
semi-processed commodity form as soybeans and derivatives.  
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The introduction of GM soybean seeds facilitated a new phase of 
capital penetration into Bolivian agriculture as ‘appropriationism’ and 
value-chain relations have significantly transformed the social relations 
of production, reproduction, property and power. ‘Capital overflow’ 
from Argentina and Brazil, two of the regions most advanced agro-
industrial hubs and largest economies continue, in different ways, to 
penetrate new spaces for capital accumulation in Bolivia. China, the 
world’s largest manufacturer, has also penetrated via the new dependen-
cy on increasing use of agro-chemicals.  
The scale at which these relations of debt and dependency have de-
veloped is very significant, as an estimated 86% of small farmers, who 
represent 78% of total soy-producing farm units, do not have access to 
machinery necessary for sowing and harvesting (Suárez, Camburn, and 
Crespo 2010, 83). Using this framework, this chapter concludes that con-
trol grabbing continues in Bolivia – primarily through new mechanisms 
of resource control by means of industrial value-chain agriculture rela-
tions – appropriating and concentrating value in the hands of transna-
tional corporations. While dominant discourses maintain that this model 
of rural development is generating employment, contributing to food 
security and food sovereignty, reducing costs of production, and benefit-
ting small-scale farmers, this chapter has argued otherwise. The current 
trajectory of agrarian change is threatening the ability of small scale 
farmers to work their lands, increasing the country’s dependency on 
food imports and thus volatile international markets, and leading to very 
extractive social, economic and environmental dynamics which are ana-
lyzed in the next chapter.   
Notes 
 
1 Parts of this chapter have been published in McKay (2015). 
2 From 490,000 hectares in 2000 to 942,000 hectares in 2014 (ANAPO 2015). 
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7 Agrarian Extractivism and the Politics of Control 
 
7.1 Introduction 
The last three chapters have analyzed i) the development of Bolivia’s 
agrarian structure in historical context, from revolution, dictatorships to 
democracy and reform; ii) the rise of Evo Morales and the MAS and the 
agrarian to Productive Revolution characterized by processes of produc-
tive exclusion and functional dualism in the countryside and iii) the new 
forms of capital penetration and control via value-chain relations of debt 
and dependency. In this chapter, these new dynamics of agrarian change 
are analyzed in the context of the broader neo-extractivist model of de-
velopment pursued by the MAS government. It is argued here that to-
gether these dynamics represent a form of agrarian extractivism that is 
leading to social, economic, and environmental impoverishment for the 
majority of the Bolivian population. 
Bolivia’s soy complex has become part of the state’s three-pronged 
extractivist development model (minerals, hydrocarbons, soybeans). 
While Bolivia has a long history of mineral extraction, the agricultural 
sector’s highly-mechanized and capital-intensive character are relatively 
new developments. As has been discussed in the preceding chapters, the 
penetration of new forms of capital into agriculture in Bolivia’s lowlands 
is transforming the rural landscape, altering social relations of produc-
tion, property, and power, and threatening present and future land and 
resource access by the rural majority, principally smallholders and indig-
enous peoples. This type of agricultural expansion – what is referred to 
here as agrarian extractivism – is characterized by four interlinked di-
mensions: (1) large volumes of materials extracted destined for export 
with little or no processing; (2) value-chain concentration and sectoral 
disarticulation (3) high intensity of environmental degradation; and (4) 
deterioration of labour opportunities and/or labour conditions. This 
chapter argues that ‘agrarian extractivism’ is a politically and analytically 
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useful concept for understanding these new dynamics and trajectories of 
agrarian change as it reveals the very extractive character of capitalist ag-
riculture, particularly in the context of contemporary land grabbing, flex 
crops, and the increasingly corporatized agro-food system. Agrarian ex-
tractivism is not used synonymously with all types of industrial capitalist 
agriculture, nor is it only in reference to soybean production. It charac-
terizes the very extractive dimensions of certain types of capitalist agri-
culture which have developed unevenly around the world. Contrary to 
forms of industrial agricultural development which may lead to value-
added processing, sectoral linkages, and employment generation, agrarian 
extractivism is used conceptually to identify the extractive character of 
certain types of industrial capitalist agriculture. It therefore seeks to chal-
lenge legitimating claims used by state and corporate actors that industri-
al capitalist agriculture fosters economic growth, generates employment 
and contributes to food security.  
As part of the state’s new extractivist development model, ‘agrarian 
extractivism’ in Bolivia has developed alongside a newly formed state-
capital alliance as a strategy to consolidate state power in Santa Cruz, re-
sulting in increased tensions among influential social movements and 
partially eroding the particular symbiotic state-society relations which 
brought Evo Morales and the MAS to power in 2006. Situated within the 
broader context of Bolivia’s neo-extractivist development model, agrari-
an extractivism is used to counter the dominant discourse and miscon-
ceptions associated with ‘industrial’ agriculture. This is understood and 
analyzed through the lens of the politics of control and the state-society-
capital nexus, revealing the various mechanisms of control discussed in 
previous chapters and their underlying dimensions of power.   
This chapter is organized as follows: the next section provides a con-
ceptual distinction among the conventional ‘extractivist’ discourse, the 
new or ‘neo’-extractivism in Latin America and the more recent emer-
gence of agro-, agricultural, and agrarian extractivism. The third section 
analyzes Bolivia’s soy complex with regards to four interlinked dimen-
sions of agrarian extractivism, revealing the economic, social and envi-
ronmental extractivist dynamics which characterize soybean production 
in the eastern lowlands of Santa Cruz. The fourth section analyzes agrar-
ian extractivism within the politics of control framework, revealing the 
various mechanisms of access and the associated dimensions of power 
discussed in Chapter 2. Understanding the role of the state and the state-
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society-capital nexus is also examined as part of the politics of control 
framework. The final section concludes the chapter with a discussion on 
the need to expand the notion of ‘new extractivism’ by not only delving 
into the extractive dynamics of particular extractive sectors, particularly 
agrarian extractivism, but also to engage deeper into our understanding 
of the changing state-society-capital relations in the context of the ‘new 
extractivism’.  
7.2 Extractivism, neo-extractivism and agrarian 
extractivism 
7.2.1 Extractivism 
By means of both colonial coercion and post-colonial ‘consent’ via polit-
ical-economic institutional arrangements, ‘extractivism’ has broadly char-
acterized the relationship between the industrialized ‘North’ and devel-
oping ‘South’ – that is, the exploitation, control and export of raw 
materials from the latter to fuel the industrial development of the for-
mer. Natural resource extraction has generally come to plague the indus-
trial development of raw material export economies by means of eco-
nomic distortions such as the ‘Dutch disease’ and the Natural Resource 
Curse (Paradox of Plenty). Indeed, extractivism has been central to ‘Latin 
American theories of development and underdevelopment’ from import-
substitution industrialization (ISI) to export-oriented development strat-
egies (see Kay 1989). 
The term ‘extractivism’ is by no means a new or novel concept. Ex-
tractivism broadly refers to ‘those activities which remove large quanti-
ties of natural resources that are not processed (or processed only to a 
limited degree), especially for export’ (Acosta 2013, 62). To be more pre-
cise, Gudynas classifies extractivism or extractivismo based on three di-
mensions: (1) high volumes of resources extracted; (2) high intensity of 
environmental impacts; and (3) resources destined for export with little 
or no processing (Gudynas 2013). Rather than measuring extractivism by 
the weight of the raw material (in tons, bushels, cubic meters or barrels), 
Gudynas argues for accounting methods which include material and en-
ergy flow analysis such as Material inputs per unit of service (MIPS) and 
the ecological rucksack (see Schmidt-Bleek 1999). This definition distin-
guishes extractivism from other forms of natural resource appropriation 
by its high intensity of environmental impacts – toxification, contamina-
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tion, pollution, soil degradation, deforestation, etc. Finally, extractivism 
includes only those resources which are exported as a raw material or 
partially processed (Gudynas 2013). As such, extractivism is not synon-
ymous with mining or agricultural production, but has distinct character-
istics in terms of quantity, intensity, processing and destination. Fur-
thermore, Acosta’s notion of extractivism as a ‘mode of accumulation’ 
entails ‘the deep structural logic of production, distribution, exchange, 
and accumulation’ (Chase-Dunn and Hall 2000, 86) and is therefore not 
simply a technical system of processing nature through labour, as sug-
gested by Garcia Linera (2013). Similarly, Gudynas (2015, 189), building 
off Bunker’s (1985) notion of ‘modes of extraction’, introduces the con-
cept of ‘modes of appropriation’ which describes the different ways of 
organizing the appropriation of distinct natural resources in specific so-
cial and environment contexts. Garcia Linera conceptualizes extractivism 
‘as the activity that simply extracts raw materials (renewables or non-
renewables)’ and therefore does not distinguish between the small-scale 
pluri-activity of indigenous populations living in protected areas known 
as Extractivist Reserves (Reserva Extrativista, ResEx) in Brazil (see 
Fearnside 1989) with open-pit mining in Potosi or monocrop soybean 
production in Santa Cruz. 
In the current phase of global capitalism guided by neoliberal eco-
nomic principles of deregulation, trade liberalization, and privatization, 
multinational corporations have come to monopolize extractive indus-
tries worldwide – whether mineral, hydrocarbon, or agrarian extractivism 
– continuing a ‘mode of accumulation and appropriation’ that resembles 
that of the colonial era. During 1980s and 1990s, extractivism in Latin 
America was characterized by a limited role of the state, the liberalization 
of capital flows and flexible labour, environmental and territorial regula-
tions (Gudynas 2010a, 3). Whether foreign or domestic capital, invest-
ment in extractive sectors has rarely been effective at building forward 
and backward linkages for productive integration with other complemen-
tary sectors. As Acosta (2013, 67) puts it, ‘an additional classical charac-
teristic of these primary production exporting economies … is that they 
are enclaves: the oil sector or the mining sector, as well as many export-
oriented farming, forestry or fishing activities, are usually isolated from 
the rest of the economy’. This is largely due to the fact that transnational 
corporations have come to dominate extractivist projects, bringing much 
needed capital investment and technology to capital-poor but resource-
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rich areas with little interest in building linkages with other sectors of the 
domestic economy since the extractivist mode of accumulation and ap-
propriation is fueled by external markets in the ‘North’ and emerging 
economies such as China and India. Extractivism is characterized by so-
cial and sectoral disarticulation from the rest of the economy, meaning 
that the capacity to consume is developed externally (demand for ex-
ports) and thus not dependent on a robust internal market or domestic 
demand (de Janvry 1981, 34). 
But after decades of resource and labour exploitation and continued 
impoverishment, social movements and a political left swept through 
Latin America during the past fifteen years promising redistributive re-
forms and a break with the logic of the neoliberal Washington Consen-
sus. With an increased role of the state and variegated degrees of chal-
lenging neoliberal policies, a new type of extractivist project has emerged 
labeled as new or ‘neo’-extractivism.  
7.2.2 New or ‘neo’ extractivism 
The new extractivism refers to the increased role of the state in extrac-
tive sectors through the nationalization of key industries, public-private 
partnerships and increased collection of royalties and taxes in order to 
fund social programmes and ‘ensure a more equitable sharing of the re-
source wealth’ (Veltmeyer 2013; Gudynas 2013). With a particularly Lat-
in American focus, new extractivism has sparked interests among many 
scholars as to whether or not it represents a break with conventional ‘ex-
tractivist’ projects, altering exploitative relations of production, or main-
tains a similar productive and exploitative logic while funnelling re-
sources to the poor in a residual way in order to maintain legitimacy 
(Acosta 2013; Bebbington 2009; Bebbington and Humphreys 
Bebbington 2011; Gudynas 2009; 2013; 2015; Seoane, Taddei, and 
Algranati 2013; Svampa 2013; Veltmeyer 2013; Veltmeyer and Petras 
2014; Arsel et al. 2014; Arsel 2012). Rather than the continued depend-
ence on the export of raw materials by transnational corporations, the 
increased role of the state in extractive sectors was, and continues to be, 
promoted by progressive-left governments in Latin America as a means 
to reclaim sovereignty over the country’s resources, redistribute the rents 
in the form of social policies and initiate a process of value-added indus-
trialization. 
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Of course, the Latin American ‘Left’ is not a homogeneous entity and 
these ‘new’ extractivist dynamics play out differently in their own specific 
contexts, as can be said with conventional extractivist projects. However, 
the consensus among leading researchers and scholars mentioned above 
is that the ‘new extractivism’ has not only continued resource extraction 
under a similar productive and exploitative logic as their predecessors, 
but is characterized by increased expansion into new frontiers and green-
field sites justified with popular discourses of social welfare. As Eduardo 
Gudynas, credited with coining the term ‘neo-extractivism’ points out, 
‘this (the promotion of new extractive sectors) is the case with mining in 
Correa’s administration in Ecuador, the support of new iron and lithium 
mining in Bolivia, the strong state advocacy in promoting the growth of 
mining in Brazil and Argentina, and, at the same time, the Uruguayan 
Left participates in prospecting for oil off its coast’ (Gudynas 2010a, 2). 
For Gudynas, the new extractivism has become, in large part, a compo-
nent of the new Latin American left project based on a similar logic of 
accumulation and modernization as the neoliberal and neoclassical ap-
proaches, whereby ‘(the state) end(s) up reproducing the same produc-
tive processes, similar relations of power, and the same social and envi-
ronmental impacts’ (Gudynas 2010a, 12).  
This is a similar reading to that of Bebbington and Humphreys-
Bebbington (2011, 141–142) who find that the underlying logics and so-
cio-environmental consequences of extractivist projects in neoliberal 
states such as Peru and so-called ‘post’-neoliberal states such as Bolivia 
and Ecuador ‘seem very similar regardless of the political project or ideo-
logical model’. While in Bolivia and Ecuador, the Constitution has been 
rewritten to grant different forms of autonomy, territory and benefits 
from the extraction of resources to indigenous peoples, Bebbington and 
Humphreys-Bebbington (2011, 140) observe that ‘Peru, Ecuador and 
Bolivia also share a growing intolerance of resistance to this policy and 
each have greeted this intolerance with increasingly harsh rhetoric, crim-
inalisation of protest (or at least threats to this effect), and a tendency on 
the part of their executive branches to emit proposals for legislative re-
form that reduce the scope for the exercise of citizen voice during the 
project cycle of extractive investment.’  
Extractivism has become so central to development policy across the 
Latin American region that it overrides adverse socio-economic and en-
vironmental concerns, seemingly enjoying a high degree of teleological 
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primacy, or what Arsel et al. (2016) describe as the ‘extractive impera-
tive’. The ‘extractive imperative’ goes beyond a set of state policies which 
facilitate extraction for development to extraction becoming a necessary 
precondition or even synonymous with development.  Arsel et al. (2016, 
881) ground their definition of the ‘extractive imperative’ on three ideo-
logical positions: 
[T]hat intensified extraction is indispensable to advance through a (implic-
itly Rostowian) process of structural economic transformation; that such a 
transition away from primary commodity exports to higher value added 
(and putatively more sustainable) goods and services (biotechnology rather 
than timber, electric cars rather than lithium ore, etc.) needs to be orches-
trated and, to a large extent, executed by the state; and that poverty and in-
equality need to be addressed urgently throughout this transition and not 
put aside as the ultimate goal of development. 
Extraction, then, becomes imperative for ‘development’ (understood 
as advancing through Rostow’s stages of economic growth model) when 
properly and partially controlled by the (developmental) state in order to 
industrialize and retain value-added surpluses, while simultaneously 
channelling extractive rents to combat poverty and inequality. This is the 
logic underlying the new extractivism in Latin America and the rational 
of Latin America’s progressive left governments for pursuing an extrac-
tivist development model in the interest of the nation. However, as Arsel 
et al. (2016, 885) point out, this imperative ‘assumes that a singular, co-
herent interest of the nation exists’ and that the state apparatus is ‘a We-
berian ideal type state that is decisively dominated and operated by effi-
cient bureaucratic machinery’. On both counts, it is evident that this is 
not the case. The extractive imperative has come to serve the interests of 
the political and economic elites at the cost of severely adverse socio-
economic and environmental implications for the majority. Despite dis-
courses of industrialization, the Bolivian state has failed to facilitate in-
dustrial value-added linkages and, although cash transfer programmes 
have led to a decrease in poverty, the lack of structural change concern-
ing productive relations renders marginalized populations vulnerable to 
shocks such as commodity price volatility, the discontinuity of cash 
transfers, and the uneven distribution of the socio-economic and envi-
ronmental costs generated by expanding extractive frontiers.  
Processed on: 6-4-2017
509436-L-bw-McKay
192 CHAPTER 7 
 
7.2.3 The new ‘extractivism’ in Bolivia 
The extractive imperative has become increasingly evident in Bolivia 
where legislative reform under Supreme Decree 2366 of May 20 2015 
allows hydrocarbon exploration within protected areas, opening up 22 
protected areas and roughly 24 million hectares of land for hydrocarbon 
extraction (Campanini 2015). Table 7.1 shows the extent of the expand-
ing extractivist frontier for hydrocarbon exploitation, which already 
compromises 11 out of the country’s 22 total national protected areas. In 
terms of land area, 17% of land under the National Protected Area Sys-
tem (Sistema Nacional de Áreas Protegidas, SNAP) are now extractivist 
zones (Campanini 2015). 
Table 7.1 
Expanding the extractivist frontier: protected areas  
and petroleum contracts 
Protected 
Area 
Total area of 
Protected  
Areas (hec-
tares) 
Area under     
exploration/  
exploitation 
Company with contact 
Iñao 263,161 90.8% Total – Gazprom 
Tariquia 247,435.12 55% Petrobras Bolivia; BG Bolivia 
Aguarague 108,348 72.5% 
YPFB Chaco; Petroandina 
SAM; Eastern Petroleum and 
Gas 
TIPNIS 1,225,347 35% Petroandina SAM; Petrobras Bolivia 
Pilon Lajas 398,451 85.5% Petrobras Bolivia, Repsol 
Madidi 1,871,060 75.5% Petrobras Bolivia; Repsol; Petroandina SAM 
Tunari 326,366 2.03% Petroandina SAM 
Apolobamba 471,383 1% Petroandina SAM 
Carrasco 686,979.9 6.87% Petroandina SAM; YPFB Cha-co 
Manuripi 747,215 31.16% YPFB 
Amboro 598,608.3 20% YPFB Andina 
Source: Data from YPFB and SERNAP compiled by (Campanini 2015) 
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Extractivism in Bolivia is indeed part of a broader development plan 
for industrialization, as stated by Vice President Garcia Linera during an 
event held by the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) on 
its Human Development Report for Latin America and the Caribbean, 
declaring that Bolivia will continue to use ‘extractivismo’ for decades to 
come (Corz 2016). 
For Bolivia’s Vice President, the new extractivism is ‘the only tech-
nical means [we have] to distribute the material wealth…and to allow us 
to have the material, technical and cognitive conditions to transform its 
technical and productive base’ (Garcia Linera 2012, 34). Bolivia’s extrac-
tivist project ‘is not a goal in itself, but can be the starting point for over-
coming extractivism itself’ (2012, 33). Garcia Linera asserts that in Boliv-
ia, the point of extractivism is to meet the needs of the population, to 
create wealth with equitable distribution and build upon it a new non-
extractive material base to preserve and expand the benefits of the work-
ing population (2012).  
Since 2006, the Bolivian state has increased its share of the domestic 
economy from 15% to 38% and now controls some 43 companies in 
strategic sectors such as hydrocarbons, telecommunications, electricity, 
mining, aeronautics, cement, among others (Lazcano 2013; Varela 
Mendoza 2014). Most notably was the nationalization of hydrocarbons 
sector and several adjustments to the mining sector, including the na-
tionalization of the Huanuni mine and favourable policies for mining 
cooperatives. In 2014, state mining companies represented just 8.7% of 
the total production value, while private mining companies and coopera-
tives represented 47.4% and 43.9% respectively (Fundación Jubileo 
2016). The nationalization of the hydrocarbon sector re-established the 
country’s natural gas as property of the state with non-transferable con-
cessions, bought back shares from companies which had previously tak-
en over state enterprises during the ‘capitalization’ of the 1990s, and re-
negotiated price contracts. Of most significance, however was the 
Hydrocarbon Law (3058) passed in 2005 during the Carlos Mesa presi-
dency which increased taxes on hydrocarbon extraction and commercial-
ization from 18% to 50%. In 2014, extractivist rents from the Direct 
Hydrocarbon Tax (IDH) (17.5%), hydrocarbon royalties (9.8%), and 
mining royalties (1.3%) accounted for 28.6% of total state revenues from 
taxes and royalties (Villegas 2015). Tax and royalty increases coincided 
with a commodities boom and heightened demand which increased the 
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state’s budget some 445% – from USD $5.9 billion in 2005 to USD 
$32.1 billion in 2015 (MEFP 2015).1  Despite the increased fiscal capacity 
of the state, little progress has been made in the way of value-added in-
dustrialization as the country’s exports remain dependent on raw materi-
als. From 2006 to 2013, primary product exports, as a share of total ex-
ports, increased from 89.4% to 96% (ECLAC 2014). 
Bolivia’s Vice President conceptualizes extractivism ‘as the activity 
that simply extracts raw materials (renewables or non-renewables)’ and 
‘without introducing greater transformation in the work performed, then 
all societies in the world, capitalist or non-capitalist, are also to a greater 
or lesser degree extractivist’ (Garcia Linera 2012, 32). For Garcia Linera, 
the central debate rests upon the relations of production when pro-
cessing nature through labour, yet his analysis disregards extractivism as 
a mode of accumulation or appropriation as argued by Acosta (2013) and 
Gudynas (2015). Acosta and Gudynas of course recognize the literal 
meaning of the word extraction, but go beyond the semantics to an anal-
ysis of the relations and forms of natural resource extraction in Latin 
America. Garcia Linera, however, refutes critiques of Bolivia’s extractiv-
ist development model by first defending extractivism in the simple lit-
eral sense of ‘to pull or draw out’ resources which as a technical system 
of processing nature through labour has nothing to do with injustices, 
exploitation or inequality and ‘can be present in pre-capitalist, capitalist 
or communitarian societies’ (Garcia Linera 2012, 34). Second, Garcia 
Linera and the MAS government defend extractivism on the basis of the 
very need to ‘distribute the material wealth generated through extractiv-
ism…to have the material, technical and cognitive conditions to trans-
form its technical and productive base’ (Garcia Linera 2012, 34). Opposi-
tion to extractivism is labelled as a form of imperialism, or ‘green 
imperialism’, whereby ‘the governments of rich nations now use envi-
ronmental concerns to promote policies that deny underdeveloped na-
tions the right to control and manage their own resources’ (Fuentes 
2011). This was the strategy used regarding the infamous TIPNIS case 
whereby the government defended the construction of a highway 
through the national park by means of resource nationalism, claiming 
that rather than violating indigenous rights and threatening the environ-
ment, the highway would secure better access to markets, health services 
and spur development (Pellegrini 2016). The MAS government, led by 
one of its leading Marxist scholars Garcia Linera, has gone on the attack 
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to defend extractivism, claiming that ‘behind the recently constructed 
‘extractivist’ criticism of the revolutionary and progressive governments, 
then, lies the shadow of the conservative restoration’ (Garcia Linera 
2012, 34). In his analysis of the TIPNIS case, Garcia Linera claims that 
any opposition to the Brazilian-financed TIPNIS highway project, 
whether intentionally or unintentionally, is counter-revolutionary and 
defends the interests of the right who want to keep Bolivia and other 
developing countries from development and progress. Garcia Linera 
(2012, 1) writes: 
The tragic course of history so unfolds that the counterrevolution can 
come hand in hand with a faction of its own builders which, without nec-
essarily advocating it, may as a consequence of the exacerbation of its cor-
poratist, regional or sectoral particularism, and without taking into account 
the general configuration of overall social forces nationally and interna-
tionally, end up defending the interests of the conservative forces of the 
right and undermining their own revolutionary process. That is precisely 
what came to happen with the so-called ‘TIPNIS march’. 
Extractivism is therefore defended by the state as a form of resource 
nationalism and as a means to regain its sovereignty from external forces 
which have historically exploited the country’s natural resource wealth 
during the ‘old extractivism’ of colonial and neoliberal regimes. But as 
Arsel et al. (2014, 123) argue:  
Nationalization has not resulted in take-over of property rights and the 
displacement of foreign corporations by economic entities owned or oper-
ated by the state, nor even by individuals who are nationals of these coun-
tries. Instead, ‘nationalisation’ has left enough space for foreign corpora-
tions to enter into various forms of agreements – concessions, joint 
ventures, etc. – that are blessed by the state. 
What Garcia Linera and others such as Federico Fuentes (2011) who 
defend neo-extractivism neglect are the relations of access and control 
over the resources being extracted and processed through labour as a 
technical system. Indeed, as Garcia Linera asserts, it is not the technical 
form that is the problem, or extractivism per se when defined in a literal 
sense of drawing out resources. Yet he fails to analyze the political econ-
omy and ecology of extractivismo in Bolivia. By ignoring the very modes 
of accumulation and appropriation, Garcia Linera uses a very literal ap-
proach to extractivism and fails to acknowledge the underlying socio-
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economic and environmental implications of extractivism in Bolivia. 
This is why it is important to deepen our understanding of extractivism, 
to analyze its characteristics as a ‘mode of accumulation and appropria-
tion’, not simply as a technical system or form of production (Acosta 
2013; Guydnas 2015). 
7.2.4 Agrarian extractivism 
Agriculture is already being included as a form of extractivism in the new 
or ‘neo’ extractivist literature. Gudynas (2010a, 2) for example, has used 
the term agricultural extractivism to refer to agriculture oriented toward 
monoculture, the use of transgenics, machinery, chemical herbicides, 
with ‘little or no processing and exportation of the produce as a com-
modity’. Gudynas suggests that this is not an ‘industry’ and using the 
term industry implies some kind of industrialization or value-added – not 
primary production for export (Ibid.). For Gudynas, agricultural activity 
which is characterized by a high volume/intensity of extraction, semi-
processed and destined for export is considered extractivism, with par-
ticular reference to soybean plantations in Latin America (Gudynas 
2010a; 2010b; 2013). Giarracca and Teubal suggest the term ‘also applies 
to a certain type of agriculture in which essential resources such as water 
and fertile land, and biodiversity, are degraded by extractivism’ (2014, 
48). Petras and Veltmeyer use the term agro-extractivism in the context 
of the agrarian question of the twenty first century, arguing that what 
governments such as China and other international investors ‘primarily 
seek are lands to meet their security need for agrofood products and en-
ergy, while multinational corporations in the extractive sector of the 
global economy are primarily concerned to feed the lucrative biofuel 
market by producing oil palm, sugarcane (for ethanol) and soya’ or what 
we might refer to as ‘flex crops’ (2014, 64). Petras and Veltmeyer go on 
to say that ‘agricultural extractivism takes a number of forms, but in the 
current context that has dominated the debate – apart from the dynamics 
of land grabbing – has been what we might term the political economy 
of biofuels capitalism: the conversion of farmland and agriculture for 
food production into the production of biofuels’ (2016, 70). Maristella 
Svampa, includes agribusiness and biofuels production in her under-
standing of the new extractivism in Latin America, ‘due to the fact that 
they consolidate a model that tends to follow a monoculture, the de-
struction of biodiversity, a concentration of land ownership and a de-
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structive re-configuration of vast territories’ and driven by what she calls 
the Commodities Consensus (Svampa 2013, 118–119).2   
Agrarian extractivism has therefore been introduced under the um-
brella of neo-extractivism to refer broadly to large-scale, intensive mono-
crop production for export. But what is the ‘extractive’ character of 
agrarian extractivism? Are all types of large-scale chemical-intensive 
monocrop plantations extractive? Evidently, this type of agricultural 
production can take many forms in terms of land control and use, labour 
relations, surplus distribution, and the social relations of consumption, 
reproduction and accumulation (Bernstein 2010). Some large-scale plan-
tations may require a large labour force, may be cooperatively owned by 
the workers, re-invest the surplus in the domestic economy creating for-
ward and backward linkages, exploit dynamic inter-sectoral synergies and 
produce value-added consumer goods for the domestic market. Yet this 
type of large-scale industrial agriculture is distinct from that which is 
highly mechanized requiring minimal wage labour, export-oriented with 
little or no processing, corporate-controlled in a monopolized market 
and highly dependent on external chemical-based inputs. Agribusiness or 
agro-industry may not be inherently extractive as such, which is why it is 
important to specify the extractive nature of the process. Agrarian ex-
tractivism as conceptualized here builds off much of the aforementioned 
literature on extractivism particularly as a mode of accumulation (Acosta, 
2013) and appropriation (Gudynas, 2015) as well as the three dimensions 
put forth by Gudynas regarding scale (volume of material extracted), 
ecological impacts (intensity of extraction), and resource destination 
(semi-processed for export) (Gudynas, 2013). As a mode of accumula-
tion, agrarian extractivism also involves particular social relations of pro-
duction and reproduction in the current phase of capitalist agriculture in 
which the surplus value is extracted and labour opportunities and/or 
conditions deteriorate via new forms of value-chain control. Taken to-
gether with Gudynas’ dimensions of extractivism and inspired by the 
work of Alonso-Fradejas (2015)3, agrarian extractivism is defined here by 
the following four interlinked features: (1) large volumes of materials ex-
tracted destined for export with little or no processing; (2) value-chain 
concentration and sectoral disarticulation (3) high intensity of environ-
mental degradation; and (4) deterioration of labour opportunities and 
labour conditions in the area/sector. Many of these features have been 
discussed in the previous chapters, and therefore will not be discussed in 
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depth in this chapter. Nonetheless, an argument for ‘agrarian extractiv-
ism’ is put forward to characterize the soy complex in Bolivia and other 
agricultural sectors with these four interlinked features.  
The soy complex should be understood in the context of the broader 
extractivist-based economy in Bolivia, namely minerals and natural gas, 
and part of the state’s three-pronged extractivist model of development. 
But while mineral and natural gas extraction contribute significantly to 
state revenues, the largely foreign-controlled soy complex does not. The 
increasing role of the state in the Bolivian economy since 2006 has coin-
cided with a somewhat laissez-faire strategy in the agricultural sector. The 
expansion of the soy complex has also halted the agrarian reform, or 
Agrarian Revolution, which was an important part of Evo Morales’ polit-
ical agenda when he came to power in 2006. In the proceeding sections, 
Bolivia’s soy complex is analyzed in terms of the four interlinked features 
of agrarian extractivism. 
7.3 Agrarian extractivism in Bolivia 
7.3.1 Large volumes of materials extracted destined for export 
with little or no processing  
The first dimension of agrarian extractivism as defined here concerns the 
volume of raw materials extracted and destined for export with little or 
no processing. Volumes are considered large relative to other agricultur-
al-based exports and include the cumulative production of smaller-scale 
units. Processing is only significant if it generates value-added sectoral 
linkages and employment opportunities. As shown in Figure 7.1, soybean 
production area under cultivation has dramatically increased over the 
past ten years, with the volume extracted going from 836,700 metric tons 
(MT) in 2007 to 2,106,600 MT in 2014 while land area for the summer 
harvest more than doubled from 428,000 ha to 935,000 during the same 
period (ANAPO 2015).4 In 2013, 2,357,866 MT of soybeans and deriva-
tives were destined for export, representing 90% of total production 
(ANAPO 2015; IBCE 2015).  
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Figure 7.1 
Total area and production, soybeans, summer harvest 
 
Source: Data compiled by author from (ANAPO 2015) 
 
 
In Chapter 6, the importance of in-country processing was discussed. 
It is the value-added component of the production process which can 
trigger sectoral articulation as complementary sectors engage in industrial 
processing and manufacturing creating employment through inter-
sectoral linkages. When soybeans are semi-processed into oilcake and 
meal for export there is no sectoral articulation and little employment 
generation. The oilcake must be further processed to be converted into 
animal feed or consumer products. Relative to Bolivia’s agricultural pro-
ductive capacity, soybean production is significantly high, occupying by 
far the largest share of acreage under cultivation and generating more 
export revenues than any other crop. The high volume of soybeans pro-
duced, semi-processed and destined for export represent the first of four 
features of agrarian extractivism in Bolivia.  
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7.3.2 Value-chain concentration and sectoral disarticulation 
The second dimension of agrarian extractivism in Bolivia pertains to the 
concentration of value-chain control and the lack of sectoral articulation. 
The dynamics of control over each component of the value-chain were 
discussed in depth in Chapter 6. The majority of value-chain compo-
nents are not produced in Bolivia, meaning their associated surplus value 
is appropriated elsewhere. Surplus value is produced during the produc-
tion of these use values, which are imported to Bolivia in order to in-
crease labour productivity and ultimately extract more value from soy-
bean production. Bolivian soil and its natural fertility is a source of use 
value in the production process which, through the application of labour 
power and agro-industrial inputs, produce surplus value represented by 
the soybean, an agro-commodity exchanged on international markets. 
Agro-industrial inputs and mechanization have substantially decreased 
the socially-necessary labour time to produce soybeans, reducing the 
need for labourers and extracting more of nature’s use values through 
intensification, thus increasing the relative surplus value appropriated by 
agro-industrialists and capitalist producers. Moreover, the soil and its 
natural fertility vary across geographical areas, enabling those who con-
trol more favourable soils to appropriate more surplus profit (Marx 
1981). The soil’s natural fertility increases the productivity of labour and 
enables the appropriation of surplus profits either by the capitalist pro-
ducer or by those controlling the land in the form of ground rent (differ-
ential rent I) (Marx 1981). Furthermore, different capitals (seeds, agro-
chemicals, machinery) can also produce more value (at least temporarily, 
due to decreasing soil fertility) on equal amounts of land using the same 
amount of labour power. This is the appeal of technological innovation 
in agriculture, such as high yielding seed varieties, agro-chemical inputs 
and advanced mechanization. This is another form of surplus profit ex-
tracted from nature (as a use value) which may be appropriated as sur-
plus value by capitalist producers or as ground rent (differential rent II) 
by landowners (Fine and Saad Filho 2004). In other words, ground rent 
is the appropriation of surplus profits by landed property. In the context 
of Bolivia’s soy complex, the main source of value is appropriated 
through ground rent, though some labour is needed to extract the re-
source and bring it to the market in commodity form.  
The most central part of the production of soybeans, which is the ba-
sis for the entire complex, is land. Control over the land means control 
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over the element of production where the soybean (and surplus value) is 
produced. The soil and the worker, as Marx put it, are ‘the original 
sources of all wealth’ (Marx 1976, 638). Land serves as both the means 
of production, by providing nutrients for the soybeans to grow, and em-
bodies part of the production process within the soil itself (Harvey 
2006b, 334). Of course, other necessary inputs, including labour power, 
seeds and machinery are required, but land remains central. Yet, as dis-
cussed in Chapters 5 and 6, formal land ownership has become less and 
less important in appropriating the surplus value from the production 
process due to processes of ‘productive exclusion’ and value-chain con-
trol were discussed in detail in Chapters 5 and 6.  
Bolivia’s soy complex can thus be characterized by the importation of 
finished products (GM seeds, agro-chemicals, machinery), the circulation 
of this agro-capital through Bolivian soil controlled by a small minority 
of agro-capitalist, a concentration of control of the production process 
by a few companies, and the export of the semi-processed product. The 
extraction of the surplus value from the production process and appro-
priated by a few domestic and multinational companies (value-chain 
concentration) and the lack of forward and backward linkages in the 
domestic economy (sectoral disarticulation) represents a significant, and 
the second, dimension of agrarian extractivism in Bolivia.  
7.3.3 High intensity of environmental degradation  
The third dimension of agrarian extractivism in Bolivia concerns the in-
tensity of environmental degradation in the region. This feature has not 
yet been discussed and will therefore be examined in greater detail than 
the other features. The intensity of environmental degradation refers to 
unsustainable farming practices which have lasting effects most directly 
on the communities in close proximity to the production process, but 
also beyond. Highly-mechanized and genetically-modified (GM) soybean 
production is based on a myriad of unsustainable farming and land use 
practices associated with declining soil fertility and erosion, contamina-
tion of water sources, high rates of deforestation, and the loss of biodi-
versity which contribute to climatic changes such as increased flooding 
and drought (Hecht 2005; Pengue 2005; Müller et al. 2014). This is 
linked to the heavy use of synthetic fertilizers and agro-chemicals re-
quired to treat large-scale monocultures, the mechanization of produc-
tion, and the massive expansion of the agricultural frontier to serve ex-
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port markets principally for animal feed and biodiesel (Catacora-Vargas 
et al. 2012). This section focuses on the intensity of environmental deg-
radation faced by rural communities in Santa Cruz with first-hand ac-
counts from smallholders in Cuatro Cañadas and San Julián.  
Since the legalization of GM seeds, the quantity of agro-chemicals 
used in production has far outpaced the cultivation area. Soybean farm-
ers in the expansion zone attest to this, explaining that year after year 
new types of weeds and pests threaten their crops and require new types 
of herbicides and pesticides. Personal interviews with farmers in 2014 
and 2015 revealed that the majority of small-scale farmers with less than 
50 hectares average close to 2 MT/hectare of soybean harvest while 
those medium and large-scale farmers who possess machinery average 
closer 3 MT/hectare (field notes, personal interviews 2014; 2015).5 The 
lack of machinery, inability to purchase top quality seed and agro-
chemical packages, and land quality/location render capital-poor farmers 
less able to produce and compete, while suffering disproportionally both 
economically and socially from ecological degradation. 
Prominent community leader Paulino Sánchez of Nuevo Palmar came 
to Cuatro Cañadas from Potosi in 1983, receiving 50 hectares from the 
government. He says that one of the more challenging issues for farmers 
today is the depletion of the soil’s fertility. ‘The soil is losing its nutri-
ents’, he says, ‘there is compaction from machinery and people use a lot 
of chemicals, so yields are decreasing’ (Sánchez, personal interview, No-
vember 2014). Over the past ten years, yields have fluctuated between 
1.3 to 2.7 MT/ha which is difficult for farmers’ economic security since 
for each hectare, one ton of harvest roughly covers the cost of produc-
tion, he said. Those who can afford the best seeds and technologies, 
however, do not suffer the cost of this environmental degradation to the 
same extent, at least in the immediate term. Sánchez also explained that 
many people are worried about the risks of investing in production due 
to high costs and the frequent periods of drought and floods. Some peo-
ple have lost everything due to natural disasters and therefore do not 
want to risk their entire savings on a tractor or harvester with so much 
uncertainty. These natural disasters, particularly the effects of El Niño 
and La Niña, are increasingly affecting not only farmers and their har-
vests but entire communities. Since 1990, there have been a total of 25 
floods which have resulted in the death of 674 people and affected close 
to 3 million (EM-DAT 2016). While the expansion of Bolivia’s agricul-
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tural frontier and the resulting deforestation is certainly not the only 
cause of the increased frequency and severity of floods and drought, for-
ests and forest loss greatly influence regional and global climates as they 
not only play an important role as a carbon sink but also return water to 
the atmosphere via the extraction of soil water by tree roots referred to 
as ‘a transpiration service’ (Malhi et al. 2008). 
A United Nations (UN) study reveals that in the past 30 years, Bolivia 
has lost over six million hectares of forest and has one of the highest 
rates of deforestation per capita in the world (320 m²/person/year) – 20 
times higher than the global average (16m²/person/year) (UN-REDD, 
2010). Seventy-five percent of this deforestation activity is located in 
Santa Cruz, with an average deforestation rate of 200,000 hectares per 
year from 2000 to 2010 (Cuéllar et al. 2012).  
A study by Müller et al. (2013) found that from 1992 to 2004, 72.6% 
of the 1.88 million hectares of forests cleared in Bolivia’s lowlands was 
due to medium and large-scale mechanized agriculture (53.7%) and 
small-scale agriculture (18.9%) with cattle ranching causing the remaining 
27.4%. This period coincides with the initial expansion of the agricultural 
frontier when soybean cultivated areas increased from 164,920 hectares 
in 1992 to 602,000 hectares in 2004 (ANAPO 2015). In the late 1990s, 
for example, three Mennonite communities abandoned over 100,000 ha 
of soybean land due to soil erosion, compaction, and exhaustion as they 
moved north to clear new territory, selling their land to cattle ranchers 
(Fearnside 2001). However, during the period from 2005 to 2010, Müller 
and others (2014) found that the principle drivers of deforestation in the 
lowlands had reversed, with cattle ranching representing 59.7% and 
mechanized agriculture (24.6%) and small-scale agriculture (15.9%) rep-
resenting a combined 41.3%. As land prices increase and market condi-
tions make growing soybeans more profitable than cattle ranching, agro-
industry tends to push cattle ranchers to expand into new areas, trigger-
ing more deforestation and opening new areas for future soybean expan-
sion (Fearnside 2001; Hecht 2005; Weis 2013).  
Deforestation has not only led to a loss of biodiversity; it also affects 
the communities which depend on forests for their livelihoods, particu-
larly the indigenous territories of Guarayos, Lomerio, and Isoso which 
are located in and around the expanding agricultural frontier. A recent 
study by Vadillo et al (2013) concludes that agro-industrial expansion is 
one of the major threats to the indigenous territory of Lomerio and the 
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Chiquitano peoples who collectively have the rights to close to 260,000 
hectares, 60% of which is forest. Guarayos is another indigenous territo-
ry threatened by agro-industrial expansion. Located to the north of the 
expansion zone, many farmers in Cuatro Cañadas and San Julián are 
seeking land in and around Guarayos where the frontier is being extend-
ed as a result of illegal deforestation, occupation, and illegal land deals 
between indigenous leaders and soybean farmers (field notes, 2014-15). 
Despite such threats to indigenous peoples and biodiversity that many 
depend on for their livelihood, the government’s agenda as announced 
by Vice President Garcia Linera and agro-industrial representatives of 
the CAO is to increase the agricultural frontier by 1 million hectares per 
year until 2020 to ‘guarantee food sovereignty’ (Vicepresidente 2012; 
Heredia Garcia 2014). This exemplifies the state’s attempt to justify and 
legitimize forms of capital accumulation through popular discourses, 
serving the interests of the landed elites and agro-industrialists while cap-
ital poor farmers and indigenous peoples remain excluded and are fur-
ther threatened by the environmental consequences of the expansion. 
The dynamics of deforestation run much deeper than the loss of for-
ests and biodiversity. Forests provide important land cover, prevent ero-
sion, absorb rainfall and provide important ecosystem services that regu-
late weather and climate patterns. There is ample evidence that 
deforestation amplifies flood risk and exacerbates the severity of El Ni-
ño-Southern Oscillation (ENSO) climate cycles (Malhi et al. 2008; 
Bradshaw et al. 2007). Rapid rates of deforestation have coincided with 
increased floods in Bolivia with the most catastrophic floods in recent 
history in 2007/2008 and 2014. In 2007 floods displaced over 100,000 
families, killing 50 people and affecting 366,000 hectares of cultivated 
land; while in 2008 floods resulted in the deaths of another 67 people, 
displacing 97 families as the river, Rio Grande, which borders the princi-
pal soy producing communities of El Puente, San Julián, Cuatro Caña-
das, and Pailon (bordering zones A and B in Map 4.1) rose between 3 to 
4.5 meters (BID 2014). In 2014, 85 municipalities were affected, displac-
ing some 24,036 families, destroying 713 homes, killing 44 people and 
affecting 352 hectares of cultivated land (BID 2014, 8). In May 2015, 
over 100 communities in the municipality of San Julián alone lost much 
of their harvest due to floods. Abraham Guzman of Nucleo 20 in San 
Julián lost his entire parcel (45 hectares), while approximately 700 hec-
tares in his community were flooded. For small farmers, this results in 
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almost an entire year’s income lost, while their initial investment in agro-
inputs leads to indebtedness – sometimes to agro-industry such as ADM, 
Gravetal, Monica, FINO, etc., or to other farmers – which could poten-
tially lead to having to sell their land. The ENSO phenomenon and 
floods continue to increase in intensity and frequency. As shown in Fig-
ure 7.2, in the 1960s the department of Santa Cruz experienced ‘normal’ 
conditions without the ENSO climate phenomenon 74% of the time; 
while in the 2000s the ENSO phenomenon became much more frequent 
than normal climate conditions. The increasing occurrences and severity 
of floods and drought do not affect everyone equally. In the soy expan-
sion zone and especially in the municipalities of Cuatro Cañadas and San 
Julián, the vast majority of small-scale farmers occupy plots of land in 
the flood zone around Rio Grande (along the line dividing zones A and 
B), a large river that borders these communities, while large-scale plots 
occupy the more fertile and slightly higher land to the east of Highway 9 
(zone B) (see Map 4.1).  
Figure 7.2 
Degree of occurrence of the El Niño-Southern Oscillation (ENSO)  
climate phenomenon, Santa Cruz 
 
  Source: ACF-IN 2009 
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Though deforestation due to the expansion of the agricultural frontier 
has been identified as a major contributor to the increasing frequency 
and intensity of flooding and erosion in Santa Cruz’s Lan Use Plan (Plan 
de Uso del Suelo – PLUS), new laws have been established which excuse 
illegal deforestation (Law 739), increase deforestation limits (Law 741), 
and amplify the regulatory inspections to make sure land is meeting a 
‘socio-economic function’ (Función Económico-Social, FES) from two to 
five years (TIERRA, 2016). Rather than implementing strict regulations 
against deforestation and promoting reforestation and sustainability prac-
tices, the government is investing close to USD $17 million in construc-
tion projects to protect communities and productive lands in order to 
facilitate the continued expansion of the agricultural frontier to serve the 
interests of the soy complex (ANAPO, 2015). Part of these funds, how-
ever, is to be raised by the municipality with the help of medium and 
large scale farmers who remain reluctant to help the broader community 
if their plots are not directly threatened. 
These residual solutions do not address the systemic ecological crises 
unfolding due to large-scale agro-industrial production and deforestation. 
Farmers are left with more uncertainties than ever – in terms of volatile 
yields due to decreasing soil fertility and the increased agro-chemical re-
quirements, drought and floods due to the ENSO system, dust storms, a 
loss of biodiversity and inability to diversify production and the contam-
ination of water sources partly due to widespread fumigation. 
Furthermore, a study by Mekonnen and Hoekstra (2011) of the 
Twente Water Centre in The Netherlands found that for every ton of 
soybeans harvested requires one ton of water. Taking into account the 
total amount of forest cover lost, the decline in soil fertility, loss of bio-
diversity, and water contamination points to a stark ecological deficit and 
potential for ecological crisis if this production model persists. The sheer 
amount of agro-chemicals used in the country – from 12.6 million kilo-
grams in 2010 to 38.3 million kilograms in 2014 – is exhausting the soil 
and threatening the health and safety of communities (SENASAG 2014). 
The ecological extraction taking place as a result of an expanding agro-
industrial soy complex is apparent.  
The capitalist penetration of agriculture and the appropriation of 
seeds, fertilizers, pest control, and even labour by industry has led to the 
‘discontinuous but persistent undermining of discrete elements of the 
agricultural production process, their transformation into industrial activ-
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ities, and their re-incorporation into agriculture as inputs’ (Goodman, 
Sorj, and Wilkinson 1987, 2). This process of ‘appropriationism’ has 
provoked this irreparable rift in the socio-ecological metabolism. The 
substitution of natural for industrial inputs allows for the accelerated ex-
traction of nature’s value, overriding previous ecological constraints, 
while the technological packages of synthetic fertilizers, genetically-
modified seeds, agro-chemicals, and mechanization similarly override 
traditional farmer knowledge, practice, and labour requirements render-
ing farmers increasingly dependent on and even obsolete to agro-
industry. This separation and disregard for the socio-ecological metabo-
lism, neglects natural processes of regeneration and the symbiosis of 
agro-ecological processes by rapid environmental degradation through 
externalizing costs and technological ‘fixes’. Such biophysical override is 
unsustainable and its tendency to generate ecological crises and move 
into new greenfield sites exposes the accelerating contradictions of in-
dustrial capitalist agriculture (Weis 2010). With nearly 90% of Bolivia’s 
soybeans and derivatives destined for export, the ecological value is not 
only extracted and appropriated for value realization elsewhere; the 
‘mode of extraction’ diminishes the productive capacity of the natural 
resources in the long term leading to ecological impoverishment and un-
equal ecological exchange between trading countries (see Bunker, 1984; 
Gudynas, 2015). As Bunker asserts in his important work on extractive 
export economies in the Amazon Basin and their tendency for unequal 
net flows of matter and energy exchanges with ‘productive’ or articulated 
industrial economies, ‘we must consider the effects of the exploitation of 
labour and the exploitation of the entire ecosystems as separate but 
complementary phenomena, both of which affect the development of 
particular regions’ (1984, 1053). The extraction of the ecological value 
from the natural environment is a defining feature of agrarian extractiv-
ism in Bolivia. As Bunker (1984, 1056) wrote over 30 years ago, ‘the eco-
logical and demographic consequences of these disruptions are likely to 
last far longer than the demand for the commodity or the particular 
mode of extraction which provides it’. For Bolivia, the socio-economic 
and ecological impoverishment of its principal ‘mode of extraction’, min-
ing, should serve as a stark reminder. The tragic underdevelopment and 
impoverishment of Bolivia’s once largest and richest mining city of 
Potosi or the more recent disappearance of Bolivia’s second largest lake, 
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Lago Poopó, for which hundreds of families depend for their livelihood, 
exemplify the harsh realities of extractivism.  
7.3.4 Deterioration of labour opportunities and/or conditions 
The fourth dimension of agrarian extractivism in Bolivia concerns the 
lack of labour opportunities and/or deteriorating labour conditions per-
taining to the soy complex. This feature is in reference to the issues dis-
cussed in Chapter 5 regarding ‘productive exclusion’, gender and genera-
tional forms of exclusion, toxicity and health hazards, and the simple 
reproduction squeeze and surplus populations. This section therefore 
does not repeat what was covered in Chapter 5, but rather points to the 
broader trends of labour dynamics associated with agrarian extractivism. 
From a labour perspective, there is nothing inherently undesirable 
with mechanized soybean production. To be sure, most people would 
much rather benefit from the increased labour productivity and less 
physically-demanding conditions of labour associated with mechanized 
agriculture. In other words, it is not mechanization as a form of agricul-
tural production which is in and of itself a problem, but the social rela-
tions of production associated with the form within the broader socio-
economic context. When the form of production substantially decreases 
the need for labour in a sectorally and socially disarticulated economy, it 
can result in surplus populations (Li 2009). This dimension of agrarian 
extractivism is not limited to the decreased need for wage labourers in 
the production process, but also deteriorating conditions for workers – 
in terms of health, safety, and precariousness. Manual sugarcane cutting 
in Brazil, for example, still provides a livelihood for some 500,000 peo-
ple, but conditions are extremely demanding both mentally and physical-
ly, often akin to slave-like conditions (Alves 2006; McGrath 2013). Data 
from the Land Pastoral Commission (Comissão Pastoral da Terra, CPT) 
revealed that 10,010 workers were liberated from slave-like labour condi-
tions in the sugarcane sector from 2003 to 2010 (Brasil 2011). Further-
more, in reference to oil palm and sugarcane plantations in Guatemala, 
Alonso-Fradejas (2015, 492) asserts that ‘while labor and labor arrange-
ments are flexibly organized to maximize surplus extraction, the working 
conditions are damaging workers’ physical and mental health in severe 
and even deadly ways’. Both of these dimensions of labour are consid-
ered part of agrarian extractivism. In Bolivia’s highly mechanized soy 
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complex, it is labour’s lack of utility for capital accumulation which is 
generating surplus populations.      
7.4 Agrarian extractivism and the politics of control 
The four interlinked dimensions of agrarian extractivism expose the very 
extractive character of Bolivia’s soy complex. Delving deeper into these 
extractive dynamics reveals the dimensions of power and mechanisms of 
access and exclusion which help us understand how the development 
and expansion of the agro-industrial soy complex is transforming agrari-
an social relations and the politics behind these processes. In Chapter 2, 
three dimensions of power were discussed: 1) the power to get someone 
or group to do something that they would not otherwise do (e.g. force); 
2) the power to exclude others (e.g. regulation, market relations); and 3) 
the power of manipulation (e.g. legitimation, cultural hegemony) (Lukes 
2005; Gaventa 1980; Hall, Hirsch, and Li 2011). These dimensions of 
power are distinct yet interrelated. For example, people may be forcibly 
displaced from their lands by a politically connected agro-industrial cor-
poration or capitalist elite which is able to negotiate with state authorities 
for a legal land concession over the area which, as far as the courts are 
concerned, legitimizes their formal right to the land and manipulates 
perceptions regarding the initial expulsion. This hypothetical demon-
strates how these three dimensions overlap and can reinforce one anoth-
er as ‘bundles of power’. Ribot and Peluso’s structural and relational 
mechanisms of access encompass these range of powers which affect 
people’s ability to benefit from resources (Ribot and Peluso 2003, 154). 
These include technology, capital, markets, labour and labour opportuni-
ties, knowledge, authority, social identities, and social relations which can 
shape of influence access (Ibid, 164–65). Most of these structural and 
relational mechanisms of access are within the first and second dimen-
sions of power. Access to knowledge, as explained by Ribot and Peluso, 
includes ‘beliefs, ideological controls and discursive practices, as well as 
negotiated systems of meanings’ and is therefore understood within the 
third dimension of power (2003, 168).  
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Table 7.2 
Power, exclusion, and access mechanisms 
 First dimen-sion of power 
Second dimension of 
power 
Third dimension of 
power 
Characteristics Force, negoti-ation 
Market forces, institu-
tional barriers, exclusion 
Manipulation, legitima-
cy, cultural hegemony, 
war of position 
Powers of   
Exclusion Force Markets, regulation Legitimation 
Access  
mechanisms 
Authority 
Technology, capital, mar-
kets, labour, authority, 
identity, social relations 
Knowledge 
Source: Author’s elaboration based on Lukes, 2005; Hall et al., 2011; Ribot and Peluso 2003. 
 
 
The mechanisms of access associated with Bolivia’s soy complex are 
mostly within the second dimension of power. However, as Colque 
(2014) points out, agro-capitalist elites do appropriate land illegally via 
their position of authority on the frontier where state authority is largely 
absent and landed elites are able to use force to extend their landhold-
ings. Further, particularly in the mid-2000s when soybean plantations 
were expanding rapidly, many smallholders were forced to substitute tra-
ditional crop production for soybean monocultures, whether they want-
ed to or not. Many of course, were attracted to the idea of ‘modernizing’ 
their smallholding complete with mechanized production, high-yielding 
seed varieties (GM) and their necessary ‘technological packages’. Others, 
like Mrs. Choque mentioned in Chapter 6, were forced to switch to GM 
soybean cultivation due to widespread contamination of their lands. 
Other crops could not grow with airplane fumigation and river run-offs 
contaminating their crops with agro-chemicals such as glyphosate. In 
other words, people can be ‘forced’ to do something that they would not 
otherwise do by means other than physical displacement or violence. 
Another example which demonstrates the first dimension of power is 
access to authority. Personnel from the Natural Disaster Unit for the 
Municipality of San Julián receive regular complaints regarding the con-
struction of illegal dams and river diversions which flood neighbouring 
parcels. The majority of these complaints are made by smallholders 
against agribusiness companies and violate Law 2140, Article 17 which 
prohibits such action (anonymous, personal communication, October 
2014). However, many of these companies are economically and politi-
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cally influential with connections at the regional or even national gov-
ernmental level. State actors, such as those at the Natural Disaster Unit 
in San Julián, have very limited capacity to act against such large and in-
fluential companies. As one member of the Natural Disaster Unit put it, 
‘even us at the municipal government level cannot change this. They (ag-
ribusiness) are too powerful for us. We try to make them pay fines, to 
comply by the law but they don’t listen and what can we do? They have 
connections with higher authorities that override us’ (anonymous, per-
sonal communication, October 2014). In this case, it is access to authori-
ty (first dimension of power) which gives agribusinesses the power to 
divert rivers or build dams illegally without repercussions that apply to 
the rest of society. 
Most access mechanisms and powers of exclusion associated with the 
soy complex fall within the second dimension of power. The capital-
intensive form of soybean production requires access to technologies, 
capital and markets which excludes the rural majority. It further excludes 
and outright eliminates access to labour opportunities. Yet, smallholders 
are encouraged to integrate and engage in value-chain relations as rec-
ommended by the World Bank with its residual approach to poverty re-
duction. This perspective condemns the use of illegitimate force (first 
dimension), enables the power of the market to allocate people, goods 
and services efficiently and effectively (second dimension), and fails to 
question the underlying logics of this type of development (third dimen-
sion). This similarly reflects the first political tendency discussed in 
Chapter 1 regarding land deals, that is ‘regulate to facilitate the workings 
of the market’ (Borras, Franco, and Wang 2013). Without questioning 
the market logic, these approaches assume that if we find a way to inte-
grate people within existing market relations, it will lead to ‘development’ 
and poverty reduction. But how did this logic of ‘development’ become 
part of the state’s dominant discourse and gain legitimacy in Bolivia – a 
country with concepts of Vivir Bien, rights to Mother Nature, and food 
sovereignty written in their Constitution? 
If we recall from Chapter 4, the development of the agricultural fron-
tier in Santa Cruz was initiated with the ‘march to the east’. Peasants, 
miners, and other wage labourers received plots of 50 hectares or less, 
while those with access to authority (political and economic elites) were 
given hundreds of thousands of hectares. Land was appropriated by 
force, social relations and authority. During the period of neoliberal re-
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structuring in the 1980s and 1990s a new kind of legitimacy was pursued 
by the state through neoliberal multiculturalism. Titles were granted and 
the state actors tried to increase their territorial control and legitimacy, 
yet the ‘normal workings of the market’ (Mackintosh 1990, 43) continued 
to exclude the rural majority. Agro-capitalists predominantly from Brazil 
penetrated the Bolivian countryside, bringing with them capital-intensive 
production practices with inputs from the ‘Big Six’ and the ABCDs. 
When Evo Morales and the MAS came to power, populist discourses 
challenged the underlying logics of neoliberal development. An Agrarian 
Revolution promised to transform the unequal agrarian structure, redis-
tribute lands of indigenous and peasant populations and pursue a path-
way towards food sovereignty. The legitimacy of the landed and agro-
capitalist elites was challenged as the state threatened their wealth and 
power. However, as explained in Chapter 5, state discourse soon 
changed from an ‘agrarian’ to a ‘productive’ revolution. State actors em-
braced the agro-industrial model, did not challenge the unequal agrarian 
structure, and encouraged smallholders to enter into value-chain rela-
tions as recommended by the World Bank. Rather than challenge the 
mechanisms of exclusion which marginalize the rural majority and the 
MAS party’s main constituents (indigenous-peasants), elected state actors 
representing the MAS formed a state-capital alliance in Santa Cruz in 
order to maintain their political power and control over the state appa-
ratus, while allowing landed elites and agro-capitalists to maintain and 
gain more control over land-based resources in the lowlands. As Boliv-
ia’s former Vice Minister of Land, Alejandro Almaraz (2014, 54) put it 
‘the indigenous and peasant project … has been defeated, and the domi-
nant interests and power of the business sector, the oligarchs and the 
latifundistas have been reinstalled.’ Legal reforms such as the extension 
of the FES, a lenient deforestation code and pardons for illegal defor-
estation, a non-retroactive land ceiling law, the abandonment of an agrar-
ian reform, more stringent penalties against land occupations, the legali-
zation of extraction within formerly protected indigenous territories, the 
push to legalize all transgenic crops at the 2015 Agricultural Summit 
‘Sembrando Bolivia’, the USD $700 million annual diesel subsidy which 
largely benefits agro-industry rather than the rural majority, and the 
commitment to expand the agricultural frontier for agro-industrial de-
velopment are evidence of this new state-agro-capital alliance which has 
emerged (Almaraz 2015). Walter Chavez (2013), a former advisor to Evo 
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Morales and now critic of the MAS, describes this process as struggle-
victory-inclusion-expansion. ‘Struggle and victory’ are in reference to the 
struggle for state power pre-and post 2006, while victory refers to the 
overwhelming support in the 2006 national elections and the 2008 refer-
endum. ‘Inclusion and expansion’ refers to the necessity of including the 
influential Santa Cruz elites within the MAS political agenda in order to 
expand their political reach and maintain state power. State discourses 
and meetings between the MAS political executive and the Santa Cruz 
elite have made it increasingly clear that a new-found relationship has 
developed between the state and agro-capital (see Webber 2016; Viaña 
2012). These changes in the state-society-capital nexus should not be 
understood as state actions and autonomous decision-making of a uni-
fied bureaucratic machine, but rather outcomes which reflect the balance 
of forces in society and class struggle. As explained in Chapter 5, the par-
ticular class positions of the masses characterized as functional dualism, 
enabled the state to form this alliance without entering into a crisis of 
legitimacy.  
These class and political dynamics of agrarian change have enabled 
agro-industry to increase its control over Bolivia’s land-based natural re-
source. As explained in Chapter 3, agro-industrial companies not only 
have a market oligopoly over upstream and downstream components, 
they also largely control research and development (R&D) and therefore 
access to knowledge. This allows them to set research and development 
agendas to serve their accumulation interests, and effectively control the 
mechanisms within the third dimension of power. The result is agrarian 
extractivism.  
Agrarian extractivism extracts raw materials in high volumes destined 
for export, controlled by a market oligopoly which appropriates the sur-
plus value from labour and nature without creating value-added sectoral 
linkages with the domestic economy. It further removes labour opportu-
nities and contributes to environmental degradation. The structural and 
relational mechanisms of access which span the three dimensions of 
power thus enable agro-industry to appropriate surplus value and retain 
the benefits from soybean production without necessarily owning the 
land. Discourses from the state and oilseed producer associations con-
tinue to promote the expansion of the agricultural frontier for food sov-
ereignty, food security, rural employment and development 
(Vicepresidente 2012; IBCE 2014). The strategic relations between elect-
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ed state actors and classes of capital in Santa Cruz used these legitimating 
discourses to maintain their control over the state apparatus and the soy 
complex, respectively. The lack of resistance, due to a variety of histori-
cal and cultural factors previously discussed but also the constraints of 
functional dualism, has enabled classes of capital to gain and maintain 
control over land-based natural resources and the soy complex at the 
expense of the rural majority and the natural environment. For the MAS, 
it was not worth the political and economic risks of challenging the land-
based wealth and power of classes of capital in Santa Cruz since social 
forces were not mobilized from below. Furthermore, without resistance 
and social organization, the state does not have the capacity to undertake 
pro-poor agrarian reform or challenge the logic of the agro-industrial soy 
complex, which would require mutually-reinforcing synergies from pro-
reformist from below (Fox 1993; Borras 2007). While state actors cer-
tainly have some autonomy and capacity through their individual agen-
cies, the state as an ensemble of contested social relations does not exer-
cise power just as it pleases, but works through the balance of class 
forces in society. With the balance of forces in Santa Cruz heavily in fa-
vour of agro-capitalist and landed elites with very little resistance, the 
MAS government would have very little to gain and much to lose if 
transformative policy changes were pursued. As Fox puts it, ‘state action 
is the result of a reciprocal cause and effect relationship between changes 
in the balance of power within the state and shifts in the balance of pow-
er within society’ (Fox 1993, 22). This is why resistance from below is so 
important if the extractive character of the soy complex is to be disman-
tled and transformed. Yet the legitimacy of the agro-industrial model of 
development is deeply entrenched within the power structures and ac-
cess mechanisms, not only in Bolivia but at the global level with the in-
creasingly concentrated control over the global food system. Without 
challenging the logic and underlying power relations of the agro-
industrial soy complex, processes of exclusion, value appropriation and 
environmental degradation are likely to result in a truncated trajectory of 
agrarian change.  
7.5 Conclusion 
The ‘new extractivism’ cannot solely be characterized by the increased 
role of the state in appropriating rents from key sectors of the extractive 
economy to redistribute to the masses in the form of social welfare pro-
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grammes. Indeed, the ‘new extractivism’ in Latin America generally im-
plies the increased role of the state, but that increased role can also ap-
pear in different forms in order to increase not only their economic con-
trol but also their political control over the territory. The decisions not to 
pursue redistributive agrarian reform, to strengthen private property, to 
loosen the deforestation code, and to facilitate agro-industry’s expansion 
of the agricultural frontier were the result of relational dynamics of the 
state-society-capital nexus. To avoid potential class warfare and a loss of 
state power, elected state managers representing the MAS opted for a 
class alliance with classes of capital represented by the Santa Cruz landed 
and industrial elites. This decision was a response to the economic 
strength of the Media Luna’s capitalist classes which, in years prior, 
threatened the state with a violent coup and to separate from the coun-
try.  
This chapter has attempted to expose the socio-economic and envi-
ronmental implications of the development and expansion of the soy 
complex, revealing its extractive character and the politics behind these 
processes. Rather than a form of ‘agro-industrialization’, it has been ar-
gued here that the soy complex is better characterized as ‘agrarian extrac-
tivism’. As a concept ‘agrarian extractivism’ is both politically and analyt-
ically useful for understanding new dynamics of agrarian change brought 
on by this type of capitalist agricultural development. It directly challeng-
es the notion of ‘agro-industrialization’ by exposing the lack of industrial 
linkages, employment generation and benefits for the domestic economy. 
Agrarian extractivism should be understood within the context of the 
broader neo-extractivist development model. As a self-proclaimed ‘gov-
ernment of social movements’ the MAS has maintained its legitimacy 
and control over the state apparatus by using extractivist rents to fund 
social welfare programmes. Though the soy complex does not generate 
significant revenues for the state, it allows for a similar balance of capital 
accumulation and political legitimacy as that generated by the other ex-
tractive sectors.  
The balance of forces in society have not undergone the same shift as 
that which took place in the mining and hydrocarbon sectors. The histo-
ry of organized mobilization among miners established their position as a 
powerful societal force. This shift forced the state to grant concessions 
to mining cooperatives and the state mining company or risk a crisis of 
legitimacy. The politics of natural gas were at the heart of the ‘gas wars’ 
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discussed in Chapter 4 which, among other factors, led to the election of 
Evo Morales and the MAS with their discourses of resource nationalism 
(see Pellegrini 2016; Arsel et al. 2014). In other words, these other pillars 
of the state’s three pronged extractivist development strategy have been 
highly politicized with societal forces struggling to change the balance of 
powers underlying the relations of access and control over these re-
sources. In the lowlands of Santa Cruz, such dynamics did not take 
shape. Despite the unequal agrarian structure, smallholders became inte-
grated into the soy complex then excluded and caught in relations of 
debt and dependency. The soy complex achieved a high degree of legiti-
macy even among those it excluded and marginalized. As such, the bal-
ance of capital accumulation and legitimacy is once again maintained, but 
under different circumstances. Legitimacy is maintained through dis-
courses of modernization, food security, food sovereignty and rural de-
velopment and due to the contradictory class positions of smallholders 
engaged in the soy complex; while accumulation interests of classes of 
capital are maintained without state interference.  
Discrepancies and contradictions between the trajectory of agrarian 
change of the agro-industrial development model and the government’s 
overall stated rural development model objectives are becoming appar-
ent. The objectives of the Productive Revolution and the New Econom-
ic, Social, Communitarian and Productive Model are to develop the agri-
cultural sector as an income and employment-generating strategic sector 
(Arce Catacora 2011). As this study has revealed, the extractive features 
of agro-industrial development are excluding the rural majority and 
threatening future farming prospects through environmental degrada-
tion, while surplus value (primarily in the form of ground rent) is appro-
priated by an agro-industrial market oligopoly. Yet the social inclusive-
ness (cash transfers) of the neo-extractivist development model, 
combined with smallholder rentierism through the ‘partida arrangement’ 
have enabled the persistence of smallholders in the soy complex despite 
being stripped of access mechanisms and excluded from the production 
process. Underlying such an apparently inclusive rural development 
model are hidden forms of exclusion which are slowly leading to the dis-
appearance of smallholders and a further concentration of power and 
resource control within the agrarian sector. The extractivist dynamics of 
agro-industrial development are therefore eroding and contradicting the 
stated objectives of the government’s broader national development 
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strategy. Such residual approaches to poverty reduction have been quite 
successful in the short term and in the context of extremely favourable 
international commodity prices, but structural inequalities persist and 
such contradictions are beginning to surface as commodity prices have 
fallen, environmental crises become more frequent and productive ex-
clusion leads to dispossession. As these dynamics come to a head, the 
state may soon face a crisis of legitimacy as smallholders’ contradictory 
class positions differentiate into those of capital and labour which will 
likely result in a heightened level of class consciousness and ‘class for 
itself’ formation. These are the dynamics of the politics of control asso-
ciated with Bolivia’s soy complex. 
Notes 
 
1 Converted to USD at a rate of 1 USD = 6.89 Bs. Original data from source 
is Bs 40.543 billion in 2005 to Bs 221.181 billion in 2015 (MEFP, 2015). 
2 For Svampa, the ‘Commodities Consensus’ refers to ‘the beginning of a new 
economic and political order sustained by the boom in international prices for 
raw materials and consumer goods, which are increasingly demanded by in-
dustrialised and emerging countries’ (Svampa 2013, 117). 
3 Alonso-Fradejas (2015) puts forth a working definition of a financialized 
and flexible type of agrarian extractivism in Guatemala characterized by a 
knowledge and metabolic rift, limited wage work opportunities and poor 
working conditions, and the appropriation of the surplus value and land rent 
by financialized capitals (2015: 491-2). 
4 Data based on summer harvest only. 
5 Interviews were conducted in Cuatro Cañadas and San Julián with 75 small, 
medium and large-scale soybean farmers in 2014 and 2015. 
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8 Conclusion 
 
8.1 Introduction 
This study set out to investigate the following central research question: 
How and to what extent is the development and expansion of the agro-industrial soy 
complex transforming agrarian social relations in Bolivia’s eastern lowlands in the 
contemporary context of new forms of capital penetration in the countryside and a 
changing state-society-capital nexus? As demonstrated throughout this disser-
tation, the capital-intensive form of production associated with the soy 
complex is leading to new forms and mechanisms of exclusion, value-
chain control, surplus appropriation and extraction which further mar-
ginalize and subordinate the majority of smallholders integrated in the 
soy complex. Processes of productive exclusion have divorced small-
holders – not to the extent of displacing them from their land – but from 
accessing the necessary means to put their land into production. Those 
who are not excluded and are working their land are caught in value-
chain relations of debt and dependency. At both ends of the value-chain, 
a market oligopoly controls the upstream and downstream components 
of the soy complex, appropriating the majority of the surplus value pro-
duced. Contrary to the claims contending that this type of agricultural 
development model is beneficial for the economy, employment genera-
tion, food security and even food sovereignty, this study has revealed its 
exclusive and extractivist character – socially, economically and envi-
ronmentally. The politics of control, as an analytical framework, has 
helped us understand the contested nature of the state and the relations 
among state, societal and capitalist actors revealing the emergence of a 
state-capital alliance enabled by particular class relations and contradic-
tions in society. The remainder of this chapter elaborates on the main 
conclusions and points to some implications of this study for research-
ers, policy makers and social movements.  
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8.2 New dynamics of control, exclusion and extraction 
If one were to apply the FAO’s original formulation of ‘land grabs’ to 
analyze the dynamics of agrarian change in Bolivia, the conclusion would 
be that land grabbing is not taking place and food security is not threat-
ened (Soto Baquero and Gómez 2012, 560). Furthermore, if one were to 
read the reports published by ANAPO, IBCE and listen to the discours-
es of the MAS executive such as Vice President Garcia Linera, one might 
conclude that the soy complex is creating tens of thousands of jobs, 
providing a livelihood for thousands of small farmers who make up the 
majority of soybean producers (78%), contributing to the country’s food 
security and even food sovereignty. The World Bank would certainly ap-
plaud these initiatives, pointing to their conclusions in WDR08 where 
they recommended the integration of smallholders into agro-industrial 
value-chain relations. But as this study has shown these dominant dis-
courses and narratives are misleading and present a veiled threat to the 
continued pursuit of such a model of agricultural development. A prop-
erty-rights approach does not capture the processes of ‘productive exclu-
sion’ discussed in Chapter 5 nor the forms of value chain control dis-
cussed in Chapter 6. The more nuanced characterization of 
contemporary land grabs as ‘control grabbing’ put forth by Borras et al. 
(2012) and using Ribot and Peluso’s (2003) ‘theory of access’ captures 
these changes in the social relations of production, property and power 
in the contemporary period. The lack of certain structural and relational 
access mechanisms prevents smallholders from benefitting from the 
fruits of their land, not only representing ‘powers of exclusion’ but also 
forms of control and adverse incorporation, hindering class conscious-
ness and organized forms of social mobilization. The lack of access to 
capital, technology, and credit deprive capital-poor smallholders from 
putting their land into production, thereby forcing them to rent their 
land and find alternative means of income generation. The mechanisms 
of exclusion and control run deeper than having access to capital or 
credit. Those farmers able to put land into production enter into value-
chain relations of debt and dependency within a corporate-controlled 
market oligopoly. These farmers bear all the risk and their income is in-
creasingly jeopardized by volatile and uncertain yields, natural disasters, 
increased production costs and the presence of new pests and weeds. 
While they are able to retain relatively more benefits than semi-
proletarian and petty bourgeois rentiers, they also risk entering into debt 
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relations where they become controlled by agro-industry’s standards, 
credit, and markets due to input-harvest debt relations. Beyond those 
capital-poor smallholders and those capital-rich farmers integrated into 
the value-chain, this study has revealed the extractive character of the soy 
complex which has important socio-economic and environmental impli-
cations for society.  
This study has argued for the need to start reframing certain types of 
so-called ‘industrial’ agriculture as agrarian extractivism. It is important 
to reveal the very extractive dynamics of agricultural production and stop 
serving a legitimating discourse that equates this type of agricultural pro-
duction to industrialization. Four interlinked dimensions of agrarian ex-
tractivism have been put forth: (1) large volumes of materials extracted 
destined for export with little or no processing; (2) value-chain concen-
tration and sectoral disarticulation (3) high intensity of environmental 
degradation; and (4) the deterioration of labour opportunities and/or 
conditions. Together, these four features of capitalist agricultural devel-
opment have become the norm, not the exception. Corporate control 
over the food system, both upstream and downstream, capital’s sub-
sumption of labour and the increased appropriation (and extraction) of 
nature’s value in the production process by means of agro-chemical in-
puts, heavy machinery, and deforestation for frontier expansion should 
not be characterized as industrialization, but extraction. The influence 
and power over R&D by agribusiness and fuelled by neo-Malthusian dis-
courses on the need to feed a growing population has given agro-
industrial development a form of legitimacy and authority in the country-
side. Agrarian extractivism forces us to go beyond oversimplified dichot-
omies of large versus small scale, GM versus agro-ecology, and to not 
group all types of ‘industrial’ agriculture together. It forces us to delve 
deeper into our analysis of the relations of production, distribution, con-
sumption and accumulation and the associated environmental implica-
tions. It implies engaging with the structural and relational access mech-
anisms by going beyond property rights and the origin of capital and 
revealing the broader socio-economic and environmental implications of 
capital penetration and new forms of production. 
These changes could not have been properly understood without tak-
ing into account the broader international political economy of food and 
agriculture and the development of green revolution technologies. The 
explosion of soybean production in Brazil and the subsequent spread of 
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the oilseed crop throughout the region has its roots the Cold War détente 
and the development of trade relations between Brazil and Japan. During 
periods of both state-led authoritarian frontier expansion and neoliberal 
reforms promoting foreign investment through a cheap land market, 
Brazilians purchased and appropriated Bolivian lands, bringing with 
them their technologies, machinery and capital investment. This ensued 
as land markets in Brazil became saturated, and later when profitable op-
portunities arose for transnational agribusiness and the ‘Big Six’, ABCDs, 
and ‘translatina’ agribusinesses from Brazil and Argentina penetrated Bo-
livia’s land and agribusiness market, as they did throughout the rest of 
the ‘Soybean Republic’. Brazil advanced as a ‘new agricultural country’ 
(NAC) much earlier, established itself as the region’s agro-industrial 
powerhouse, and as new ‘greenfield’ sites for investment opened up, 
agro-capitalist took advantage of the opportunities – first in land and 
later in the upstream and downstream components of the value chain. 
As the origin of large-scale soybean production and ‘Green Revolution’ 
technologies, Brazil’s influence is that of a regional hegemony and its 
agricultural development model perceived as advanced, modernized, and 
to be replicated. The Brazilian influence in Bolivia’s soy complex is thus 
one that must be understood in its historical context, not as a recent 
wave of large-scale land investments nor through government relations. 
Brazilian agro-capitalists, rather, became part of Bolivia’s agro-capitalist 
and landowning elite as the frontier expanded and thus came to appro-
priate and purchase land by virtue of their economic and land-based 
power relations in the context of a weak state presence and authority. 
Indeed, since 1996 the land titling (saneamiento) process has been ongoing, 
underfunded, messy, and incomplete (Colque, Tinta, and Sanjinés 2016). 
But rather than emphasizing the ‘foreignization’ of land and agriculture, 
this study underlines the importance of how new capital penetration, 
foreign or domestic, is changing the social relations of production, ac-
cumulation, and the politics in the countryside.  
8.3 The politics of control: power, access, and the state 
By contextualizing the development of Bolivia’s agrarian structure histor-
ically, this study has shown how these forms of exclusion and mecha-
nisms of control have changed over time, from authority and force, mar-
kets and regulation, to legitimacy and consent. The underlying 
dimensions of power, control and access mechanisms have been ana-
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lyzed in relation to the state-society-capital nexus, as the balance of forc-
es in society help us understand political and socio-economic change. 
The politics of control, as the overarching analytical framework guiding 
this study, has captured the new forms and mechanisms of resource con-
trol and value appropriation (or extraction) in (agro)extractive sectors 
through an analysis of access rather than property or concessional rights. 
These include various forms of dispossession and displacement, but also 
mechanisms of exclusion and appropriation which do not necessarily 
require the physical removal of people from the land or formal owner-
ship of property rights. It also provides an analytical framework for eval-
uating the state’s dual and often contradictory functions of facilitating 
capital accumulation and maintaining political legitimacy and the strate-
gic relations among state and societal actors in gaining and maintaining 
control over the state apparatus. Using this framework to analyze the 
development and expansion of the agro-industrial soy complex in Bolivia 
has revealed how problematic this dominant development model can be 
for the rural majority, the environment, and the domestic economy. 
Productivity gains and economic growth are not trickling-down to the 
rural poor, but rather leading to exclusion, value-appropriation, and ex-
traction. The integration of smallholders into value-chain relations as 
recommended in the World Bank’s Development Report of 2008 dis-
misses the very structural and relational access mechanisms associated 
with production, property, and power analyzed in this study. Taking a 
relational approach, this study challenges the agro-industrial logic of de-
velopment, revealing its extractive dynamics and detrimental impacts on 
domestic economies, employment opportunities, and the natural envi-
ronment. 
The dynamics of exclusion, value appropriation, and extraction are 
not unique to the agro-industrial soy complex, but rather systemic fea-
tures of the dominant model of ‘industrial’ capitalist agriculture. The ‘in-
dustrial’ components are via appropriationism and substitutionism, not 
through sectoral-linkages and value-added industrial production 
(Goodman, Sorj, and Wilkinson 1987). Furthermore, as Tony Weis ex-
plains, the agro-industrial model is deteriorating the biophysical founda-
tions of agriculture, including ‘soil erosion and salinization; the overdraft 
of water and threats to its long-term supply; the loss of biodiversity and 
crucial ‘ecosystem services’ (e.g. pollination, soil formation); and green-
house gas (GHG) emissions’ (Weis 2010, 316). The agro-industrial bias 
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in the national policies of many nation-states, particularly in the Global 
North, and the increasing concentration of control by the ‘Big Six’ agro-
chemical companies (Monsanto, Syngenta, Bayer, Dupont, Dow and 
BASF) upstream and the ABCD agro-industrial companies (ADM, 
Bunge, Cargill, Dreyfus) downstream has not only not led to a market 
oligopoly conducive to ‘price fixing’ and limited consumer choices, but 
has led to corporate control and dominance over R&D, agricultural 
knowledge and authority. The threats this presents goes beyond those of 
markets and regulations to legitimacy through manufacturing consent. It 
is urgent and pertinent that we continue to critically examine the socio-
economic and environmental implications of agro-industrial develop-
ment around the world so as to not take for granted the legitimacy 
claimed by a corporate oligopoly-controlled R&D agenda for agro-
industrial development. As this study has shown, it is crucial to go be-
yond a property-rights based approach centred around land as well as 
exclusively focusing on the origins of capital (i.e. ‘foreignization’) to the 
forms and mechanisms of exclusion, control, surplus appropriation and 
extraction associated with capital penetration. In order to fully grasp the-
se new dynamics of agrarian change we must not only engage with as-
pects of accumulation, but also the new forms and relations of produc-
tion and the role and nature of the state in their historical formations. 
Particularly in the current context of the resource rush, new and chang-
ing dynamics of agrarian change triggered by the capitalist development 
of the countryside highlight the relevance of re-engaging with contempo-
rary agrarian questions of capital and labour (Akram-Lodhi and Kay 
2009).  
While it is clear that in many parts of the world capital is taking hold 
of and revolutionizing agriculture through the commodification of pro-
duction, it is highly uneven and variegated, taking different forms over 
different historical periods. In the contemporary period of industrial val-
ue-chain agriculture and global capitalism, this study has revealed some 
of those forms and the dynamics of agrarian change which have emerged 
in the context of the soy complex in Bolivia. Its capital-intensive form is 
exclusive, while industrial capital’s concentration of control over the up-
stream and downstream components have not only created new spaces 
for capital accumulation but appropriate the majority of the surplus value 
without the need to have formal ownership or nominal rights over the 
land. Smallholders representing the rural majority have become adversely 
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incorporated into these new value-chain relations, caught in contradicto-
ry class positions which hinders class consciousness and organized forms 
of resistance. These new forms of capital penetration are shaping, and 
being shaped by, the political dynamics of agrarian change characterized 
by the functional dualism which has emerged in the countryside. Caught 
in contradictory class positions, it is in the interest of capital for small-
holders to remain on the land. If the majority of smallholders are even-
tually dispossessed due to the simple reproduction squeeze discussed in 
Chapter 5, surplus populations could emerge and threaten the state-
capital alliance, disrupting the fine balance of accumulation and legitima-
cy. As an analytical framework, the politics of control captures these dy-
namics of production, accumulation, and political formations in their 
context-specific and historically situated contexts. Beyond the soy com-
plex and dynamics of agrarian change specific to Bolivia, the politics of 
control as an analytical framework for agrarian political economy can be 
used across sectors and geographic areas to analyze the socio-economic 
and political dynamics of agrarian change.  Whether its sugarcane in Bra-
zil, China or southern Africa, oil palm in Indonesia, Colombia or Nige-
ria, maize in the United States or Mexico, the politics of control as a 
framework for analysis can help us understand how new forms of capital 
penetration are leading agrarian transformation and the implications for 
society, the economy and the environment. The new ways capital is pen-
etrating the agricultural sector and new actors involved – through appro-
priationism, substitutionism, ‘flexing’, and financial markets – demand a 
deeper understanding into how these processes are shaping the social 
relations of production, property and power. The Bolivian case present-
ed here demonstrates new forms of covert, adverse incorporation lead-
ing to a truncated trajectory of agrarian change. Smallholders are exclud-
ed, though ‘officially’ remain classified as small-scale farmers in the 
soybean sector. The very extractive character of new types of so-called 
‘industrial’ value-chain agriculture is not leading to any type of industrial-
ization in the home market. Rather, the industrial components are manu-
factured elsewhere and seek new spaces and sites to circulate, produce 
and extract surplus value. Just as the capital-intensive form of production 
shapes the relations of production, it also shapes political formations in 
the countryside. The Bolivian case demonstrates the lack of organized 
class-for-itself mobilizations due to the changing forms and relations of 
production brought on by the soy complex. These are the new dynamics 
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of agrarian change that we must continue to engage with and make 
known to the wider society. In combining access analysis, control grab-
bing, and state theory within a framework of agrarian political economy 
inspired by the works of Byres (1996) and Bernstein (1996; 2010) this 
study hopes to contribute to our understanding of contemporary dynam-
ics of agrarian change through the advancement of the politics of control 
and concepts such as productive exclusion, value-chain control, agrarian 
extractivism, and the state-society-nexus which, when applied to other 
sectors and places, may illuminate more generalizable trends and tenden-
cies of agro-industrial capital’s penetration into the countryside in the 
contemporary era.   
8.4 Trajectories of agrarian change and broader 
implications of this study 
There are a number of broader implications which can be drawn from 
this study for further scientific research, for policy makers, and for social 
movements which are important to take forward. For researchers, sever-
al currents and directions of agrarian change point to important, yet un-
derstudied, areas for future research in agrarian studies. First, the amal-
gamation of agribusiness, pharmaceutical, chemical, and petroleum 
companies such as the proposed Monsanto-Bayer merger, or Shell-
Cosan merger for sugarcane flex crop production (McKay et al. 2016), 
and the financialization of food and agriculture characterized by agro-
commodity derivatives, farmland funds, agricultural risk managements, 
etc. (Murphy, Burch, and Clapp 2012; Fairbairn 2014; Isakson 2014; 
Ghosh 2010) requires investigations in agrarian studies to go beyond the 
agricultural sector to broader analyses into sectoral linkages. This in-
volves examining the relations among industrial and agricultural sectors. 
Second, the increasingly creative ways that capital has penetrated the 
countryside further requires analyses which focus on access and control, 
rather than property and concessional rights. Relatedly, this requires go-
ing beyond the rural to how and why people move between the urban 
and rural or have diversified livelihood strategies as farmers, rentiers, 
shopkeepers or rural and urban wage labourers. The functional dualism 
and resultant contradictory class positions of semi-proletarians and petty 
bourgeois rentiers have significant implications for resistance and trajec-
tories of agrarian change. Third, as extractive sectors become integrated 
at the corporate level, forms of resistance and organized mobilization 
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must also integrate and form alliances. Revealing the extractive dynamics 
of agricultural production and reframing it as agrarian extractivism can 
challenge the legitimating discourse of industrial agriculture and poten-
tially lead to strategic alliances among those struggling for social justice in 
(agro) extractive sectors. More studies on agrarian extractivism across 
various agricultural sectors and case study sites will help develop and re-
fine this concept. Fourth, the new relations among developing countries 
and emerging economies such as BRICS and some MICs require more 
in-depth critical analyses. China’s investment, trade and financial rela-
tions with Bolivia, for example, have increased dramatically over the past 
ten years. In 2015, Chinese companies were awarded the majority of 
public contracts from the Bolivian state, while China’s Import-Export 
Bank has become the country’s largest financier. As bilateral trade in-
creased 11-fold since 2005, China has surpassed Brazil and the United 
States as Bolivia’s primary source of imports. How the so-called ‘Beijing 
Consensus’ differs from the ‘Washington Consensus’ and their implica-
tions for agrarian change and resource control will require further inves-
tigation. Fifth, despite increased corporate control over the global food 
system, alternatives such as food sovereignty remain important, but must 
be rigorously assessed for their viability and contradictions in the con-
temporary context. Many of the so-called ‘neo-exractivist’ states in Latin 
America have poured significant funds into food sovereignty and food-
sovereignty-like programmes, but do so with rents derived from resource 
extraction. Such profoundly contradictory models of development re-
quire further investigation into the limits and possibilities, convergences 
and contradictions of pursuing food sovereignty alternatives while re-
maining fiscally dependent on extractivist rents.  
For researchers in Bolivia, this study points to the need to continue to 
investigate and reveal the challenges faced by smallholders during this 
transition in order to engage with, and put pressure on, state actors. If 
this trajectory of agrarian change continues to develop as this study sug-
gests, the MAS government may be faced with increased pressure from 
society and especially rural populations who may be surplus to the needs 
of capital accumulation. This could trigger widespread social discontent 
among various social movements, given the recent forms of contestation 
around TIPNIS, the Indigenous Fund, COMIBOL, and numerous other 
political scandals such as the Vice Presidents false academic credential 
and the President’s affair with a manager of the China CAMC Engineer-
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ing Company. The legitimacy of the MAS is currently very fragile and 
with elections coming up in 2020 they will need to re-establish their rela-
tions with civil society and support a new candidate in order to avoid 
relying on one personality and cacique-style leadership which has plagued 
Venezuela. Organic intellectuals in Bolivia such as those associated with 
the Comuna as well as critical NGOs and researchers associated with 
Fundación TIERRA, CEDIB, CIPCA, PROBIOMA, among others 
need to continue to share their valuable research and open spaces for 
dialogue with state actors and social movements alike. For this study, 
people in Cuatro Cañadas and San Julián were very eager and happy to 
share their stories, experiences and challenges with me, in part, because 
no one else was listening. One of the main purposes of this research is to 
provide an outlet for these stories to be shared and heard among a wider 
audience. As researchers, we need to continue to share these stories to 
uncover the reality faced by rural populations within the capitalist devel-
opment of agriculture. 
For policy-makers and elected state managers, the findings of this 
study should be taken with a high sense of urgency and importance. The 
rural majority represented by smallholders have maintained, for the most 
part, formal rights to their land. This is extremely important for their 
livelihoods and the future of farming in the Bolivian lowlands. Before 
they are forced to abandon these lands for reasons raised throughout this 
study, reformist state actors need to use their capacities and strategic po-
sitioning in order to effect change by engaging with allied forces in socie-
ty. First of all, loopholes in the land ceiling need to be closed and applied 
retroactively so as to eliminate the continued existence of the latifundium 
and redistribute the land to the landless and smallholders. Second, there 
is a need to re-orient rural and agricultural policies away from the agro-
industrial and landlord bias by prioritizing the needs and interests of the 
rural majority of smallholders, including women and the youth. Bolivia’s 
export-oriented agricultural development model has increased the coun-
try’s dependence on food imports, making the country much more vul-
nerable to volatile commodity prices and food insecurity – far from any 
pathway towards food sovereignty. Third, the country needs to focus on 
industrialization and strengthening rural-urban, agriculture-industry inter-
sectoral linkages which will generate employment opportunities through 
value-added processing and manufacturing. The so-called ‘industrializa-
tion’ strategy to date has been one of importing value-added industrial-
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ized goods in order to extract resources for export. The soy complex has 
developed into a form of agrarian extractivism similar to the mining and 
hydrocarbon sectors. Fourth, the environmental crisis and ecological cri-
sis is real and imminent. The increased intensity and severity of the 
ENSO phenomenon has caused major flooding and droughts in the past 
two years alone. Farmers can no longer follow the regular planting and 
harvesting cycles. Yields are extremely volatile as soil fertility is in decline 
and new pests appear every year and are widespread. Deforestation is not 
only exacerbating these environmental crises but threatening indigenous 
livelihoods. Stronger environmental policies are needed which cannot be 
detached from the model of agricultural development being pursued.  
For social movements and their NGO allies and scholar-activists, this 
study points to the importance of forming broader alliances and con-
verging social movements struggles against a common ‘enemy’ or set of 
policies. This is, in part, the purpose of reframing certain types of capi-
talist industrial agriculture as agrarian extractivism in order to facilitate 
the convergence among those working in and around (agro)extractive 
sectors. Historically it has been the convergence of social movements 
which has managed to shift the balance of forces in society and open the 
way for transformative political and social change. This was demonstrat-
ed in the revolutionary struggles in the 1950s and once again, 50 years 
later, during the struggles against neoliberal policies which eventually 
brought Evo Morales and the MAS to state power. As a self-proclaimed 
‘government of social movements’ the political legitimacy of the MAS 
hinges upon their relationship with the principal social movements rep-
resented by the Unity Pact. Despite the fracturing of the Unity Pact in 
recent years, their social bases remain vibrant and strong with common 
struggles largely based on various forms of exclusion and threats to their 
livelihoods brought on by extractivismo. History shows that it is in the best 
interest of these movements to continue to form loose alliances to in-
crease their strength and influence in numbers, representing peasants, 
indigenous, women, and other trade unions among the rural and urban 
working classes. While their relations with the state are important, their 
autonomy is crucial if they are to maintain their ability to criticize and 
hold state actors accountable. Furthermore, the politics within the 
movements are equally as important so as to ensure that individual polit-
ical clientelism and caciques do not emerge which use their position within 
the movement for self-gain. This study hopes to provide some perspec-
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tive on these issues and particularly on the specific class positions of 
smallholders in the soy complex today. 
8.4 Epilogue 
The rise of the MAS and election of President Evo Morales represented 
a new era in Bolivian history and politics as the country’s first indigenous 
president vowed to rollback neoliberal policies and pursue a pro-poor 
socially-just and inclusive development agenda. Resource nationalism, a 
redistribution of the wealth, agrarian reform, and anti-imperialist dis-
courses rejecting the neoliberal model of development were applauded 
and supported by the majority. Discourses of food sovereignty, rights to 
Mother Nature, and ‘vivir bien’ replaced capitalist discourses of the need 
for economic growth and striving for an ‘age of high mass consumption’. 
The so-called ‘government of social movements’ transformed state-
society relations as the country’s most prominent social movements be-
came incorporated into the state. Indigenous, peasants, miners, trade un-
ion workers, and women became empowered, symbolically, politically, 
and materially. Political participation was an important factor in this pro-
cess as key social movements were invited to draft a new Constitution 
and movement leaders were appointed to ministry-level positions. Mo-
rales’ history, identity and discourse enhanced the state’s degree of legit-
imacy as the country’s majority could finally self-identify with their lead-
er. But as movement leaders transitioned to state managers, they became 
gradually absorbed and partially co-opted by the state apparatus. Many 
social movements lost much of their autonomy to challenge and criticize 
the MAS government for fear that they would lose state support, access 
to resources, and be labelled as the opposition and against the ‘process 
of change’.  
The commodities boom increased the fiscal capacity of the state as 
extractivist rents are distributed to the poor through cash transfers and 
state-led projects. What has transpired, however, is a high degree of po-
litical clientelism as state revenues are transferred to regions and their 
movement’s leaders in exchange for political support. President Morales 
has explicitly warned the general public that if they do not vote for the 
MAS representative in municipal or departmental election, they will not 
receive support from the state.1 As commodity prices and extractive-
based revenues fall, the MAS increases extractivist expansion into fron-
tiers – for lithium, natural gas, minerals and agro-commodities. Extrac-
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tivist rents and the increased accumulation of capital are necessary for 
the MAS’ political legitimacy. Yet, these dual functions of the capitalist 
state contradict in their current form as the state’s model of extractivismo 
has failed to transform the unequal socio-economic structures of pro-
duction, distribution, consumption and accumulation and maintained an 
economy based on primary product exports controlled by market oli-
gopolies. But while the state’s legitimacy has been compromised for its 
extractive over-reach in hydrocarbon and mining sectors (Pueblo 2016), 
including the infamous TIPNIS conflict, this has not been the case in 
terms of the development and expansion of the soy complex as a type of 
agrarian extractivism. 
This study has provided a critical analysis, grounded in agrarian politi-
cal economy, into how and the extent to which the development and 
expansion of the agro-industrial soy complex is transforming agrarian 
social relations in Bolivia’s eastern lowlands and the changing state-
society-relations associated with these processes. Forms of exclusion, 
mechanisms of control and value appropriation, and the extractive dy-
namics of the soy complex have been revealed. The politics of control 
has helped us understand the role and nature of the state and the rela-
tions among classes in society. This critique is written with a sense of 
urgency as these processes of agrarian change continue to unfold and 
threaten the rural majority. Despite the unpromising trajectories alluded 
to throughout this study, such directions of change in no way represent 
predetermined outcomes. Actors from both the state and society are able 
to effect change and pursue a pathway away from extractivismo and to-
wards food sovereignty and Vivir Bien. This study hopes to contribute to 
efforts towards that change. 
Note 
 
1 In a national television broadcast on Gigavision, President Morales stated the 
following: ‘I just want to tell our grandparents and future generations: how I can 
work with the city of El Alto with people from the ‘right’? I'm not going to work 
(with these people), brothers. If you want more work there this (MAS candidate) 
Edgar Patana, if they want more work there is (MAS candidate) Felipa Huanca. 
Make a reflection, depends on you.’ (Chuquimia, 2015, author’s translation). 
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 Appendix: Key Informant Interviews 
 
 
Name Description Location Land (hectares)  
Federici Santos Researcher, Embrapa Cecat 
Brasilia, 
Brazil 
		
Francisco 
Reifschneider 
Researcher, Embrapa 
Cecat 
Brasilia, 
Brazil 
 
Paulo Duarte MKT Place Research Secretary, EMBRAPA 
Brasilia, 
Brazil 
		
Rui Samarcos 
Lora 
Advisor, Office for 
International Affairs, 
Ministry of Agriculture, 
Livestock and Food 
Supply (MAPA) 
Brasilia, 
Brazil 
 
Luis Job 
Public Administrator, 
Secretary for Agroenergy 
Production, Department 
for sugarcane and 
agroenergy, MAPA 
Brasilia, 
Brazil 
		
Joao Parkinson 
Castro 
Minister of Economic 
Affairs in South 
America, Itamarity, 
Ministry of Foreign 
Affairs 
Brasilia, 
Brazil 
 
Wolney Matos 
de Andrade 
Agência Brasileira de 
Cooperação (ABC) 
Brasilia, 
Brazil 
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Rita Zanotto 
Regional Secretary, La 
Via Campesina-
Coordinadora 
Latinoamericana de 
Organizaciones del 
Campo (LVC-CLOC) 
Brasilia, 
Brazil 
 
Alexandre 
Conceição Coordinator, MST Brazil 
Brasilia, 
Brazil 
		
Leonardo 
Batista 
Ministry of Agrarian 
Development (MDA) 
Brasilia, 
Brazil 
 
Isidoro 
Barrientos 
Flores 
President, ACIPAC 
Cuatro 
Cañadas, 
Bolivia 
		
Gerson 
Rodriguez 
Ejecutivo Federacion 
Sindical de Comunidades 
Interculturales de 
Productores 
Agropecuarios Cuatro 
Cañadas 
Cuatro 
Cañadas, 
Bolivia 
 
Dominga 
Fernández M. 
Mayor of Cuatro 
Cañadas, agronomist, 
medium-scale soy 
producer (120 ha) 
Cuatro 
Cañadas, 
Bolivia 
  
Modesto Cruz 
Former sub-Mayor of 
Cuatro Cañadas, 
smallholder 
Cuatro 
Cañadas, 
Bolivia  
Andres 
Chuviru 
Community Leader, 
smallholder 
cuatro 
Cañadas, 
Bolivia 
  
Rosa Vargas 
Executive, Federacion 
de Mujeres 
Interculturales 
Productores 
Agropecuarios Cuatro 
Cañadas 
Cuatro 
Cañadas, 
Bolivia  
Celso Molle Smallholder Cuatro 
Cañadas, 
35 
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Bolivia 
Damian Barga 
Community leader 
(OTB) of San Miguel de 
los Angeles, smallholder 
Cuatro 
Cañadas, 
Bolivia 
25 
Julio Lira and 
Lothilda 
Moreno 
Smallholders 
Cuatro 
Cañadas, 
Bolivia 
38 
Betty Rueda 
and Benigno 
Duran Vejar 
Smallholders 
Naciones 
Unidas, 
Cuatro 
Cañadas 
18 
Daniel Bejar 
Former President of the 
Junta Escolar, 
Community Leader and 
carpenter 
Naciones 
Unidas, 
Cuatro 
Cañadas 
 
Celso 
Sombrana 
Former OTB, 
smallholder 
Naciones 
Unidas, 
Cuatro 
Cañadas 
47 
Alberto Castro 
Veterinarian and 
Agricultural Engineer at 
the Centro Educativo 
Alternativa 
Nuevo 
Palmar, 
Cuatro 
Cañadas 
		
Andres Vera 
Garcia Medium-scale producer 
Cuatro 
Cañadas, 
Bolivia 
120+50 
(rent) 
Claudio Batista 
Vega 
Brazilian medium-scale 
producer 
Cuatro 
Cañadas, 
Bolivia 
430+270 
(rent) 
Paulino 
Sanchez 
Smallholder, Community 
Leader 
Nuevo 
Palmar, 
Cuatro 
Cañadas 
50+250 
(rent) 
Julio 
Rodriguez 
Smallholder, Community 
Leader 
Nuevo 
Palmar, 
Cuatro 
50 
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Cañadas 
Placido 
Canabri 
Mumani 
Medium-scale producer 
Naciones 
Unidas, 
Cuatro 
Cañadas 
500 
Iglenio Klaus Brazilian large-scale producer San Julián 1400 
Abrahm Rema Mennonite, smallholder Colonia Valle Esperanza 50 
Herman Santi 
Martinez 
Manager of Silos for 
DESA 
Cuatro 
Cañadas, 
Bolivia 
20000 
(DESA) 
Waldemar 
Rojas 
Lawyer, medium-scale 
producer 
Cuatro 
Cañadas, 
Bolivia 
520 
Anonymous Smallholder La Brecha, San Julián 45 
Virginia 
Rodriguez Smallholder 
Nucleo 66, 
San Julián 50 
Anonymous Medium-scale producer San Julián 80 
Freddy 
Chacong Horm 
Farm Manager for 
Large-scale landowner 
Cuatro 
Cañadas, 
Bolivia 
1040 
Señora Julia Labourer for Mennonites 
Cuatro 
Cañadas, 
Bolivia 
0 
Señora 
Madelaine 
Caretaker, Labourer for 
Mennonites 
Cuatro 
Cañadas, 
Bolivia 
0 
Señor Edwin 
Construction worker, 
seasonal wage labourer 
for RICO, FINO, 
Gravetal 
Cuatro 
Cañadas, 
Bolivia 
0 
Señora Dora Labourer for Mennonites 
Cuatro 
Cañadas, 
0 
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Bolivia 
Estevan Labourer for Mennonites 
Cuatro 
Cañadas, 
Bolivia 
0 
Rossmary   Smallholder 
Cuatro 
Cañadas, 
Bolivia 
50 
Damian 
Sembrana 
Flores 
Smallholder 
Nuevo 
Palmar, 
Cuatro 
Cañadas 
50 
Anthony Student, labourer for Mennonites 
Cuatro 
Cañadas, 
Bolivia 
0 
Lucio 
Quinteros Medium-scale producer 
Cuatro 
Cañadas, 
Bolivia 
300 
Jacob Mennonite, smallholder 
Nueva 
Estrella, 
Cuatro 
Cañadas 
50 
William Farm Manager for medium-scale landowner 
Cuatro 
Cañadas, 
Bolivia 
450 
Olver Brazilian medium-scale producer 
Cuatro 
Cañadas, 
Bolivia 
100 
Señora Choque Medium-scale producer; Small shop owner 
Cuatro 
Cañadas, 
Bolivia 
100 
Leonardo 
Barrientos 
Manager of ACIPAC 
and smallholder 
Cuatro 
Cañadas, 
Bolivia 
43 
Mario Lopez Smallholder Nucleo 24, San Julián 50 
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Anastacio 
Ribeira and 
Leonila Cruz 
Smallholders Nucleo 24, San Julián 49 
Alejandro 
Santos Smallholder 
Nucleo 24, 
San Julián 50 
Gustino 
Camino Smallholder 
Nucleo 11, 
San Julián 43 
Victor Smallholder 
Puerto Rico, 
Cuatro 
Cañadas 
39 
Jacinto Sequli Smallholder Nucleo 21, San Julián 50 
Abrahm Fehr Leader of the Mennonite Colony Valle Esperanza 
Valle 
Esperanza, 
Cuatro 
Cañadas 
50 
Demetrio 
Perez President, ANAPO 
Santa Cruz, 
Bolivia 
 
Fanny Pisaro 
President of the 
Women's Organization 
of San Miguel de los 
Angeles, leader of 
chickin coup project 
CRIOLLA 
Cuatro 
Cañadas, 
Bolivia 
		
Fernando   Adminstrator, ACIPAC 
Cuatro 
Cañadas, 
Bolivia 
 
Alfredo 
Armellon 
Secretary of 'Vivir Bien', 
Youth Patriot 
Organization of Cuatro 
Cañadas (JPCC) 
Cuatro 
Cañadas, 
Bolivia 
		
Carlos 
Larrazabal 
Antezana 
General Manager, 
Bolivia-Brazil National 
Chamber of Commerce 
(CAMBOBRA) 
La Paz 
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Freddy 
Gonzales 
Project Manager for 
Financial Services, 
Ministry of Rural and 
Land Development 
La Paz 
		
Amilcen 
Mamani 
Director of Land, Vice 
Ministry of Land La Paz 
 
Emma 
Fraudental 
Accountant for ACIPA-
SJ San Julián 
		
Rodolfo 
Machaca 
General Secretary for 
CSUTCB La Paz 
 
Freddy Aldana 
Manager of risk, natural 
disasters for the 
Municipality of San 
Julián 
San Julián 
		
Varinia Magne 
Technical Engineer for 
Classification and 
Analysis, EMAPA 
Cuatro 
Cañadas, 
Bolivia 
 
Juan de Dios 
Fernandez 
General Secretary for 
INRA La Paz 
		
Anonymous President of APPAO San Julián  
Maximo 
Huaylla 
Director of Economic 
Development, 
Municipality of San 
Julián 
San Julián 
		
Roberto 
Churata 
Senior Official, Rural 
Development 
Consultant, Founder of 
CAPPO 
San Julián 
 
Anonymous Private Distributor of agro-inputs San Julián 
		
Ronal Escalera Agricultural Engineer, ANAPO San Julián 
 
Francisco Ortiz 
Director of Economic 
and Productive 
Development, 
Municipality of Cuatro 
Cuatro 
Cañadas, 
Bolivia 
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Cañadas 
Alcides Vadillo 
Regional Director, 
Fundación TIERRA; 
former National 
Director of INRA 
Santa Cruz, 
Bolivia 
 
Fernando 
Morales 
Agricultural engineer, 
CIAT 
Santa Cruz, 
Bolivia 
		
Eudal Rivera Agro-engineer for Agro Tierra 
Cuatro 
Cañadas, 
Bolivia 
 
Rossmary 
Jaldin FAO Bolivia 
Santa Cruz, 
Bolivia 
		
Ronal Quispe FaO Bolivia Santa Cruz, Bolivia 
 
Señora Norma Roadside fruit market owner 
Cuatro 
Cañadas, 
Bolivia 
		
Anonymous Truck Driver for DESA 
Cuatro 
Cañadas, 
Bolivia 
 
Anonymous FINO Manager 
Cuatro 
Cañadas, 
Bolivia 
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